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‘I am often told, “Don’t waste your time reading books, you’d be 
better off  reading the leading journals in your field.” Unfortunate-
ly, the authors of  this book have closely read some of  those arti-
cles: examining arguments, with simple principles and words, plus 
a touch of  irony – and a shared belief  in ideas and debates. The 
suspicions that we all have in a part of  our head appears in its ugly 
nakedness: what is this social game that authors in leading manage-
ment journals play? What grants them their truth effects? This is 
a book that one should read the day one enters the academic field; 
and then regularly thereafter so as not to forget.’ Professor Jean-
Luc Moriceau, Telecom Business School (France) 
The standards of  scholarship prevailing in the social sciences of  
management are indicative of  an atrophy of  the critical function. 
This results in a kind of  tribalized authoritarianism, a dispersed 
oligarchy of  the gatekeepers in which the congeniality of  ideas and 
findings with their own have replaced judgments based on the qual-
ity of  argument and evidence. The authors in this volume turn to 
the practice of  practical criticism to destabilize authority in the so-
cial sciences of  management, and to assert that it must be possible 
for criticism of  scholarly outputs – particularly those of  established 
authority-figures – to be heard and debated.
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  1 
Introduction 
Peter Armstrong and Geoff Lightfoot 
The papers collected in this volume are from the Second Conference of 
Practical Criticism in the Managerial Social Sciences with the exception 
of Armstrong’s which is a hold-over from the First Conference. The 
conferences were launched in 2007 out of a sense that the standards of 
scholarship prevailing in the social sciences of management were 
indicative of an atrophy of the critical function – ironically so in the 
case of those areas of study which claimed to be critical. This, it was 
observed, had resulted not in state of intellectual anomie, as might have 
been expected, but in a kind of tribalized authoritarianism, a dispersed 
oligarchy of the gatekeepers in which the congeniality of ideas and 
findings with their own had replaced judgments based on the quality of 
argument and evidence. At the same time it was recognised that to 
begin with a declaration of what standards might be appropriate, as has 
been attempted by Pfeffer (1993) in the USA and Hodgkinson, Herriot 
and Anderson (2001) in the UK, would itself be inappropriate in a 
discipline whose strength is precisely a plurality of approach and 
method. Accordingly inspiration was sought in the field of literary 
criticism, a field in which judgments of quality face broadly similar 
problems. 
In 1919, Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch, head of Cambridge University’s 
English Department, asked I. A. Richards to prepare a course with the 
brief that it should enable the students to turn out a passable book 
review. Richards’ response was both logical and straightforward, at least 
in principle. His premise was that the students would best learn how to 
form interpretations and judgments of a text which were simultaneously 
their own and publicly justifiable, by first doing it and then submitting 
their efforts to the comments of the group. Accordingly they were 
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asked to prepare critical assessments of anonymized excerpts which 
were then circulated for group discussion, the ground rules of which 
stipulated that all statement about a text had to be justifiable by 
reference to that text. The course was called ‘Practical Criticism’ and it 
proved both popular and immensely influential. The story of how it 
became the principle intellectual tool of ‘Cambridge English’ through 
the agency of Richards’ student, F.R. Leavis, has been outlined in the 
introduction to the collection of papers from the First Conference 
(Armstrong and Lilley, 2008). 
The interest of this approach (as distinct from certain aspects of the 
later practice of both Richards and Leavis) is that the interpolation of 
group discussion into a process of trial and error allowed for the 
emergence of group standards of criticism without attempting to 
legislate in advance what these should be and without, even, articulating 
them as a set of principles. In miniaturized form, the example of 
Richard’s classes suggests a non-authoritarian model of how norms of 
scholarship might develop in other communities through a process 
analogous to Practical Criticism, namely group discussion of close 
readings of particular pieces of work, paying particular attention to their 
arguments and recourse to evidence. The model also clarifies the 
conditions needed for such norms to emerge: that it must be possible 
for criticism of scholarly outputs – particularly those of established 
authority-figures to be heard and debated. Whilst not entirely absent, 
such conditions are not presently widespread in the managerial social 
sciences and it was the intention that the Conferences of Practical 
Criticism should provide for them. 
It was important to Richards’ pedagogy that the texts distributed to 
the student were anonymized. That way, the students were prevented 
from recycling received judgments or, more insidiously, from projecting 
into a text those experiences which they were supposed to discover. In 
academic fields of study we are not so well served. Though the 
refereeing process is anonymous – in theory at least – all other readings 
of a text are exposed to the full battery of reputational effects: author, 
co-authors, institutional affiliation, and, as the title of this volume 
indicates, the standing of the journal in which it appears. Separable only 
in principle, these indices of status interact in a vicious circle of 
inclusion and exclusion. As MacDonald and Kam (2007) have pointed 
out, the status of ‘leading journal’ rests on a circularity: ‘top’ academics 
from ‘top’ institutions publish in ‘top’ journals, while those journals 
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establish their ‘top’ ratings by having ‘top’ academics from ‘top’ 
institutions publish in them. Meanwhile the pressures on junior staff to 
produce some ‘objective’ indicator of their suitability for employment or 
promotion by publishing in prestigious journals leads them to pay 
particular attention to the work of their editorial boards, thereby adding 
to the citation counts which are the very essences of top-ness. A 
commonplace spectacle, particularly at US conference, is the post-
session crowd of anxious young people dancing attendance on an 
important editor for all the world like flies around a cow-pat. One has 
only to encounter a few instances of this kind of low-level self-
abasement to realize that the destabilization of academic authority is an 
urgent moral need as well as an intellectual one. 
Geoff Lightfoot’s contribution to this project of emancipation 
examines a paper which was published in the prestigious Journal of 
Financial Economics by one of its associate editors. DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo claim that their study of the media reportage of a takeover in 
the Californian lumber industry bears out a theory of the press 
developed by one of the founding editors of the journal in question. 
According to Michael Jensen, the popular press operates in a market for 
ideas which is defined by a widespread inability to tolerate ambiguity. It 
therefore reports financial affairs as a narrative of black-and-white 
confrontation between the ‘good’ of public interest and an ‘evil’ of 
financial markets. As Lightfoot reveals, the arguments which led Jensen 
to this philosophical anthropology of mass stupidity read like something 
a satirist would reject as lacking that indispensable element of 
believability. In real life, however – if one can use such a term of the 
Journal of Financial Economics – the endorsement of Jensen’s thinking 
through the medium of an empirical study seems to be the only 
reasonable explanation of the publication of the De Angelos’ paper, 
since this is able to achieve its forced marriage of hard science and soft 
theory only through a doubtful presentation of statistical data and a 
thoroughly one-sided account of the press reports in question. 
Norman Jackson and Pippa Carter connect their contribution to I.A. 
Richards’ observation that the antidote to the hegemony of received 
ideas is the habit of close and critical scrutiny of the knowledge-claims 
upon which they rest. The subject of their examination is one of the ur-
texts of a belief which is now lodged deep in the disciplinary 
unconscious of managerial sociology: that people, or more precisely, 
workers, have fundamental psychological needs which can only be 
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satisfied by labour. During the early 1930s, Marienthal, a small town in 
Austria, was experiencing widespread and semi-permanent 
unemployment. The influential sociologists Marie Jahoda, Paul 
Lazarsfeld and Hans Zeisel used this as a natural experiment in the 
social psychology of work deprivation. Jackson and Carter’s detailed re-
reading of their text reveals that this interpretation was partly the 
product of a middle-class incomprehension of a working-class way of 
life and partly the result of projecting into their observations a 
preconceived notion of how the workless should behave. The study 
could, perhaps, be read as an invitation to perform similar close reading 
analyses of other samples of managerial sociology. 
Nick Butler’s thoughtful examination of Edgar Schein’s process 
consultation suggests yet another direction in which the practical 
criticism of managerial writings might develop – that of projecting 
forward the political and organizational implications of managerial 
thinking. Employing Armstrong’s ideas on the connection between the 
20th century ascendancy of managerial capitalism and the largely 
unexamined notion that management consists of a set of context-
independent organizational and interpersonal skills, he argues that 
Edgar Schein’s process consultation proposes a similar abstraction of 
consultancy from the knowledge of particular managerial or technical 
processes. Whilst the insistence that interpersonal process is 
fundamental to management succeeds in representing Schein’s brand of 
consultancy as dealing with the core of management, and particularly so 
at the senior levels, Schein’s notion that management itself is a species 
of consultancy simultaneously threatens to absorb consultancy back 
into management itself. One is left to wonder what the future holds for 
a corporate economy dominated by ideas of management and 
consultancy which are sublimated to this extent. 
Doyen of the Academy of Management and consultant to some of 
the world’s major corporations, Karl Weick holds that individuals are 
incapable of constructive and co-ordinated action in the face of crisis in 
the absence of the wisdom and sense-making which it is the mission 
and prerogative of managerial leadership to supply. A staple of 
leadership theory, Weick’s best-known exposition of this view is his re-
analysis of Maclean’s account of the Mann Gulch disaster, a forest fire 
in which thirteen young fire-fighters lost their lives. Thomas Basbøll’s 
careful forensic analysis of this celebrated exercise in armchair 
ethnography shows that Weick’s reading of this disaster as a failure of 
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leadership, and specifically of its sense-making role, is actually a 
projection of Weick’s own presuppositions into Maclean’s account. A 
necessary consequence of such a re-writing of the record is to throw the 
blame for the deaths of the firemen onto their team leader. Basbøll’s 
tone never varies from that of the patient and meticulous scholar but 
his anger at this aspect of Weick’s re-interpretation is palpable. 
The Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximizing Model (REMM) of human 
behaviour originating in the Rochester School of Finance has been 
hugely influential amongst those inclined by temperament or 
institutional affiliation to ditch the socio-political crap in favour of a 
‘hard science’ approach to management and organizations. Jeroen 
Veldman uses a close reading of Jensen and Meckling’s would-be 
definitive account of The Nature of Man to explore its implications for 
the ontology and politics of organization. He finds the approach 
permeated by an intellectually threadbare yet dogmatic methodological 
individualism which can only depict organizations as ‘purely conceptual 
artefacts’, a convenient way of describing networks of freely-negotiated 
contracts between autonomous and initially equal individuals. This, as 
Veldman points out, creates difficulties for the REMM model in 
theorizing those contractual relationships in which organizations figure 
as separate legal entities. The difficulty is ‘overcome’ – to the 
satisfaction of REMM theorists at least - by abstracting the REMM 
model to a level which encompasses both the individual human being 
and the ‘separate legal entity’ of the firm, whilst simultaneously insisting 
that the latter is a ‘purely conceptual’ entity. This exercise in 
doublethink, Veldman concludes, enables Jensen and Meckling ‘s 
‘science of organizations’ to suppress the contradiction involved in 
arguing against state regulation of the corporation on the ground of 
liberal individualism. 
It has been said of the best literary criticism that it makes the reader 
want to return to its subject. The evident delight with which Alan 
McKinley explores speech act theory as it is expounded in the writings 
of J.L Austin and Judith Butler is a case in point. McKinley depicts 
speech act theory as a body of thought in motion. Where there is a 
certain stasis implicit in Austin’s posit of a community of speech which 
understands certain utterances in a performative sense, Butler, 
approaching Austin through Derrida and being more concerned to 
explore the possibilities of subverting gender as performance, 
emphasizes the potential instabilities of performativity. Since 
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management as a practice depends heavily on performative utterances, 
McKinley suggest that its critical study will need to make a serious 
engagement with speech act theory at some point. He does, however, 
caution against taking a recent intervention by Spicer, Alvesson and 
Kärreman (2009) as indicative of its potential. 
In his discussion of the international circulation of ideas, Bourdieu 
(1999: 222) remarked that the importation of ideas from one culture 
into another frequently has the effect of stripping them of their context 
of debate. It is a remark which applies both directly and by analogy to 
the importations of literary theory into management and organizational 
studies (MOS) discussed by Christina Volkmann and Christian De 
Cock: directly inasmuch as the theories in question were first developed 
in languages other than English and by analogy inasmuch as literary 
theory is a subculture – perhaps many subcultures – differing in its 
ontology, epistemology and norms of scholarship from those of MOS. 
Most importantly, argue Volkmann and De Cock, literary theory to its 
practitioners is not a fixed entity in which there exist established truths 
but a conversation structured around a variety of approaches. Its 
importation into MOS however, has so far taken the form of summary 
statements of the key ideas of particular literary theorists as if these 
constituted expert testimony. The irony is that the rationale offered for 
the importation of literary theory into MOS in the first place was 
precisely to open up new perspectives. 
Peter Armstrong’s contribution, finally, presents us with the familiar 
and unedifying spectacle of an author complaining that he has been 
traduced. For those who can be bothered with this kind of thing, the 
occasion is Hugh Willmott’s development of a theory of managerial 
agency which takes due account of the social relations of production (as 
he says ‘bourgeois analysis’ does not) whilst simultaneously avoiding the 
reduction of human agency to personifications of economic categories 
(as he thinks Armstrong does). Willmott’s solution (so says Armstrong) 
is to allow social structures into his theory only as they are instantiated 
and, once instantiated, to influence the social action through which they 
are instantiated only through the subjectivities of the actors who are 
doing the instantiating. Specifically and notwithstanding the structural 
pressures to concentrate on the job in hand, Willmott thinks that most 
managers are more interested in their own subjectivities than they are in 
profit, that this makes a difference to what they do and hence, by 
changing the manner of their instantiation, to the capitalist social 
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relations of production. He also believes that a number of the major 
industrial ethnographies of the 20th century demonstrate that this is the 
case – or rather, that they would have done so had their authors paid 
sufficient attention to subjectivities. Armstrong says that Willmott’s re-
readings are pure conjecture and that his alternative to bourgeois 
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Towards a Clinical Study of Finance: 
The DeAngelos and the Redwoods 
Geoff Lightfoot 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I want to explore an example of how ‘theory’ is 
established and promulgated within the academic discipline of finance. 
It takes the example of a paper published in a leading journal which 
builds on theory developed by Michael Jensen, one of the leading and 
most cited figures within the field. 
A couple of years ago, a colleague mentioned that he had sent a 
paper to The Journal of Financial Economics – one of the top three ranked 
journals in the field of finance – for which he had paid a submission fee 
of $500. Luckily, however, his paper was returned by the editor within a 
quarter of an hour – deemed unsuitable – and he only had to pay $100 
for this privilege. He was furious because his paper had won a prize at a 
prestigious conference and he didn’t feel that it could have been 
properly read in the time twixt receipt and return. I was more curious 
about the idea of submission fees. When publishing in a journal, it’s 
accepted that you do all the work and the publisher takes all the money 
(and copyright) for the uncertain status benefits that might accrue to 
you. Paying hard cash to be mugged in this way seemed a further 
affront.  
Happily the journal is open about its submission details. Even 
proud, perhaps, for they publish a graph (see below) that sets fees 





Figure 1: JFE Submissions & Real Submission Fees1 
 
The editor of the journal suggests that this demonstrates the effective 
way in which increasing fees has acted to cap the number of 
submissions.2 A cynic may well suggest that the graph indicates that the 
more you charge, the longer the queue. But it is not entirely clear what 
service you might expect for your payment - the editor, together with 
editors from two other leading finance journals, line up to castigate 
those whose behaviour they ‘feel is counterproductive to the collegial 
process of producing high quality academic journals’, ‘undervalue[s] the 
services they receive’ by ‘submit[ting] papers to journals at a relatively 
early stage of production in the hope that “the referee will help me 
figure out how to revise it to make it publishable.” In effect, by paying a 
submission fee the author is buying very cheap consulting advice on 
how to write the paper.’ (Green, O’Hara and Schwert, undated).3 If only 
it were so, as my colleague could attest.  
Intrigued, I started to pay more attention to the journal. I had read 
the occasional article from it over the years but never subscribed, nor 
really considered who published what in it. Helpfully, the journal does 
publish a list of its most published authors. It also publishes a list of its 
Towards a Clinical Study of Finance 
 11 
advisory and associate editors, which for ease of reference, I have 
combined into one table.4 
 
Rank Author  Papers/ CoAuthor5 
Papers/ 
Author Editorial Connection  
1 Fama E.F.  12.00  18  Advisory  
2 Stulz R.M.  10.42  21  Advisory  
3 Stambaugh  R.F.  8.33  12  Previous Associate  
5  French K.R.  7.33  13  Advisory  
6 Schwert G.W.  7.33  10  Editor  
4 DeAngelo H.  7.33  17  Associate  
7 Roll R.  7.00  10  Previous Associate 
8 Smith C.W.  6.50  11  Advisory  
9 Ruback R.S.  5.83  8  Previous Editor  
10 Harvey C.R.  5.75  11  Previous Associate  
 Table 1: JFE Most published authors and their editorial affiliation.6 
 
To get more of a handle on how the journal worked, I needed to look at 
the work of one of these authors in more detail. But whose? Well, a 
quick skim through the home pages of the authors in this table revealed 
that out of his last 12 publications, Harry DeAngelo had 11 of them 
printed in The Journal of Financial Economics.7 Such symbiosis surely 
deserves study and perhaps by examining his work I might get more of 
an understanding of what makes a paper worthy of a top-ranked finance 
journal. 
In this chapter, I want to concentrate on the paper published in 
1998 (with Linda DeAngelo), ‘Ancient Redwoods and the Politics of 
Finance: The Hostile Takeover of the Pacific Lumber Company’.8 
Although my interest was piqued by the ‘Politics of Finance’ in the title, 
it is perhaps timely to revisit this article as Pacific Lumber, the focus of 
the DeAngelos’ tale, filed for bankruptcy in January 2007. Pacific 
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Lumber, a northern Californian timber company, was taken over by 
MAXXAM Inc. in 1986, initially financed through junk-bonds via 
Drexel Burnham Lambert. Following the takeover, MAXXAM 
increased the rate at which timber was harvested, leading to heightened 
conflict with environmental groups and, apparently, stoking media 
interest. The DeAngelos look at media reporting of the case and they 
suggest that this was a fine example of how a hostile and misguided 
press was responsible for antipathy to Wall Street and takeovers at that 
time. 
The Birth of the Clinic 
The DeAngelos article is described as a ‘clinical study’, a slightly unusual 
terminology in the social sciences. The remit for what might be one of 
these rare beasts is first set out by the editorial board of JFE in Jensen et 
al. (1989: 3): 
The objective of this section is to provide a high-quality professional 
outlet for scholarly studies of specific cases, events, practices, and 
specialized applications. By supplying insights about the world, 
challenging accepted theory, and using unique sources of data, clinical 
studies stand on their own as an important medium of research. Like 
the medical literature from which the term ‘clinical’ is borrowed, these 
articles will frequently deal with individual situations or small numbers 
of cases of special interest. 
Essentially, then, we are talking about case studies. Since case studies 
have a long history in the social sciences, with research methods and 
techniques vigorously discussed, how do the editors of JFE propose to 
make use of this expertise. Well, by ignoring it and starting from 
scratch, effectively: 
There is currently no standard or accepted model for clinical financial 
papers. We will, over time, uncover the principles that ensure the 
integrity and reliability of these efforts. (1989: 6) 
Of course, such issues still trouble case study research beyond finance, 
but why should there be such antipathy towards learning from other 
disciplines. Partly, the answer comes from the wish of finance 
academics (and colleagues from economic faculties) to be seen as 
scientists – and case studies have no place in science as they conceive of 
it. This view still predominates through a slightly more realistic 
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commentary from 12 years later, when Tufano (2001) looks back at the 
evolution of the clinical study: ‘Throughout history, scientists and 
historians of science have debated about how ‘science’ should be and is 
carried out’ (2001: 182). Rather alarmingly, he continues, ‘JFE readers 
perhaps have little patience for enduring long methodological debates’, 
and thus unsurprisingly avoids directly addressing the ontological and 
epistemological issues that case study research might raise as part of a 
discipline devoutly eschewing inductive analysis. However, he does 
point out that such research does demand consideration of ‘how we 
advance ideas’ (2001: 182) and suggests that clinical studies may have 
four roles: developing theory; testing theory; applying ‘useful’ theory; 
and communicating theory. Which might best fit the DeAngelos’ work? 
They introduce the paper by suggesting that:  
[Pacific Lumber…] is therefore an important case to study to 
understand the process through which the general public came to hold 
such negative views of Wall Street in the wake of the 1980s takeover 
wave (see e.g., Jensen, 1991, 1993). (1998: 5) 
They conclude by suggesting that: 
The media treatment of the PL case closely fits the pattern predicted by 
Jensen (1979), who argues that market demand induces the media to 
publish entertaining stories that portray dramatic conflicts as 
confrontations of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ personalities. (1998: 30). 
In the absence of developing, testing or applying theory according to 
the rules outlined by Tufano, communicating theory seems to be the 
most likely. Tufano suggests that this might involve, ‘communicat[ing] 
knowledge to theorists, empiricists, and educators, providing them with 
carefully documented descriptions of behaviors and innovations that 
will influence the way they write theory, construct tests, or teach classes’ 
(Tufano, 2001: 183-4), and a brief trawl through Google shows that, 
although the paper may not be widely cited, it appears on the syllabi of 
courses at both UCLA and DuPaul universities. But this leads to a 
further question: what theory is being communicated? 
Toward a Theory of the Press 
It is to Jensen’s paper that we turn, specifically the 1979 paper cited, 
‘Toward a Theory of the Press’. There are early indications that we may 
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be in for a wild ride as we press toward this elusive theory. Jensen 
warms up to his theme with a dictionary quotation: 
Webster’s defines romantic as 
1: consisting of or resembling a romance 2: having no basis in fact: 
imaginary 3: impractical in conception or plan: visionary 4: marked by 
the imagination or emotional appeal of the heroic, adventurous, remote, 
mysterious or idealized… 
Surely no better word can be found to describe the content of the press. 
(Jensen, 1979: 1) 
I imagine Jensen is alluding to definitions 2 and 4, here, although this 
might have no basis in fact. He certainly seems very sceptical of the 
press but we must hope such an influential author and scientist rises 
above such simple prejudice to provide solid evidence. Unfortunately, it 
doesn’t seem that it is going to be that straightforward as Jensen instead 
includes, approvingly, substantial chunks from articles by H. L. 
Mencken – a newspaperman (sic) and author. In these pieces Mencken 
does not seem enamoured of his trade: 
The average American newspaper, especially of the so-called better sort, 
has the intelligence of a Baptist evangelist, the courage of a rat, the 
fairness of a Prohibitionist boob-bumper, the information of a high-
school janitor, the taste of a designer of celluloid valentines, and the 
honor of a police-station lawyer. (Mencken, 1920 in Jensen, 1979: 1) 
Well, Mencken does have an interestingly cynical take, for sure. And 
I’ve no complaints with polemical attacks on the press in general but 
there seems to be an odd move in that all the work by other journalists 
is imaginary, whereas somehow Mencken’s account is factual. Jensen is 
surprisingly quiet on the rationale for this distinction. But this is mere 
scene setting for the key question for Jensen: ‘Why is it that the public 
at large and the press that reflects its views are so basically antagonistic 
toward markets in general?’ (1979: 10) Again, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
there is no evidence presented that this is so and lesser mortals might 
believe that, indeed, the press is generally extremely sympathetic to 
markets and business – especially compared to, say, command 
economies and trade unions. Still, no matter the implausibility of the 
premise and the lack of evidence, Jensen is keen to run with it as 
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incontrovertible and therefore seeks roots for this supposed bias. He 
finds it within the family: 
[P]eople seem to carry over their training from the home, supported 
and formalized in most religious traditions, and the Golden Rule, to the 
outside world. They apparently find it difficult to see that the informal, 
long-run, non-quid pro quo exchange mechanism appropriate to the 
family environment is simply an inefficient mechanism for organizing 
exchanges when the frequency of contact is much lower and where the 
opportunity for symmetric provision of favors is nonexistent. (Jensen, 
1979: 13) 
Oikos, nomos and the economic? Let us see what is this exchange 
mechanism in the family that is so inappropriate. Jensen helps by 
detailing some of the calculus of his patrician home life: 
I consent to the wishes of my wife (for instance, by accompanying her 
to a movie or concert she wishes to attend) to make her happy and to 
maintain good relations – goodwill that I can draw upon the next time I 
unexpectedly bring home a colleague for dinner (or, worse yet, forget to 
come home for dinner). If I ignore her preferences too flagrantly, or 
she mine, the “exploited party” can retaliate in this game of life by 
voluntarily withholding future services or favors in many dimensions of 
the relationship. (Jensen, 1979: 11) 
Withholding future services and favours? Have we arrived at a theory of 
the press from Jensen being denied his Friday night rumpy-pumpy 
because he came home late from work? But that would be too facile: 
inappropriate service in the office also casts a long shadow: 
[T]hese considerations of exchange extend to the employer-employee 
relationship in the business world – for example, the executive and his 
secretary. (Jensen, 1979: 12) 
This non-quid pro quo long-run exchange relationship provides a 
refreshing antidote to the visions of the workplace one might encounter 
in Human Relations. But we need to make a couple more steps to draw to 
a complete theory: the first takes us from the family to the individual. 
We are confronted with the ‘fact’ that ‘people (especially those who are 
not members of the scientific community) have an enormous intolerance 
of ambiguity’ (Jensen, 1979: 6). At the same time, drawing upon Jensen 
and Meckling’s REMM (Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximizing Model of 
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human behaviour) in ‘The Nature of Man’ (see Veldman’s analysis in 
this volume) Jensen suggests that it is not in individuals’ interests to pay 
attention to politics and other matters of import. Instead, he suggests 
that his ‘study (sic) of the history of mankind – its religions, drama, 
literature, operas, and fairy tales’ demonstrate ‘that people like to have 
stories told and problems explained in the context of Good versus Evil’ 
(Jensen, 1979: 8). This plays out in financial reportage as a series of 
easily digestible stories of heroes and villains for the ambiguity-hating 
non-scientific public. Wall Street vs Main Street, with the financiers as 
the bad guys, obviously. And this still seems to be happening – even 
now people are blaming bankers for the recent financial mayhem.  
Now, it may simply be that I have missed a cunning joke (and not 
for the first time), for Jensen’s own tale seems rather thin on shades of 
grey. But if we bite our cheeks and assume that Jensen is playing it 
straight, what are we left with? We start with an odd perception as to 
how the world is, filter it through prejudice, leaven it with strange 
theoretical constructs and season with cod-scientism and sexism. Low 
on evidence, long on assertion, flitting weirdly between deductivist and 
inductivist arguments, it is a theory, albeit one so ludicrous that it seems 
incredible that any academic would take seriously.9 Why, then, have the 
DeAngelos? One clue is perhaps in the acknowledgements. 
We are also grateful to … especially Michael Jensen (the editor) for 
useful comments. (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1998: 31) 
The knot tying editors and contributors gets tighter – and we shall 
return to some of the implications of this later. But for now, let’s return 
to the DeAngelos’ paper now that we realised what ‘theory’ is being 
communicated and explore some of the inherent problems with case 
study research when the researcher enters the site with the theoretical 
frame already fixed.  
Getting Wood 
The DeAngelos contend that: 
The media universally blame MAXXAM’s junk bond-financed takeover 
for the threat to Headwaters Forest [a hitherto apparently unthreatened 
and untouched tract of Californian Redwood trees, some up to 2000 
years old], and the sheer number of seemingly independent stories 
offering essentially the same interpretation lends credence to this view. 
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The media tell a gripping tale of Wall Street greed versus the 
environment that pits an evil corporate raider against environmentalists 
and a paternalistic former management. The broad readership appeal of 
this story gave environmentalists a powerful case to mobilize public 
opinion in favor of preserving Headwaters Forest. Its apparent evidence 
of the destructive environmental impact of Wall Street greed prompted 
politicians to hold hearings that appealed to the environmentally 
conscious voter of the 1990s. (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1998: 4, 
emphasis added). 
Effectively, the argument rests upon media widely disseminating their 
‘misreading of economic facts’ (ibid.: 29) to the general public who, 
demanding simplistic morality tales, end up with ‘erroneous 
perceptions’ (ibid.). Thus, for the purposes of the argument here, we 
need to look both at the supposedly misread facts and the way in which 
the media supposedly promulgates them.  
The key mistakes made in the reporting are claimed to be that: 
! MAXXAM’s takeover didn’t cause the trees to be felled because; 
! There are economic reasons to harvest old-growth timber; and 
! They would have been felled anyway, just as they have been 
historically  
! Pacific Lumber before the takeover wasn’t; 
! A family firm; or 
! Well run  
! Raising profits, not paying off debt, was the reason for 
increasing production. 
That there are economic reasons to harvest old-growth timber would 
seem unremarkable, perhaps. After all, a single one of these Californian 
Redwoods was at the time valued at up to $100,000. But the DeAngelos 
seek to make a different point when investigating ‘the real economic 
threat’ (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1998: 13): ‘that profit-oriented 
owners have incentives to harvest old-growth redwoods and replace 
them with young trees that will generate a greater volume of salable 
wood product’ (ibid.: 19). They also provide a table, illustrating the 






Tree age  Average growth  
20-30  10.8 %  
30-40  6.5 %  
40-50  4.l %  
50-60  3.0%  
60-70  2.4 %  
70-80  1.9 %  
80-90  1.6 %  
90-100  1.3 %  
Old growth  Nil or negative  
Table 2: Average annual growth rate (%) 
of redwood tree volume at various ages. 
Reproduced from DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1998: 19). 
 
 
It is always useful to be suspicious when price, normally the means by 
which arguments in finance are settled, disappears in place of volume 
and long-term planning enters at the expense of short-term profit 
maximization. For not only is percentage added to existing volume 
misleading in itself, because of the size of existing trees (or existing 
volume per acre), but it is not just volume that counts, but quality of 
timber. And old growth timber is less knotty, finer-grained, more 
sought after and therefore substantially more expensive. And thus the 
obvious economic imperative – that there are always incentives to 
harvest old-growth timber, whether or not the site is replanted with 
what will become younger, faster-growing trees (as deforestation 
worldwide has historically shown) – slips away.  
The second point is related. The DeAngelos contend that all the 
virgin old-growth timber would have been felled at some point. 
Unrestricted and unregulated, I have little doubt that this would have 
happened, given the economic incentives. But such unmitigated 
freedom does not exist for logging in California, and the DeAngelos 
provide some rather murky illustrations to help them argue otherwise. 
The paper presents a table, part of which is reproduced below. 
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 Maintain Pacific 
Lumber’s pre-
takeover virgin 
forest harvest rate 
(1) 
Maintain long-run 
harvest rate from 
the formation of 
Pacific Lumber (2) 
Maintain long-run 
harvest rate from 





reduction in virgin 
forest inventory 
1200.0 acres per 
year 
1654.3 acres per 
year 
1225.4 acres per 
year 
Years until all 
virgin forests are 
logged if 
harvesting 
continues at given 
pre-takeover rate 
13.4 years 9.7 years 13.1 years 
Table 3: Estimated time until all of Pacific Lumber’s holdings of virgin forest 
are logged (from 1 January 1986). Reproduced from DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(1998: 15). 
 
Column (1) is taken from a single line taken from an internal memo 
from October 1985, presented at the Congressional Hearing on the 
takeover which said, ‘Presently we are cutting about 1,200 acres of 
virgin old-growth each year to meet the mill requirements’ (DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo, 1998: 15). Given the limited possibilities of assessing the 
context and accuracy of that memo, we shall let it stand. But the other 
two columns are more interesting, and a graphical representation of this 





Figure 2: Total acres of old-growth redwoods (rear) and acres of old growth 
protected in parks (front) at various dates from the pre-logging period through 
1993. From DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1998: 18). 
 
Now, this chart has dates at irregular intervals, which can be a mite 
confusing (as well as generally being considered bad practice). But when 
we also have the DeAngelos discussing the long-run logging rates as a 
linear progression it becomes even more misleading. By way of 
demonstration, I have taken (approximate) data values of non-park old-
growth redwood from the DeAngelos chart and plotted them against 
date, then let Excel draw a graph with these data points. This produces 
Figure 3, which shows massive deforestation post-war, and a reduction 
in felling rates since 1964. With the benefit of hindsight, we can add a 
further data point to illustrate this – the roughly 50,000 acres of old-
growth redwood currently remaining in private hands10 which produces 
Figure 5.  
Towards a Clinical Study of Finance 
 21 
 
Figure 3: Total acres of remaining old-growth redwoods, 1845-1993. Estimated 
from DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1998: 18). 
 
 
Figure 4: Total acres of remaining old-growth redwoods, 1845-2007. Estimated 
from DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1998: 18) and Redwood National Park.11 
 
This representation is crude, but it illustrates just how markedly 

















5 cover all old-growth in private hands, not just Pacific Lumber, but 
especially given the weight of Pacific Lumber’s holdings in the total, it is 
probably not too dissimilar to the pattern of their acreage. Table 6 
illustrates how the DeAngelos’ linear projection based on the long-run 
harvesting rate differs from the pattern derived from the data. But we 
shouldn’t be too unkind – if they’d merely extrapolated the trend from 
1944 to 1963, they could have pointed out that such a linear projection 
would show all old-growth had indeed already been felled by 1972.  
 
 
Figure 5: Total acres of remaining old-growth redwoods, 1845-1993, with ‘long-
run trend’ superimposed. Estimated from DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1998: 18) 
 
Their third point is undoubtedly correct: Pacific Lumber was not a 
‘family firm’ by any normal definition, but many media reports did 
consistently label it as such. The fourth: the question of whether it was 
‘well-run’ is more complex. For some, pointing out that the company 
failed to go bankrupt in the first 100 years of its life but did under the 
ownership of MAXXAM would be enough to suggest it was at least 
better run before. But that ignores the ‘advances’ made in modern 
finance theory which argues both that debt is a significant incentive and 
that bankruptcies offer opportunities. Given the difference between 
everyday perceptions of business that would see bankruptcy as evidence 
of mismanagement, we should not expect consensus on what defines 
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Certainly, some of the DeAngelos material seems to suggest a 
somewhat lackadaisical approach by managers: that MAXXAM became 
interested in a deal because shareholders more than readily subscribed 
to a share buyback offer and that Pacific Lumber’s own estimates of its 
assets were woefully inadequate, for example. Others are less 
convincing – that the share price that reached a high of $33-34 in 1981 
was in the low $20s in 1984 can at least partially be explained by the 
recession in 1981/2 during which timber prices first fell dramatically 
and then failed to recover. And others just reflect the hopeless divide 
between the perceptions of finance theorists and other commentators. 
Thus, although the DeAngelos are undoubtedly right when they say that 
increasing debt in exchange for equity will have significant tax benefits 
(the proceeds of which can be passed to shareholders) the alternative 
position – that this produces unnecessary risk – is not part of their 
discourse and thereby ignored. The surplus in the pension fund is 
treated as evidence of poor management rather than prudence while the 
paternal aspects of the firm, such as the company-owned town and all 
the amenities provided, are granted little purchase as they do not 
conform to the accepted wisdom within the discipline of finance that, 
following Friedman’s (1965; 1970) contentious claims, the only 
responsibility of company directors is to maximise returns to 
shareholders. I do not wish to claim here that one perception is right 
and the other wrong, but merely to point out that evidence of what 
constitutes a ‘well-run’ firm will differ considerably and cannot, as the 
DeAngelos attempt, be settled from a single paradigm.  
Similar differences arise when considering the environmental 
credentials of Pacific Lumber. The different media reports suggest that 
the company did avoid confrontation with environmental groups. That 
this was more about seeking a quiet life rather than any deep 
commitment to environmental principles seems a reasonable 
supposition and the DeAngelos do provide enough evidence to show 
that Pacific Lumber did what it thought it could easily get away with. 
Yet, when discussing this issue, the DeAngelos are not afraid to identify 
the villains of the piece. Thus, the environmentalists Earth First!’s 
‘methods include dramatic civil disobedience… neo-Luddite tactics 
such as sabotage of logging equipment and threats to spike trees with 
metal rods that seriously endanger timber workers. Earth First! activists 
illegally ‘explored’ PL’s property…’ (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1998: 4) 
I am not sure how ‘threats’ stack up, against, say, the bomb that was 
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attached to one environmentalists car or the death of another (which 
remain unmentioned in the DeAngelos’ account), but it is pleasing to 
see them trying to prove Jensen right by supplying a simplistic morality 
tale of ‘good’ (that untrammelled property rights are a universal good 
scarcely needs mentioning) and ‘evil’ for the environmental activists. 
Yet it is this selectivity that lies at the heart of the DeAngelos’ tale. 
Partly, this is reflected in the treatment of the fifth point above – 
that the increased cutting rate was caused by the need to pay off debt, 
rather than from the desire to increase profit. As the DeAngelos 
acknowledge, this partly arises from claims that MAXXAM themselves 
made – ‘likely they did so because the need to generate cash to meet 
debt obligation is an excusable motive to most people whereas the 
desire for greater profit is not’ (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1998: 23). 
Leaving aside that this suggests that the media didn’t demonise financiers 
wherever possible – all they would have had to do was merely report 
what the DeAngelos believe to be true – this scarcely seems to have 
been universally reported. Some accounts merely state that the junk 
bonds financed the takeover by the profit-oriented MAXXAM, others 
quote company officers’ rebuttals of such claims by ‘critics’. But 
discovering such alternate positions requires unpicking much of the 
DeAngelos’ presentation of their analysis and returning to the 
underlying sources. 
Unlikely Stories, Mostly 
The DeAngelos deploy an unusual approach to their presentation of 
data: 
To give readers a reasonably comprehensive yet parsimonious picture 
of the media version of the PL case, we next present it using direct 
quotations from the articles in the Appendix, i.e., using journalists’ own 
words. For simplicity of presentation, we omit quotation marks, 
although all passages are quoted verbatim. The number in brackets 
following the quote gives the Appendix location of the more complete 
abstract. We do not claim that the dramatization we next present 
characterizes the media treatment in every case, as one finds an 
occasional even-handed discussion of the necessity to trade off the 
interests of commercial timber firms and those of the public. Moreover, 
we quote the more colorful phrases from each article. (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 1998: 10-11) 
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It’s an interesting approach (and I don’t mean that in an entirely 
negative way). Forming a collage out of quotes from different sources 
is, in my view, a legitimate way of coherently presenting qualitative data 
and does provide the possibility (as in this case) of stitching together a 
readable story. However, the obvious danger is that each quote is ripped 
from its original context and applied in a different one. Possibly not a 
problem in some instances but one that should set off all kinds of 
alarms when you are attempting to illustrate widespread misreading. 
The let-out that the DeAngelos attempt ‘not… every case… occasional 
even-handed’ is rather inadequate, especially given their quantification 
elsewhere. And the selection can be eye-catching. Let’s have a close 
look at one of the sources cited from Time, 8th April 1991;12 since it is 
fairly short, I’ve reproduced it here in full.  
‘Debt-for-nature’ swaps are the method of the moment for well-heeled 
environmentalists wishing to put parts of the Third World off limits to 
development. If it works with debt-straitened countries, why not with 
similarly strapped companies? That’s the reasoning behind the latest 
swap plan, intended to protect a 2,900-acre redwood forest in Northern 
California’s Humboldt County. 
The main player is Maxxam, a Houston conglomerate that issued junk 
bonds in order to purchase the lumber firm that formerly owned the 
forest. Among the bond buyers: the infamous Columbia Savings & 
Loan of Beverly Hills, which was seized by the government in January. 
The seizure has left Uncle Sam holding Columbia’s share of the 
Maxxam bonds. Maxxam, left short of cash by the takeover, has 
increased the cutting and selling of the redwood timber, thus infuriating 
local conservationists. 
In an effort to protect the forest, California wants to buy from the 
Federal Government some $60 million of Maxxam bonds, hopefully at 
a discount. The state would then hand the bonds back to Maxxam, 
freeing the company from ever having to repay that debt. In return for 
the bonds and an undetermined additional payment, Maxxam would 
give the forest to the state. 
Happy ending: the Federal Government unloads some bonds, Maxxam 
gets rid of some debt, Californians get to keep some 1,700-year-old 
redwoods and Governor Pete Wilson upgrades his image with 
environmentalists, who opposed his election. 
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I quite like this story – slyly mocking throughout (and especially of 
Governor Pete Wilson). How might this fit into the DeAngelos’ tale? 
Well, none of it appears in their collage and the extract reproduced in 
their appendix is simply, ‘Buy a junk bond, save a redwood (picture 
caption)’ (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1998: 36). So, one of the 
DeAngelos’ occasional ‘even-handed’ articles, then. 
It’s just that there do seem to be an awful lot of these occasional 
articles. Another example, this time from the Christian Science Monitor.13 
The DeAngelos extract  
THE 3,000-acre Headwaters Forest in northern California harbors trees 
taller than Norman Schwarzkopf and older than the Crusades. … “It is 
like the last great buffalo herd,” says John Amodio, environmental 
adviser to California Gov. Pete Wilson. (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 
1998: 36) 
Their extract was taken from the introduction – I’ve included the rest of 
the first 4 paragraphs to get more of a sense of how this story unfolds: 
THE 3,000-acre Headwaters Forest in northern California harbors trees 
taller than Norman Schwarzkopf and older than the Crusades. It is the 
largest privately owned grove of redwoods in the world. Until recently, 
it seemed many of these ancient sentinels would end up as someone’s 
deck or hot tub. Now, under a novel ‘debt-for-nature’ swap being put 
together, they could become the crown jewel of a decades-long quest to 
preserve what remains of the world’s tallest trees. 
“It is like the last great buffalo herd,” says John Amodio, environmental 
adviser to California Gov. Pete Wilson, one of the parties trying to 
broker the deal. 
The talks between the state and federal governments and Pacific 
Lumber Company, owner of Headwaters, is one of two major thrusts in 
California that could affect the cutting of redwoods and perhaps affect 
forestry practices nationwide. 
The second effort, less amicable and far more encompassing, is an 
attempt by environmental groups to reduce overall timber harvesting in 
the state and limit the controversial practice of clear-cutting. 
Already, we can see that, if anything, this article is shaping up with a 
degree of hostility to environmental protestors – and so it continues. 
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Also, worryingly, this article is not part of the media ‘universally’ 
blaming junk-bonds for the threat to the forest – the link is never made 
despite discussion of the bonds. 
Another, this time from the New York Times.14 The DeAngelos take: 
“This was the crown jewel of the North American timber industry,” he 
(Mr Bertain) said. “I was just stunned for four months after the 
takeover…” 
For many residents of this community (Eureka), the Pacific Lumber 
takeover has come to epitomize the social and environmental costs of 
the junk bond era of the 1980’s. 
Environmentalists have used Pacific Lumber’s logging practices as the 
rallying point in their battle to save the remaining stands of California’s 
old-growth redwood forests. “This is in-your-face forestry,” said Joshua 
Kaufman, a Humboldt County paleontologist who helped form an 
environmental coalition after he saw Pacific Lumber trucks rolling up 
and down the road on which he lives. (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1998: 
37) 
The original article is much more nuanced – largely a tragic tale of a 
misguided campaigner. But the companies contrasting opinion is spelt 
out and Hurwitz, boss of MAXXAM, is portrayed as ‘vilified’ and 
‘daring’ as well as having pulled off ‘a business coup’. A larger extract 
follows:  
In a cluttered office overflowing with filing boxes and legal briefs, 
William H. Bertain is standing fast in his quixotic campaign to wrest 
back control of the Pacific Lumber Company, which was acquired in 
1986 by Charles E. Hurwitz, a Houston financier.  
A child of the lush redwood forests in this fog-shrouded country, Mr. 
Bertain has dedicated the last seven years to a legal fight that few 
believe can be won, returning the company to the Murphy family that 
had managed it since the turn of the century.  
Mr. Hurwitz’s Maxxam Inc. bought Pacific Lumber for about $900 
million in a buyout financed largely with junk bonds handled by Drexel 
Burnham Lambert, and three members of the Murphy family have 
retained Mr. Bertain to have the buyout undone, asserting that 
shareholders were defrauded. Maxxam also faces a barrage of lawsuits 
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from employees, shareholders and environmentalists seeking to halt the 
harvesting of old-growth timber.  
Despite demoralizing odds, Mr. Bertain says he carries on the crusade 
because outside investors – whom he calls ‘corporados’ – are 
threatening to destroy a way of life.  
“This was the crown jewel of the North American timber industry,” he 
said. “I was just stunned for four months after the takeover, but then I 
set out by committing to do everything that was legal and moral to stop 
this.” 
Mr. Bertain’s campaign has set him at odds with John Campbell, the 
president of Pacific Lumber and a 24-year veteran of the company, the 
world’s largest holder of virgin redwood forests. “He’s barking up the 
wrong tree,” Mr. Campbell said in a telephone interview. “He’s a zealot 
and he has his emotions and his ego involved.”  
Pacific Lumber is not practicing cut-and-run forestry, the Australian-
born lumberman insists. Countering critics who charge that Mr. 
Hurwitz had to increase the company’s cutting rate to pay nearly $800 
million of debt incurred when it was taken over, Mr. Campbell says the 
company has shown that it intends to be a positive long-term economic 
force here in Humboldt County, on the Northern California coast 
nearly 300 miles north of San Francisco. … 
For many residents of this community, the Pacific Lumber takeover has 
come to epitomize the social and environmental costs of the junk bond 
era of the 1980’s. But beyond being vilified as a corporate raider, Mr. 
Hurwitz has never been charged with violating any laws, and in the 
short run at least, his company has increased employment in the region. 
Mr. Bertain’s supporters include members of labor unions, community 
leaders and environmentalists. … 
Unfazed by the various lawsuits against his holdings, Mr. Hurwitz has 
forged ahead, moving to reduce the debt load of Pacific Lumber. He 
recently refinanced Pacific Lumber’s $510 million debt and split the 
company into three concerns, leading many industry executives to say – 
and even some environmentalists to concede – that the Houston 
financier had pulled off a business coup.  
“They got a phenomenal decrease in the cost of capital,” said Craig 
Gilmore, a financial analyst at Gilmore & Company in Carlsbad, Calif.  
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In a daring stroke, Mr. Hurwitz shifted Pacific Lumber’s timber assets 
to two new companies, Scotia Pacific and Salmon Creek, cutting back 
on the company’s short-term debt, financed by junk bonds, and 
replacing it with bonds backed by 179,000 acres of redwood and 
Douglas fir timberland. 
These are not isolated examples of selective quoting which entirely 
changes the picture given, and even these few examples are taken 
mainly from journals that wouldn’t necessarily be expected to be 
supportive of MAXXAM. Yet, in the DeAngelos’ account any diversity 
is remorselessly trampled down: ‘The Pacific Lumber case illustrates (1) 
how a misreading of economic facts can take on a life of its own when 
reported by enough credible and apparently independent media sources’ 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1998: 29); ‘By portraying the PL takeover as 
a case of 1980s Wall Street greed versus the environment, the media 
wove a fascinating morality tale with broad readership appeal’ (ibid.: 29-
30); ‘the media, environmentalists, and politicians likely portrayed the 
Pacific Lumber takeover as a case of Wall Street greed destroying the 
environment’ (ibid.: 30); ‘Our circulation data establish that the PL 
parable was widely disseminated’ (ibid.); ‘The resource implications of 
the media treatment of PL are immense’ (ibid.); ‘The personalization of 
the PL case’ (ibid.); ‘The demonization of Charles Hurwitz and 
MAXXAM’ (ibid.); ‘the public portrayal of the PL case.’ (ibid.: 31). 
More Fun with Numbers 
There is another aspect to the selectivity in the DeAngelos article: when 
looking through our library’s electronic resources to check some of the 
material the DeAngelos cite, I found that in the Nexis database, the 
American newspaper with the most articles containing the search terms 
‘MAXXAM’ and ‘Pacific’ was the Houston Chronicle – from the city 
where MAXXAM was headquartered. Many of these articles were 
overwhelmingly positive towards MAXXAM – perhaps because the 
only sources reported were MAXXAM employees or representatives – 
but this paper didn’t fit the DeAngelos carefully constructed search 
criteria (National media such as the New York Times, business media 
such as the Wall Street Journal and Californian newspapers). And with the 
Californian press markedly more hostile to MAXXAM than the Texan 




Except we won’t be finding such nuances within the DeAngelos’ 
case. Despite the ironing out of contrary positions, they claim:  
Nonetheless, the sheer volume of articles – 76 in major periodicals – 
indicates that media dramatization of the PL case is a widespread 
phenomenon. (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1998: 11) 
This quote illustrates the way in which widespread coverage has shifted 
to widespread ‘media dramatisation’ and how the (not-so) ‘occasional’ 
becomes obscured within a single ‘dramatisation’. However, the idea of 
one ‘dramatisation’ assists considerably when it comes to defining what 
might be meant by ‘widespread’. Take the DeAngelos approach (1998: 
9, table 1): 
Pacific Lumber print media coverage: annual incidence of articles in 
major outlets and circulation of periodicals that published them over 
January 1986-December 1996. 
This table gives a yearly summary of the 76 articles abstracted in the 
Appendix that appeared in national newspapers or magazines, the 
national financial press, and in two major California newspapers. See 
the Appendix for a summary of the sampling algorithm used to identify 
these articles. The far right column gives the per issue (e.g., one day’s 
average circulation for the Wall Street Journal, one week for Time 
magazine, etc.) total domestic circulation of the publication sources for 
the year that each article appeared. The circulation figures are obtained 
from various issues of Audit Bureau of Circulations (FAS-FAX Report), 
Gale Directory of Publications and Broadcast Media, and Working 
Press of the Nation. 
Year Number of articles Total circulation 
1986 1 706,577 
1987 10 10,064,887 
1988 8 5,553,529 
1989 8 22,125,587 
1990 5 6,367,160 
1991 4 5,502,117 
1992 2 2,365,812 
1993 6 5,346,586 
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Year Number of articles Total circulation 
1994 6 12,125,556 
1995 3 1,656,024 
1996 23 28,764,745 
Total 76 100,578,580 
 
This is a rather unusual way of grouping together very different 
publications. Circulation ranges from the tiny (the Christian Science 
Monitor, say) to the vast (Reader’s Digest), different types of articles (short 
book reviews to extended investigations) and publications (local 
newspapers to international journals). Grouping them all together does 
give a satisfyingly large number – over 100 million – but completely 
obliterates potential differences. A pleasing irony in a paper that 
attempts to lambast the media, following Jensen (1979), for providing 
‘simplistic explanations rather than the carefully detailed analysis 
required to understand complex phenomena’ (1979: 30). 
Concluding Comments  
That this article so vividly displays the faults of which it accuses the 
media would merely be an amusing anecdote had it been published in 
an inconsequential journal or on some vitriolic blog, say. But it is the 
status of the journal that makes this more important, for it tells us much 
about how knowledge is created and travels through the finance 
academy. Jensen’s ‘theory of the press’, with its preference for prejudice 
over evidence, patrician values and absurd reductionism, would almost 
anywhere else be gleefully mocked and held up as glorious evidence of 
the intellectual failure of the modern university. It would normally be 
astonishing to find it as the lynchpin theory in the conclusions of an 
article, were it not that Jensen was at the time editor of the Journal of 
Financial Economics. I am not trying to imply malpractice here – rather it 
is that ideological sympathies apparently preclude critical scrutiny and it 
is the solipsistic world of academic finance that is my concern. For it is 
the refusal to engage with other social sciences, both in terms of theory 
and methodology, that seem to lie behind some of the worst excesses 
within and without the finance academy. Thus, although there is 
panoply of approaches to the media across the social sciences, because 
they are not established within the finance literature, they are 
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disregarded and the only acceptable text becomes the bereft Jensen’s. 
That this then becomes promulgated within a leading journal gives it a 
misleading authority and credibility; establishment within the canon of 
finance literature. 
Also apparent in this tale of two papers is a haphazard approach to a 
‘scientific’ ideal – that once scientific authority has been sufficiently 
asserted then anything goes – freeing authors from rigour in approaches 
to quantitative and qualitative data or, indeed, to testing theory. If the 
DeAngelos wanted to remain within a quasi-scientific paradigm, then 
there is more than enough material in the reports that they cite to easily 
disprove Jensen’s theory – surely a more satisfying approach within 
scientific lore than taking empirical liberties in an attempt to justify it. 
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3 The editors ‘… hope these comments are taken in the spirit in which they are 
given. The opportunity to serve as an editor is a privilege. It provides each of 
us with the chance to observe the inner workings of a community of 
scholarship. It imparts a deep appreciation for the importance of the peer 
review process, and of the generosity of the hundreds of individuals who help 
us, and help their colleagues, by sharing their time, their expertise, and their 
creativity in serving as referees. We encourage authors to value these shared 
resources as well.’ 
4 Adapted from: http://jfe.rochester.edu/editor.htm and http://jfe.rochester. 
edu/authorpapers.htm (accessed 30 January 2010).  
5 Papers/Author is the total number of papers submitted with the author’s 
name on them. Papers/CoAuthor divides each paper by the number of 
authors. 
6 Adapted from http://jfe.rochester.edu/editor.htm and http://jfe.rochester. 
edu/authorpapers.htm (accessed 30 January 2010). 
7 See http://marshallinside.usc.edu/deangelo/pubs.htm (accessed 30 January 
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Marienthal  At Work 
Norman Jackson and Pippa Carter 
If we wish for a population easy to control by suggestion we shall 
decide what repertory of suggestions it shall be susceptible to and 
encourage this tendency except in the few. But if we wish for a high and 
diffused civilisation, with its attendant risks, we shall combat this form 
of mental inertia. (Richards, 1964 [1929]: 314) 
Introduction 
It would appear that students of managerial and organizational 
knowledge, whoever they may be, are particularly prone to an uncritical 
acceptance of knowledge claims, of the ‘wisdom’, in the field. Perhaps it 
is the very popularity of this field of knowledge amongst consumers 
that stimulates knowledge producers to provide a constant supply of 
easily digestible formulae revealing how to achieve the organizational 
nirvana, formulae which are then enthusiastically embraced, without 
thorough interrogation of their credentials, logic or implications. 
Richards proposed that, in the field of literature, the antidote to this 
kind of suggestibility is close textual examination, in order to proceed 
beyond the surface, the obvious, the received, to enable informed and 
critical judgement, ‘“to rouse the mind, to assist observation, to make 
people sociable, to excite indignation”’ (Richards, 1964: 292, quoting 
Confucius). How much is this proactive and questioning engagement 
even more necessary in the Social Sciences, and especially in 
Management and Organization Studies, where research produces 
knowledge claims that inform and shape policy, strategy and practice at 
all levels of society. 
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A close textual reading, in our view, focuses primarily on the 
principles and quality of scholarship, as embodied in a text. It is an 
interrogatory process that should be undertaken before engagement with 
the findings or proposals of any particular piece of research, before any 
attempt to refute, replicate or apply such findings or proposals. If we 
miss out this, we would suggest, crucial evaluation, we are able only 
reactively to respond to findings, to approach issues only on the basis of 
an agenda pre-set by the researcher, rather than to address the issues 
themselves. In this view, critical textual readings are not especially 
concerned with ‘findings’ – although some such may inevitably be 
thrown into doubt by the practice itself – they are about matters of 
scholarship. The question that is being foregrounded here is: can good 
quality knowledge be produced from poor quality research? 
In this chapter we propose a close textual reading of the book, 
Marienthal: The Sociography of an Unemployed Community, by Jahoda, 
Lazarsfeld and Zeisel (2002, first published in 1933, by the Leipzig-
based publisher, Hirzel), a study that is still widely celebrated, and that is 
regarded by many as a ‘landmark’ examination of the effects of long-
term unemployment (see, for example, Fleck, 2002). The eponymous 
Marienthal was a small village in 1930s Austria, not far from Vienna, 
which was largely dependent upon a single factory – a textile mill – for 
employment. During the Great Depression this factory closed, making 
most of the workers jobless with little prospect of finding alternative 
employment. Marienthal is a study of how the village coped with this dire 
situation. The study itself comprises eight chapters, occupying 98 pages 
(in the 2002 edition). These are accompanied by a contemporaneous 
Afterword: towards a history of sociography, written by one of the authors, 
Zeisel, reflecting on the history of such studies, in terms of both 
methodology and subject matter, a Foreword, written by another of the 
authors, Lazarsfeld, some forty years after the original publication of the 
study, on the occasion of its translation into English, and, in the 2002 
edition, an Introduction, written by a contemporary commentator, Fleck. 
The chapter titles beyond the introductory chapters give a good 
indication of the concerns, and conclusions, of the study: The Living 
Standard, Menus and Budgets, A Weary Community, Responses to Deprivation, 
The Meaning of Time, Fading Resilience.  
It might, of course, be asked whether a study of so long ago has any 
contemporary relevance. Perhaps, whatever its strengths and 
shortcomings were, these have been negated by time. However, 
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Marienthal, as a piece of research, is still regarded as important in, and 
beyond, its field, in terms of its findings, as an exemplary way of doing 
research and as an important case study in social science studies, (see, 
for example, Fleck, 2002, and Cole, 2007, who also offers a catalogue of 
references to the use of the study in sociology, psychology and social 
psychology).1 Marienthal is also regarded as especially significant in the 
field of study of work organization(s), in terms of its ‘implications’ for 
‘the meaning of work’.  
The association of the study with the field of research into ‘work 
organization’ was made explicit because the knowledge claims 
emanating from Marienthal foreshadowed what was later, and 
influentially, to be glossed by one of the authors as ‘the latent functions 
of work’ (Jahoda, 1979). The original study identified a number of 
characteristic features of daily existence experienced by the long-term 
unemployed – namely, lack of time structure, loss of social relations, 
loss of sense of social purpose, loss of social status and personal 
identity, and lack of regular activity. In other words, when workers 
experience an extended period of unemployment, not only do they lose 
their income, but they also suffer social and psychological problems 
associated with motivation, sense-making, interpersonal relations, their 
sense of self, and their sense of self-worth. By inver t ing  these  
observat ions ,  these  prob l ems became the  very  th ings  that  employed  
work,  and work organizat ions ,  so lv ed  for  the  worker  (see, for 
example, Jahoda and Rush, 1980: 11). This, then, gives some indication 
of why Marienthal is regarded as such a seminal piece of work: if indeed 
the study did uncover certain eternal verities about the centrality of 
wage labour to psychological well-being and a stable social structure, 
then it has huge implications for both economic and social policy, and 
for our understanding of the labour process.  
We do not share the general enthusiasm for Marienthal, as a study or 
in terms of the implications so neatly drawn from its findings. On first 
becoming acquainted with Marienthal, we experienced some unease with 
interpretations of the data and some scepticism about the coherence 
and integrity of these interpretations. A further close textual reading 
generated more questions about the whole project and the validity of its 
knowledge claims, to the extent that every aspect of it started to look 
more dubious.  
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There are two kinds of problem that it is relevant to identify in 
particular: problems of interpretation of the data, and problems related 
to the research process itself. However, the ubiquity of these issues in 
the study presents problems, in turn, for this analysis. For example, 
individual details of the research process, which taken singly may be 
relatively unimportant or innocuous, when aggregated appear to 
discredit the entire project. Secondly, to analyse every claim, illustration, 
association, practice, and so on, would be to produce a paper many 
times longer than the original book. Accordingly, we concentrate our 
critique on some specific examples of weakness in scholarship 
represented in the research. We should emphasise that our critical 
reading is almost exclusively internal to the text Marienthal. In other 
words, where we question, for example, interpretations of the data, or 
details of the research process, the basis for such questions is contained 
within the text itself, but has been, perhaps, overlooked, ignored or 
even repressed by the authors, in favour of their preferred 
understandings and attributed meanings. Thus, we have not sought to 
locate the study in terms of the wider body of research on cognate 
issues, nor have we sought to apply judgements about the quality of the 
scholarship and the probity of the findings from sources external to the 
text itself. Marienthal is unusual, in our experience, in containing within 
the text all the material that is needed to question its validity. 
The Meanings of Marientha l  
On examination of the text of Marienthal, a considerable range of issues 
almost immediately announces itself as potentially problematic to the 
process of data interpretation. There is, for example, quite clearly a 
‘cultural blindness’ – the strangeness of the working class – imbuing the 
observations of the researchers. This cultural blindness leads them, 
despite their very best intentions, to regard the subjects of their study as 
objects, as other, as different in kind to themselves. This has 
implications for both the management of the research and the 
management of its findings. Cultural blindness is reinforced by the 
evidence within the text of judgemental attitudes informed by 
fundamentally middle class values and the uncomfortable confrontation 
of the metropolitan and the provincial.  
The quality of the data is also affected by a certain naivety on the 
part of the researchers. For example, they seem to be unaware of the 
possibility that their respondents might manipulate the situation to serve 
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their own interests, even though they have identified this tendency in 
other respects, such as attempts by the villagers to gain access to as 
many forms of relief as possible, regardless of strict eligibility. Access to 
the respondents was almost exclusively based on ‘bribery’, in the form 
of charitable works, welfare initiatives, even competitions with prizes. 
The researchers did not, apparently, consider that this might, in itself, 
affect how people responded to their surveys, that data might be 
‘bought’ for potential reward, that they might even be told, therefore, 
what people thought they wanted to hear. There is, indeed, a pervasive 
lack of truthfulness in the study. The researchers did sometimes feel 
that people were being ‘duplicitous’ (Jahoda et al., 2002: 41) with others, 
especially with those in positions of authority or in control of resources 
(but not with them?), and were critical of this. However, they 
themselves were duplicitous in their dealings with the villagers – for 
example, claiming objectives other than a study – but did not regard 
such opportunism in the same light as that of the villagers. Perhaps they 
believed that it was somehow justifiable in their own case, because their 
desire was to do good?  
Our initial disquiet with Marienthal arose from the posited causal 
relations determined from the data and the questionable interpretations 
of observed behaviour. One of the most significant examples of the 
former is an apparent conflation between unemployment and poverty. 
It might be argued that, for those whose only income derives from 
selling their labour to others, loss of job is the same as loss of income. 
However, we would argue that such conflation leads to different 
conclusions about the value of employment to those reached if the 
distinction is maintained – in other words, if the conditions experienced 
in the village are simply the consequence of unemployment, then, 
crudely put, the ‘solution’ is to provide employment; if, however, the 
conditions experienced are a consequence of the burden of 
unemployment on top of pre-existing poverty, then any ‘solution’ must 
involve a much wider range of strategies than merely providing work, 
such as social policy to mitigate poverty. 
There is considerable attention paid in the study to the economic 
aspects of the situation in Marienthal, and much quantitative data 
provided from a variety of sources. For example, there is information, 
inter alia, on schoolchildren’s packed lunches (Jahoda et al., 2002: 17), on 
the extent of relief payments (ibid.: 18), on the incidence of meat in the 
diet (ibid.: 26). There is no particular reason to doubt these data. 
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However, some of the conclusions drawn from such data are much 
more questionable. For example, the authors offer (ibid.: 39-40) some 
rather superficial statistics (in percentages rather than in actual sales 
figures) which purport to show a significant decline in the purchase of 
the newspaper, the Arbeiter Zeitung, the central organ of the Austrian 
Social Democratic Party, (by far the dominant political party in 
Marienthal), even though it is sold at a reduced rate to those who are 
unemployed. They declare, on this basis, the very significant conclusion 
that this demonstrates a dramatic decline in ‘interest in politics’ (ibid.: 
40) among the villagers. However, this is not necessarily a justifiable 
correlation. Reduced sales does not necessarily signify reduced 
readership – people may have been sharing copies, for example, and a 
not inconsiderable proportion of the population of Marienthal had 
actually left the village entirely since the factory closure (ibid.: 40, 59). 
Equally, reduced sales, or even reduced readership, do not necessarily 
signify reduced interest. 
Unemployment or Poverty? 
This difficulty applies a fortiori to the qualitative data. These data are 
intended to illustrate issues that might be described as relevant to, in 
modern parlance, ‘the quality of life’. The text ‘illuminates’ the poor 
clothing, the attenuated social life, the lack of motivation, the strained 
interpersonal relationships, among the villagers, and attributes all this to 
their unemployment. It is this ascription of causality that is one of the 
most obvious problems with Marienthal. We have already noted that it 
might be argued that, since the inhabitants of Marienthal derived their 
income from employment, loss of employment did indeed cause their 
problems. But it can be suggested that this is an overly simplistic 
interpretation. That the conditions found in the village were simply the 
direct effect of unemployment is an assumption of causality that actually 
warrants more demonstration before it can be accepted. For example, 
that people were going short came from a lack of resources to exchange 
for what they needed. Adequate welfare relief, for instance, would have 
offset some of these problems. Contrary to the assertion that ‘(t)he only 
real remedy, of course, is a return to work’ (Jahoda et al., 2002: 24), 
return to work is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to ensure 
that people have enough disposable resources to alleviate want. Then, 
as now, there was no guarantee that full time employment precluded the 
experience of want. It is, indeed, noted in the text that wages in 
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‘neighbouring factories’ were ‘at times lower than some of the 
unemployment relief rates’ and so ‘families working in the surrounding 
area differ little, in their standard of living, from the unemployed’ (ibid.: 
20).  
The tendency to make this easy assumption about causality is 
connected to another problem with the study, that there is little sense of 
what might be called the ‘normal’ conditions in the village, no base with 
which to compare the social-psychological conditions studied in 1931-
32 (there are some quantitative data, and some narrative, on past 
economic conditions, for example, in the chapter The Industrial Village). We 
do know, however, that the situation prior to the start of the then 
current period of long-term unemployment was not  long-term full 
employment. Unlike its heyday in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the recent history of the factory had been characterised by 
periods of reduced working and industrial unrest, with the factory being 
closed down progressively during 1929-30 (Jahoda et al., 2002: 13-14). 
Even in employment, factory workers of that period would hardly be 
affluent – what might, perhaps, be called ‘employed poverty’ would be a 
more normal condition. Indeed, it might well be suggested that, rather 
than a direct effect of the final closure of the factory, the conditions 
witnessed in Marienthal are likely to have reflected the cumulative 
effects, over a considerable period of time, of low income, even when 
work was available. That the conditions might be the effect of poverty, 
as well as of unemployment, is not considered, yet that may have been of 
crucial significance, and would have had far-reaching impacts on the 
conclusions of the study. For example, even if we accept the framework 
of findings offered by the authors, viewing the specific factors as effects 
of long-term poverty, rather than of the absence of work, would, in 
itself, throw very considerable doubt on the later connection of these 
findings to ‘the meaning of work’.  
This conflation of unemployment with poverty in the research 
commits two ‘sins’. Firstly, it promotes the view that the raison d’être of 
the less privileged members of society is to work – if the only way that 
the poor can maintain themselves, materially and, just as importantly, 
socially and psychologically, is through work, then that is what they 
must need. Being human in their case is the same as being a worker. 
This is the classic ideology of class, the logic of the workhouse, of 
workfare – and, indeed, Jahoda did elsewhere argue in favour of 
welfare-to-work programmes (Fleck, 2002: xii). Secondly, it promotes 
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the idea of the working class as dependent, as requiring the shelter of 
employers as a kind of patron or guardian. Once denied this 
benevolence they become socially disoriented, decline into apathy, cease 
to function properly. Yes, clearly all the worker needs, to be happy and 
to fulfil his/her social role, is employed work. Indeed, Jahoda later 
asserted that ‘it is only a very small group of psychologically privileged 
people who can by their own initiative create the latent consequences of 
employment, outside a compelling manifest [i.e., economic] reason’ 
(Jahoda and Rush, 1980: 29) – and, should technology ever realise its 
potential to obviate the need for employed work, ‘new forms of 
organized work outside employment’ (ibid.: 35) would need to be 
created. 
Sympathy or Empathy, Sentiment or Rationality? 
The authors of Marienthal are full of sympathy for the people of the 
village, but the bias inherent in this type of interpretation is part and 
parcel of a general lack of empathy with them, symptomatic of their 
‘cultural blindness’ when confronted with the ‘strangeness’ of typical 
working class lives. There are many instances of the, apparently 
unwitting, certainly unacknowledged, predominance of middle class 
values in interpreting the data. It is well illustrated by one of the 
‘quantitative studies’, that of people walking in the street. The men are 
observed to walk more slowly than the women. The authors note that, 
in families where the husband is unemployed, the man may be idle but 
the work of the wife in the home does not decrease, and may increase, 
since she now has to make more effort to supply the needs of the family 
with very little money (Jahoda et al., 2002: 74ff). Thus, women going 
about their normal business hurry along as usual. Men, on the other 
hand, do not, because they lack pressing business. But, as there is no 
denying that the (unemployed) men have no work, we might ask, why 
should they hurry?  
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The authors offer the following table, derived from their (covert) 
observations (Jahoda et al., 2002: 67): 
Walking mph Men Women Total 
3 or more 7 10 17 
2.5 8 3 11 
2 18 4 22 
Total 33 17 50 
It is interesting to note that, in Work Measurement, a person under 
incentive conditions is normally expected to walk at 4 miles per hour. 
Without incentive, it is 3 mph when working. If people not under 
incentives and not working choose to walk at 2 mph, it is hardly 
surprising or reprehensible. Just as significantly, as any city-dweller who 
has spent time in a country village will know, time, and how it should be 
spent, is regarded differently there – village time is just slower than city 
time. There is no information on general walking speeds in times of 
employment in Marienthal, but one might hypothesise that they were 
always slower than those of ever-hurrying city people, such as the 
researchers. Despite all this, it is asserted that the men have ‘forgotten 
how to hurry’ (ibid.: 66). The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
hurrying as ‘acting with undue or immoderate haste, under pressure, 
having little time’ – one might suggest that, if the men continued to 
hurry when there was nothing to hurry for, this might itself indicate 
some underlying emotional problem. The authors themselves note that 
‘(o)nce someone trotted past; it turned out to be the village idiot’ (ibid.: 
67). Quite!  
Apparently, ‘the workers of Marienthal have lost the material and 
moral incentives to make use of their time’ (Jahoda et al., 2002: 66, our 
emphasis). The men stand around, carry on leisurely conversations, 
several smoke pipes, watch the traffic pass. Would the researchers have 
seen similar problems in the strolling boulevardier, the sauntering 
flâneur, the idle rich? When workers find that they have free time by 
force of circumstance not of their making and they use it in such 
activities, then they are seen as morally degenerate. Truly, it is the 
absolute duty of the workers to look busy! Indeed, we learn that ‘… 
sixty people had already emigrated, which means that the people we 
found in Marienthal were the less energetic ones who stayed’ (ibid.: 59, our 
emphasis). This last, somewhat disparaging, comment illustrates very 
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clearly the normative judgements being made by the researchers. 
Anyone who had not abandoned the village to find work – possibly 
non-existent work, bearing in mind that the Great Depression was in 
full swing – was judged to lack energy. Surely, one could be energetic in 
seeking work without leaving home – a case in point is noted (ibid.: 52), 
a man who had written ‘130 applications for jobs, all of which remained 
unanswered’. Perhaps some could not leave for other reasons, such as 
having dependents in need of their immediate presence. Perhaps some 
thought they might be worse off in abandoning what little security they 
had amongst friends and family in Marienthal. Perhaps some just 
weighed all the facts, calculated the pros and cons, and made a reasoned 
judgement that their best interest was served by staying put. Indeed, no 
evidence is furnished to suggest that those who left fared any better 
than those who stayed, although there is some comment about the fate 
of people who emigrated abroad, notably, ‘the unhappy experience of 
some Marienthal families who had gone to France’ (ibid.: 57). It is even 
possible that the researchers themselves were supplying incentives for 
the villagers to stay in Marienthal, through their welfare and charitable 
initiatives, though this does not seem to have been considered.  
That the unemployed men of Marienthal had adjusted their use of 
time to accommodate their new experienced reality, as they saw it, 
seems to the researchers only to indicate despair and moral decay. They 
demonstrate little understanding of the life of the working class. After 
all, as previously noted, unemployment, for the villagers, and for 
workers generally, was part of their normal experience – it was just a 
fact of life for the working class.  
Normality or Abnormality? 
Another cogent illustration of this general lack of empathy is provided 
by the story of ‘Family 273’, a one-parent family, with one child: ‘The 
mother had become an alien through marriage and thereupon lost her 
claim to relief. Immediately after the wedding her husband ran away to 
join the foreign legion. … The woman leads a lonely life and is very 
apathetic…’ (Jahoda et al., 2002: 21). Quite apart from the problem of 
unemployment, this woman would seem to have good cause to feel 
lonely and apathetic. To marry and then to lose both your husband and 
your right to relief, and to have a child to support, could be seen as 
devastating in its own right. As it happens, we do not know what role 
the factory closure had, if any, in this family and to link her problems to 
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it in this way seems, on the surface, somewhat bizarre2. As with the 
walking speed examples, it is implied that people are just not dealing 
with their problems ‘adequately’ – there seems to be an almost 
Pythonesque requirement to ‘always look on the bright side of life’!  
A further telling example of the experienced strangeness of the 
inhabitants of Marienthal is their desire to grow flowers. The authors 
note the widespread ‘ownership’ of allotments. Out of the total of 478 
families that comprises the village, 392 have at least one, and everyone 
who wanted an allotment got one (ibid.: 23). A typical allotment is 
about 60 square metres, and the yield of vegetables is ‘considerable’ 
(ibid.). Later, they give a number of examples of ‘surprising and 
seemingly irrational spending’ (ibid.: 55) that, in their view, represent 
evidence of either ‘a yearning for some remains of joy’ or are ‘possible 
symptoms of dissolution’ (ibid.). For example: 
Flowers are growing on many of the allotments, although potatoes and 
other vegetables are vital; beds that could yield some 160 pounds of 
potatoes are filled instead with carnations, tulips, roses, bell flowers, 
pansies, and dahlias. When asked why this was so, we were told: “One 
can’t just live on food, one needs something also for the soul. It is so 
nice to have a vase of flowers at home”. (Jahoda et al., 2002: 55) 
Presumably our researchers thought that unemployed workers should 
live by bread, or potatoes, alone – though there is no evidence that 
more potatoes were needed. Another surprise appears to be the 
attention given to children. With regard to one family: 
The regular and relatively expensive consumption of 2 liters [sic] of 
milk per day is also remarkable; it was bought mainly for the children. 
We noticed time and again, whenever we visited this family, the special 
concern for the welfare of the children shown by parents who had to 
forfeit the most elementary amenities of their own. (Jahoda et al., 2002: 
30) 
This family comprised two adults and five children. Other ‘irrational’ 
expenditure occurred when some women ‘…on a birthday or other 
festive occasion and following a sudden impulse, bought a picture book 
as a present for a child’ (ibid.: 55). Or, again, when ‘another family, 
living only on emergency assistance, spent good money on mourning 
clothes after someone in the family died’ (ibid., our emphasis). These 
comments are redolent of, if not outright disapproval, then 
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incomprehension. That, apart from bringing a little joy into an 
overwhelmingly depressing situation, the decision to grow flowers 
might have been taken by a mature, intelligent adult with a competent 
understanding of the situation in which they find themselves, did not 
seem to occur to the researchers. That parents do, as part of normal 
parenting, even under adversity, prioritise their children’s needs also 
escapes them, as does the parental urge to give them an occasional treat. 
That even poor people have rituals surrounding death and may need to 
show respect for the dead and show publicly that they are in mourning 
seems similarly to disturb them. 
This incomprehension regarding children is also evident in the 
attempts to analyse the villagers’ use of, and approach to, time. Some 
were given timetables to complete showing how they spent the day. As 
presented in Marienthal, the data are given in clock-hours: 6-7; 7-8; and 
so on. Whether by request of, or editing by, the researchers, or just the 
inclination of those completing the timesheets, (there is evidence for 
each possibility), the entries for each time slot are somewhat sparse. For 
example: 
A.M. 
6-7 Getting up. 
7-8 Wake the boys because they have to go to school. 
8-9 When they have gone, I go down to the shed to get wood and 
water. (Jahoda et al., 2002: 68) 
This particular example of an unemployed man’s expenditure of time is 
compared to a time sheet by a man who is still in work. Arguing that it 
is an illustration of the problem with time that unemployment brings, 
the authors remark that ‘(w)aking the children certainly does not take up 
a whole hour’ (ibid.: 69). Ignoring the limitations of the method, this 
suggests that they lack direct experience of having children! In any case, 
the period in question also seems to cover the entire process of getting 
them to school, because, in the next period, they have gone. There is a 
similar sense of incomprehension when encountering the behaviour of 
the teenagers of Marienthal: despite the activities that the researchers 
organized for them, ‘(t)hey disappeared and just “hung around”. The 
leaders of the two youth groups confirmed that their problem, too, was 
getting hold of the young people’ (ibid.: 63). The researchers attribute 
this to an ‘attitude equivalent to resignation’ (ibid.). However, it could 
be suggested that, on the contrary, this is just what teenagers do! 
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Many of these comments and interpretations are also undermined 
by the previously noted absence of any sense of what might constitute 
‘the normal’ for the people of Marienthal. Yet this lack may contribute 
crucially to attributions of abnormality to behaviour that might be 
entirely normal. The life of the village can never have been luxurious. 
Add to this the experience of the routine cycle of shorter periods of 
unemployment and much of the deprivation and coping behaviour 
identified by the researchers would simply be the lot of the factory 
worker. Indeed, they note, with regard to the physical condition of the 
villagers: 
The state of health of the community, despite its rural environment, has 
never been particularly good, according to the doctor’s reports. Work in 
a spinning or weaving mill is not healthy. (Jahoda et al., 2002: 34) 
Regarding one household we are informed that:  
The children are clean and well cared for, the mother told us she 
maintained and mended all their things herself. … She even mended her husband’s 
suits. (ibid.: 46, our emphasis) 
And in another,  
The couple is known for its quarrelsomeness. The wife is not too 
popular. (ibid.: 51) 
Much of this behaviour would be normal regardless of the state of 
employment. It is interesting to speculate who the researchers thought 
normally repaired the family’s clothes, or whether perhaps they threw 
away damaged or worn garments and simply bought new ones. As 
regards quarrelsome couples, these may be found even outside of the 
unemployed working class. It is hard to escape the feeling that the 
researchers had some idea of a working class idyll where, in return for 
‘full-ish’ employment, workers were diligent, well-behaved, even 
tempered, and undemanding, gratefully knew their place and were 
attentive to the needs of their family, the community and their 
employer. 
Solidarity or Friction? 
The whole matter of the socio-political relations of the villagers 
provides yet another very pertinent example of the judgemental naivety 
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of the researchers. Political clubs were an important feature in Austria at 
the time. Thus the researchers ‘… knew that the active elements of the 
population were politically organized and, consequently, we sought to 
establish political contact with them. Since all shades of political opinion 
were represented in our research team, we were allowed access to 
practically all organizations’ (Jahoda et al., 2002: 6). However, we learn 
later, ‘…when political parties organize charities, people occasionally try 
to benefit from all sides; a few men had actually become members of 
both politically opposed organizations. However, … such duplicity was 
quickly discovered’ (ibid.: 41). It is interesting that they use the 
judgemental word ‘duplicity’ to describe this behaviour. Perhaps what 
they were seeing was the rational behaviour of desperate people in 
distress, seeking to obtain aid for their families as best they could. Even 
the authors acknowledge that ‘(a)s privation increases, organization 
membership becomes less a matter of conviction and more a matter of 
financial interest’ (ibid.: 42). They also note an ‘unusual’ decline in the 
normal political hostilities in the village (ibid.: 41), which they see as a 
manifestation of a moderation of traditional political differences, 
though they do wonder if this might be challenged by the new National 
Socialist Party branch (ibid.). Might the arrival of the Nazis even be 
what caused the reduction in normal political activity? What seems clear 
is that engagement with village politics was rather more complex than 
merely gaining access to the political clubs.  
The voting pattern in the village (voting being compulsory) 
remained virtually unchanged in the period 1929-1932, the Social 
Democrats attracting four times the combined support of all other 
parties. However, the researchers detect ‘a decline from a higher cultural 
level of political confrontation’, in favour of ‘a rise in more primitive 
hostilities motivated by personal malice’ (Jahoda et al., 2002: 43). The 
evidence for this is the increase (‘traced with almost documentary 
precision’ (ibid.)) in denunciations to the authorities that people were 
doing casual work whilst drawing unemployment pay (ibid.): 
 
Number of 
Denunciations Founded Unfouded 
1928-29 9 6 3 
1930-31 28 7 21 
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In an adult population of over 1100 this three-fold increase may or may 
not be statistically significant as an indicator of increased personal 
malice, but it must be noted that founded claims remained essentially 
static. What does seem of significance is that 1928 and the first half of 
1929 were ‘not bad years for Marienthal… Employment was at its peak’ 
(Jahoda et al., 2002: 14). In other words, the increase in denunciations 
followed a major increase in those claiming. Thus, that the number of 
denunciations grew is not really surprising, but, of necessity, most 
claims for relief were genuine and so would be allowable. 
Denunciations, as a percentage of those claiming, almost certainly fell. The 
researchers do acknowledge, alongside these acts of ‘personal malice’, 
‘much willingness of villagers to help those more distressed’ and that 
the balance of ‘public spirited and antisocial behaviour’ (ibid.: 44) has 
been unchanged by events. However, they then attribute this lack of 
‘antisocial impulses’, not to neighbourliness, class solidarity or normal 
humanitarian feelings, but to ‘a growing lassitude’ (ibid.). Truly, 
Marienthal is a strange tribe! They can’t even be bothered to be nasty to 
their fellow villagers. 
It is worth examining this issue a little further as it does again 
illustrate the intrusion of the researchers’ prejudices into the study. 
Having asserted that there was an increase in hostilities based on 
personal malice, a few lines later they state they cannot be sure, due to 
absence of any historical data (Jahoda et al., 2002: 43). They then 
acknowledge that various officials with more experience of Marienthal 
believe that there has been no increase in this type of behaviour, which 
our team then ascribes to a lack of motivation (ibid.: 44). The one piece 
of ‘hard’ data on which they base this assertion is the rise, from 3 in the 
first period to 21 in the second, of unfounded denunciations to the 
Industrial Commission (ibid.: 43). So, how should we understand this 
seven-fold increase? Firstly, we have no evidence that those with a 
propensity to denounce their fellow villagers are uniformly distributed 
amongst the population. It seems equally likely that it is the same few 
people who have a greater opportunity, and tendency, to ‘shop’ their 
neighbours. Secondly, it may be that, given the degree of distress, the 
authorities were exercising a certain amount of discretion when vetting 
claims. The researchers themselves note that ‘(e)ven the officials no 
longer pretend that it is possible to live on the relief money one may or 
may not receive… Violations of the fishing laws and even minor thefts 
of coal from the railways are ignored by the authorities… (P)eople can 
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see the welfare officer and in some cases get permission to take odd 
jobs for a few hours’ (ibid.: 22). That such denunciations were not 
upheld does not necessarily mean that they were strictly ‘unfounded’. 
Thirdly, as we know from the current furore over MP’s expenses claims 
in the UK, what observers see as outrageous and undeserved might, in 
fact, be within the rules!  
Why then did the researchers claim to have identified an increase in 
personal malice amongst the villagers, based upon a questionable 
interpretation of data, then to decide it did not exist, but only because 
of the ‘lassitude’ of those unemployed, (as though it should exist!)? The 
idea that a community in adversity might exhibit solidarity in the face of 
a common threat (what was later, and in a different context, labelled the 
Dunkirk spirit) apparently seems strange to them and is, we would 
suggest, another example of ‘cultural blindness’. 
Producing the Meanings of Marientha l  
In the foregoing we have raised some questions about just some of the 
issues of interpretation that arise from a critical textual reading of 
Marienthal – and it is worth reiterating that the grounds for questioning 
the interpretations offered by the authors are based on material in the 
text itself, but generally unexplored by them. The inescapable 
implication of this reading is that Marienthal is, in some respects, a well-
intentioned but fundamentally flawed piece of research. We have 
already suggested some of the factors that seem to have influenced the 
development of interpretations of the research material. But the 
inevitable question that follows from that is, how could this have 
happened? In order to understand this, it is worth looking at some of 
the characteristics of the research process itself. According to the jacket 
notes,  
Marienthal represents a colossal breakthrough in social research. It 
provides a combination of quantification and interpretive analysis of 
qualitative material – an approach that remains in the forefront of 
present-day research design… The work provides a unique insight into 
how creative innovations can assist in overcoming collective 
deprivations [sic]. 
These are big claims. 
The Introduction states quite clearly what the research objectives were: 
Marienthal at Work 
 51 
(T)here is a gap between the bare figures of official statistics and the 
literary accounts, open as they invariably are to all kinds of accidental 
impressions. The purpose of our study of the Austrian village, 
Marienthal, is to bridge this gap. [NP] Our idea was to find procedures 
which would combine the use of numerical data with immersion… into 
the situation. To this end it was necessary to gain such close contact 
with the population of Marienthal that we could learn the smallest 
details of their daily life. At the same time we had to perceive each day 
so that it was possible to reconstruct it objectively… (Jahoda et al., 
2002: 1). 
Thus, there is an unequivocal statement about what the research 
problematic was. What the researchers do not seem to have is some 
theoretical conceptualisation of how such knowledge could be 
produced. Fleck (2002: xii) says that ‘(t)he research group did not waste 
its time debating preparatory meta-theoretical problems’ – or, as it 
might otherwise be described, developing a methodology. Accordingly, 
the research is not designed around a set of procedures that have been, 
at least, hypothesised as epistemologically appropriate to producing the 
knowledge that they wanted to produce. However, the researchers do 
have some, apparently intuitive, ideas about what methods to use in the 
research process. These amounted to what might be called covert 
participant observation, and what Fleck says is almost action research 
(although not seeking to stimulate political activism) (2002: xiv). It was 
essentially ad hoc: many techniques were ‘discovered’ as they went along. 
This may be highly innovative, as Fleck claims, but it does suggest that 
there was no possibility, and no attempt, to test such techniques in 
terms of what kind of knowledge (as opposed to data) they might 
produce. In other words, they have methods without methodology, 
techniques without an informing research rationale.  
It is noteworthy that none of the authors was at all closely involved 
in the fieldwork. Fleck points out that this was just the way it happened, 
rather than being part of the research design (2002: xiv). This is 
inevitably so, because there really was no research design – as he 
comments, ‘the researchers started their project off the cuff’ (ibid.: xiii). 
But, because there was no research design and no a priori methodology, 
there is no indication of what the various techniques that were used 
were intended to do, or whether they were successful in achieving this 
intention. Equally, there seems to have been no evaluation, on 
completion of the project, of how effective the techniques were in 
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producing valid knowledge claims – as opposed to an evaluation based 
on subjective preference, (for example, whether the resultant knowledge 
claims had ‘fit’ with what the researchers believed to be the case and/or 
wanted to say). The collected research material ‘weighed sixty-six 
pounds’ (Jahoda et al., 2002: 9), but is now ‘lost due to political 
circumstances’ (Fleck, 2002: xvi). That the material did not survive such 
turbulent times is hardly surprising and, obviously, by no means the 
fault of the researchers. It does mean, however, that it is not possible 
now to re-evaluate how effective the techniques used in the research 
process may have been. 
The researchers did not exactly parachute into the village and start 
collecting data and interviewing people, they had a policy of active 
involvement in the life of the village, of contributing some good to the 
situation: 
If we were to succeed we had to adopt a very special approach: we 
made it a consistent point of policy that none of our researchers should 
be in Marienthal as a mere reporter or outside observer. Everyone was 
to fit naturally into the communal life by participating in some activity 
generally useful to the community. This proved most difficult in the 
case of the researcher who actually lived in Marienthal. (Jahoda et al., 
2002: 5, our emphasis) 
This researcher was Lotte Danzinger: there is some confusion about her 
family name, she is Danziger in the text, but Danzinger according to 
Fleck. She was a young psychology graduate and lived in Marienthal for 
about 6 weeks. It was she who established initial contact with the 
villagers, through the charitable clothing project, which involved a 
private collection of clothes in Vienna, which were then cleaned and 
repaired to be distributed by the research team to the villagers, and 
which was a primary technique for gaining access to the people and to 
their homes. She later said, in an interview with Fleck in 1988: 
Well, I lived there for a while and did a number of interviews, but I 
really hated it… I had a terrible, an awful room, really awful. That was 
for about a week, or perhaps ten days… I left the house in the morning 
and did a few interviews with different families, and then wrote them 
down in the afternoon… you could not really write them down in the 
presence of the people because then they would have immediately 
stopped telling their stories, so you had to draw up the protocols from 
memory. (Fleck, 2002: xiii, ellipses in original) 
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While it is understandable that she would not want to take notes during 
her interviews, the project was, thus, very dependent on her memory 
and her interpretation, indeed, on her ‘objectivity’. Without wanting to 
cast doubt on her talents, clearly there is a problem about these field 
notes being objective accounts, and it may not be inconsequential that 
she was so very unhappy in Marienthal. 
The ambition to integrate themselves into the life of the village is 
another example of the naivety of the researchers. A total of 120 days 
(Jahoda et al., 2002: 9) were spent in Marienthal on the project, and it 
seems ‘that “ten psychologists” conducted the field work’ (Fleck 2002: 
xiii), at one time or another. To be useful to the community might have 
contributed to their being accepted, but it could not contribute to their 
being integrated – indeed, these very activities may have emphasised 
their ‘outsider-ness’ and placed them (perhaps unwittingly) in positions 
of authority. In any case, it is likely that none of the villagers would have 
been under the illusion that the visitors were sharing in their situation. 
In a village the size of Marienthal, to have a team of strangers, city-
based professional people, appear suddenly and start asking questions 
could hardly have realised the intention to ‘fit naturally’ into the village. 
This is unlikely to have worked under more normal conditions, but, at 
that time, the relatively close enquiries into their personal circumstances 
may well even have seemed quite threatening to some people. 
Additionally, the special projects had implications for the research 
process. Apart from the clothing project, these included free medical 
treatment and parental counselling, a pattern design course, girls’ 
gymnastics, at least one competition offering a prize, and so on. The 
research team were not just making enquiries into people’s 
circumstances, they were also, through the charitable works that they 
were engaged in, manipulating those circumstances. It may even have 
been the case that the villagers were aware that the ‘visitors’ had access 
to various kinds of official information about individuals. It may be – 
indeed, it seems quite likely – that such factors influenced the 
information given, the behaviour of the villagers and the degree of 
acceptance of the team in Marienthal. All these factors have a significant 
bearing on the research process and potentially raise questions about 
the validity of the data. 
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The Researchers 
Given the many issues that arise from a critical textual reading of 
Marienthal, it is relevant to ask who the authors were. It is worthy of 
note that ‘(a)ll three [of the authors], and most of their collaborators, 
came from fairly well-established, Jewish upper middle-class families’ 
(Fleck 2002: xx). In particular, Lazarsfeld, who was married to Jahoda at 
the time of the study, was very well connected, socially: 
his father Robert was a lawyer and his mother Sophie ran a salon where 
leading left intellectuals met regularly. One of them became young 
Paul’s mentor and Paul’s mother’s lover: Friedrich Adler, the son of the 
founder of the Social Democratic Party in Austria, Victor Adler. (ibid.) 
In their professional lives, they were principally engaged in the 
application of economic psychology to market research (ibid.: xxii). 
Their original plan had been to study the leisure activities of workers, 
who were felt to have been rather ignored by marketing practice. What 
became the study, Marienthal, was suggested to them by a Social 
Democrat politician, Otto Bauer, who proposed both the topic and the 
location, but had no further practical involvement in the study (ibid.: 
xix). As previously noted, none of the authors was directly involved in 
the field work – during that period, Jahoda was finishing her PhD, 
Lazarsfeld was busy directing other projects and Zeisel was working in 
his father’s law firm in Vienna. Indeed, there was, apparently, some 
long-lasting disagreement among the authors about ‘the true authorship 
of Marienthal. Evidently the book was the result of a collaborative effort 
even if it is true that Jahoda wrote the main text’ (ibid.: xxx).  
The book was published in 1933. On the advice of their German-
based publisher, it was published anonymously – at least, the authors’ 
names did not appear on the title page, though it seems that they did 
appear inside the book (Fleck, 2002: xxv) – on the grounds that their 
names identified them as Jewish. It was received in a generally positive 
way but then, in effect, disappeared for about 30 years. It was not 
translated into English until 1971, because the authors did not wish it. 
Since its publication in English, Marienthal has come to be regarded as a 
seminal piece of research – the present 2002 edition has warranted at 
least one reprinting. 
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Why did the authors not want the study to be translated into 
English? Lazarsfeld, in his introduction to the first English edition, is 
quite specific about this: 
For a long time we did not consent to an English translation of our 
study. Certain aspects of our approach were very naive. We never stated 
explicitly our sampling procedures and probably never had very good 
ones; our typologies were developed intuitively and never checked for 
their logical consistency. We did not use attitude scales – we hardly 
knew about them. Many of the standards on which my colleagues and I 
would later insist in our teaching were neglected. I can excuse this only 
by remembering the adventurous pioneering spirit that propelled us; but 
it made me uncomfortable enough that for a while I refused any offer 
to publish a translation. (Lazarsfeld, 2002: xxxv) 
Clearly, the authors themselves did not want to make any particular 
claims about innovative research practices and the centrality of the 
study. Nonetheless, such claims have been made. They finally agreed to 
translation into English, apparently, because in the late 1960s and the 
1970s unemployment was again rising in the developed countries, and 
academics were again taking an interest in the phenomenon. Then later, 
‘social scientists looking for prototypes rediscovered Marienthal… Over 
the next thirty years Marienthal functioned as a blueprint for successors’ 
studies. Jahoda’s contributions about the latent functions of paid work 
had a lasting effect on students of work and unemployment from 
different disciplines and a wide range of countries’ (Fleck, 2002: xxvii).3 
 
A Contribution to What? 
It is precisely this contemporary impact of Marienthal that really 
concerns us. We opened this chapter with Richards’ warning about 
feeding a susceptible audience with superficially plausible, (but 
ideologically acceptable), explanations as a means of social control. In 
the uncritical contemporary acceptance of Marienthal we have, we would 
suggest, an outstanding example of these concerns. 
We wish to emphasise that we would not seek to deny any utility 
that Marienthal may have had as a pioneering study in the 1930s, and it is 
certainly an interesting historical document. What we do question is its 
continuing status as an important piece of informing research. It may 
well have been innovative in its time but, while such innovation in the 
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research process can be celebrated, it is also attended by risk, especially 
in terms of establishing the validity of the research claims that ensue. As 
we have indicated, even the authors did not, apparently, want to make 
any big claims about the research process. By modern standards, this 
research process can be seen as rather amateurish, and it is highly 
unlikely that any contemporary research project would seek to replicate, 
in detail, that of Marienthal. This alone, one might have hoped, would 
encourage a more careful, and more critical, appreciation. The question 
is, then, why is it still so uncritically well-regarded? The remarkable 
thing about Marienthal is that its impact has been most significant, not in 
terms of what unemployment does to  workers, but in terms of what 
employment can do for  workers. 
Some of the findings of Marienthal are nowadays unsurprising – for 
example, that the stress of an endless struggle to survive, (though this 
particular characterisation is noteworthy by its absence), might lead to 
interpersonal friction, an attenuated social life, changed patterns of 
behaviour, a reorientation of interests in favour of more immediate 
concerns, self-doubt and uncertainties about the future. One particular 
finding, however, was most adventitious, namely, the loss of structure in 
the lives of the unemployed. This was most clearly articulated in the 
chapter entitled The Meaning of Time. Of course, free time in conditions 
of abject poverty is not the same as leisure time, though this is not how 
the authors see it: 
On examination this leisure proves to be a tragic gift. Cut off from their 
work and deprived of contact with the outside world, the workers of 
Marienthal have lost the material and moral incentives to make use of 
their time. Now that they are no longer under any pressure, they 
undertake nothing new and drift gradually out of an ordered existence 
into one that is undisciplined and empty. (Jahoda et al., 2002: 66) 
Clearly, and explicitly, for the authors, this ‘problem’ is caused by the 
absence of employed work, with the implication that, even if the 
unemployed workers were not poverty-stricken, they would still not 
know what to do with their time. In other words, economics aside, 
workers must have jobs. Thus, the immediate rationale for selling one’s 
labour becomes diluted. In the perpetual struggle between Capital and 
Labour, the former seeking a minimal outlay, the latter seeking an 
adequate return, the ultimate burden for Capital has been to pay 
sufficient for Labour to reproduce itself (that is, to survive). 
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Contemporaneously with the increase in popularity of defining the 
labour process in terms of non-material satisfactions, we have seen the 
formal legitimation, with initiatives in the UK such as Family Income 
Supplement, of the absence of a requirement on Capital to pay a living 
wage. The doctrine that there is a moral obligation to have a job, 
irrespective of how little the wage, preoccupied and energised policy 
makers in the closing decades of the last century. But the enthusiasm of 
Capital continually to shift the wage obligation towards welfare 
payments, minimising costs and improving profits, did see, eventually, 
the introduction of the much-lauded (though not by employers) 
Minimum Wage. We should note, nonetheless, that the dissociation 
from the economic imperative of selling one’s labour in order to survive 
remains intact: the obligation is to pay a minimum wage, not a living wage. 
This is, we would suggest, why the findings of Marienthal remain so 
popular: in effect, they substantiate the notion of the non-corporeality, 
the immateriality, of Labour. 
Cole (2007: 1135) nicely captures the potency of this study with his 
characterisation of it as having ‘emotional appeal’. It seems almost 
churlish to question such a sympathetic account of the travails, the 
emiseration, of the unemployed. However, a critical textual reading of 
the book has disclosed a range of factors influencing the interpretations 
of the data – such as, cultural blindness, naivety, the clash of middle 
class values and the lived experience of the working class – that really 
ought to excite caution. If it is possible to question the interpretations 
of the data, this must raise further questions about the findings; if it is 
possible to question the findings, this must throw doubt onto the later 
characterisation of these findings in terms of the ‘latent functions of 
work’. That these issues have not been generally developed is, we would 
suggest, the effect of a more significant aspect of the study, i t s  
ideo log i ca l  f i t  w i th  dominant  v i ews o f  the  va lue  o f  employed  work . 
What more could Capital desire, than the belief that Labour should 
depend on paid work not just for income, but also for its social and 
psychological infrastructure? The message of Marienthal fitted perfectly 
into the then burgeoning, and still flourishing, literature on ‘the meaning 
of work’. Its principle contribution has been to the idea that paid work 
has therapeut i c  va lues , even that these therapeutic values are more 
significant than its economic value, for workers.  
Carey (1977: 34) commented on Herzberg’s work that he ‘claimed to 
have found scientific proof that the true human nature and needs of 
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men [sic] comprise just those attitudes and values which fit them ideally 
for a loyal, subordinate role in a free enterprise system’. In our view, 
Marienthal is precisely another example of this fortuitous phenomenon! 
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1  Interestingly, and very symbolic of the continuing significance of Marienthal in 
the present, the University of Graz is in the process of constructing a 
fascinating and very informative website about the book and, especially, about 
the place, to be found at www.agso.uni-graz.at/marienthal. This site clarifies 
some of the confusions that arise in Marienthal, but fails to clarify others (see 
below). Confusions have abounded, including disagreements among the 
authors about when the book was published, who wrote it, even when the 
study took place. 
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2 There are a number of tables regarding the demographics of Marienthal, and 
relating these to numbers of people (or, sometimes, ‘consumer units’), in 
receipt of relief, classified as unemployed, etc. It is, however, very difficult to 
work out from these tables specific data on these matters, partly because they 
do not use comparable units of analysis – for example, some refer to 
individuals, some to families. It seems that 66% of the population of 
Marienthal was of working age (15-59 years of age) (Jahoda et al., 2002: 15), 
that 82% of people were dependent on unemployment relief (this figure 
includes children) (ibid.: 21), that 93 families had at least one member working 
and a further 18 families had someone who was in receipt of a pension, and 
that 9 families – of which Family 273 was clearly one – were not in receipt of 
any relief at all, either because their entitlement had been exhausted or 
because they were ineligible (ibid.: 19). Trying to elucidate these figures by 
consulting the website does not help, since those figures also do not appear to 
stack up. 
3 The book has been translated into, inter alia, French, Italian, Spanish, 
Norwegian, Korean, Hungarian, Polish. It seems to have proved to be 
especially attractive in countries making the transition to capitalism. 
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‘Lessons for Managers and Consultants’: 
A Reading of Edgar H. Schein’s Process  
Consul tat ion 
Nick Butler 
Introduction 
Perhaps more than anyone else in the field, Edgar H. Schein straddles 
the divide between academic researcher and organizational consultant. 
Born in Zurich to Hungarian and German parents in 1928, Schein spent 
his early years in Switzerland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia 
before emigrating to the United States in 1938. Having studied at the 
Universities of Chicago, Stanford, and Harvard, Schein went on to work 
in the Neuropsychiatry Division of the Walter Reed Army Institute of 
Research during the early 1950s. It was here that he conducted research 
into the effects of communist ‘brainwashing’ and indoctrination 
techniques on US prisoners-of-war repatriated from China and North 
Korea. This research, he writes, first alerted him to the power of 
‘interpersonal forces’ over and above ‘the threat of physical force’ 
(Schein, 1993: 39). Fittingly, the theme of ‘coercive persuasion’ would 
come to form the basis of his first, co-authored, book (Schein, Schneier, 
and Barker, 1961). After leaving the Walter Reed Army Institute of 
Research in 1956, Schein began teaching at MIT’s Sloan School of 
Management and became a Professor of Organizational Psychology and 
Management in 1964. He has since gone on to work as a consultant for 
such corporate luminaries as Proctor & Gamble, Citibank, Con Edison, 
ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, and, in the public sector, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. Oil drilling and nuclear fission aside, Schein has 
written extensively on leadership, corporate culture, organizational 
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development, and career management, and his academic contribution 
was recently affirmed by his ‘Vita Contemplativa’ in Organization Studies 
(Schein, 2006). In this chapter, I will focus exclusively on Schein’s 
model of ‘process consultation’. 
Schein outlines the model of process consultation in a trilogy of 
practitioner-oriented textbooks written over several decades (1969; 
1987; 1999).1 For Schein, this model is ‘a special kind of consultation’ 
(1969: 3) in that it does not require the consultant to possess any 
technical expertise in a specific organizational area. Unlike conventional 
content-based consulting, which seeks to make operational 
improvements to the client organization, process consultation is based 
entirely on knowledge about how to establish a collaborative consultant-
client relation in order to conduct the joint diagnosis of organizational 
problems and the joint formulation of solutions to these problems. 
These problems and their solutions, moreover, will be informal and 
relational, rather than formal and technical, in nature. Process 
consultation thus seeks to improve interpersonal relations between 
members of staff in the client organization. For this reason, Schein 
claims that his model of process consultation can be applied not only by 
consultants in relation to their clients, but also by managers in relation 
to their subordinates. The result is as simple as it is seemingly 
contradictory: by drawing on the model of process consultation, 
managers are able to act as ‘their own consultants’ in organizations. The 
present chapter examines this conundrum by conducting a close reading 
of Schein’s Process Consultation, focusing in particular on the first and 
second volumes. 
I will begin by suggesting that the model of process consultation is 
to be understood primarily in terms of its relation to management. The 
first section will outline precisely what is meant by the term 
‘management’ by drawing on the work of management theorist Peter 
Armstrong, which will serve to guide the discussion in the remainder of 
the chapter. I will conclude by arguing that process consultation allows 
consultants to gain power over managers whilst simultaneously 
threatening to undermine the very basis of this power. I want to suggest 
that this is the real lesson to be drawn from Schein’s work. 
Technical and Relational Components of Management 
The meaning and significance of Schein’s model of process consultation 
lies in its relation to management. Before this relation can be brought to 
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light, however, we first need to clarify what we mean by ‘management’ 
since, as Grey (1999: 563) points out, ‘there are competing claims about 
what management is and should be’. Some commentators have 
attempted to define management according to the day-to-day activities 
performed by managers, often reaching very different conclusions from 
‘classic’ management thinkers such as Fayol and Drucker (see e.g. 
Carroll and Gillen, 1987; Hales, 1986; Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg, 1973; 
Watson, 1994; Whitley, 1989). Other commentators, meanwhile, have 
argued that management has become far more diffused throughout 
organizations with the shift from a ‘command-and-control’ to a 
‘facilitate-and-empower’ structure, which means that the task of 
managing is no longer performed solely by an occupational group of 
trained managers (see e.g. Barker, 1993; 1999; Ezzamel, Lilley, and 
Willmott, 1994; Ezzamel and Willmott, 1998; Sewell, 1998; Sewell and 
Wilkinson, 1992). This argument is extended even further by theorists 
who suggest that the ideology of management has seeped out of the 
workplace and entered our everyday lives (see e.g. Hancock and Tyler, 
2004; 2008; 2009). The field of management studies, we might be 
tempted to say, is characterized precisely by this proliferation of 
perspectives on its object of study. But does this mean that 
‘management’ is fundamentally unstable, ambiguous, and indeterminate? 
Perhaps. In any case, this chapter will seek to clarify Schein’s model 
of process consultation by outlining its relation to ‘management’ as it is 
understood by Armstrong. Whereas most commentators focus on the 
(necessarily piecemeal) level of the empirical practice of managing in 
specific organizations, Armstrong deals with the historical development 
of prescriptive managerial knowledge as a whole. By reviewing this 
practitioner literature for managers, Armstrong is able to highlight 
recurring themes, prevalent trends, and sudden transformations in the 
body of managerial knowledge (which, no doubt, has come to inform 
actual management practice over the years). Armstrong’s analysis tells us 
that while managers perform operational tasks as part of their work, 
they also need to manage the relation with their subordinates. This 
implies that management, as a body of knowledge, involves two 
components: technical and relational. As we will see, it is this distinction 
that allows us to reflect on the meaning and significance of Schein’s 
model of process consultation. 
In a series of articles and book-chapters, Armstrong (1987; 1991; 
1992; 1996) examines the distinction between the technical and the 
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relational components of management from a historical perspective. He 
notes that, for some of the earliest proponents of management theory in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the right and ability to 
manage was inextricable from technical expertise. In Frederick Taylor’s 
view, for example, 
the core of managerial expertise was the knowledge of productive 
processes which enabled the industrial engineer to redesign them so as 
to eliminate ‘waste’ effort. Indeed, Taylor considered the possession of 
such knowledge to be the sole legitimate basis on which management 
could claim authority over the workforce. (Armstrong, 1992: 44; 
emphasis in original) 
Control over labour, in a Taylorist context, is secured by the application 
of mechanical engineering design principles to the production process 
(i.e. analyzing and altering factory workers’ physical movements to 
achieve maximum efficiency). Technical expertise, from this 
perspective, is not separate from managerial practice; the two go hand-
in-hand. This means that, for Taylor, ‘[m]anagement, as a body of 
knowledge and code of behaviour, remained industry-specific’ 
(Armstrong, 1991: 247). 
Beginning in the 1920s, the technical and relational components of 
management come to be separated. Whereas previously management 
was conceptualized as practical knowledge of the production process in 
a particular industry, now management starts to be discussed as an 
abstract, universal set of skills that is detached from any specific 
organizational area and therefore applicable in any given industry. As 
Armstrong (1991: 247) puts it, management is conceptualized as ‘a set 
of techniques which stand in an additive relationship to the technical 
elements of real-life managerial work’. Such a view finds early 
expression in Fayol’s General and Industrial Management (1949: 83), first 
published in the original French in 1916 and translated into English in 
1929: 
For a divisional engineer managerial ability is as important as technical 
ability. This fact may be surprising but is easily explainable thus: the 
manager of a metallurgical division, for instance, blast furnaces, steel 
works, rolling-mills, has not for some years been exclusively concerned 
with metallurgy – or even with a limited section of metallurgy. All 
details learnt at college about mines, railways, construction, are no 
longer any more than vaguely useful for him, whereas handling of men, 
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planning, in a word, elements of management, are constantly taking up 
his attention. At the particular level of authority which he has reached 
the services which he will subsequently be able to render and his own 
advancement will most likely turn far more on his managerial than on 
his technical ability. 
Fayol makes a clear distinction between knowledge about how to 
control the production process and knowledge about how to control 
subordinates, that is to say, the ‘handling of men’. For Fayol, unlike 
Taylor, ‘technical ability’ and ‘managerial ability’ do not go hand-in-
hand; the former is divorced from, and secondary to, the latter. This 
means that the relational component of management – forecasting, 
planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating, and controlling 
(Fayol, 1949: 5-6; see also Armstrong, 1991: 246-8; 1992: 44-5; 1996: 
278-9) – is understood as the properly managerial aspect of managers’ 
work whereas the technical component of management is, in turn, 
understood as the non-managerial aspect of managers’ work. This 
conceptualization of management, Armstrong notes (1996: 293-5), is 
now firmly established in both the practitioner literature for managers 
and the educational textbooks for students of management. 
A number of consequences follow from this conceptualization of 
management. First, the separation of the technical component from the 
relational component of management results in a clearer distinction 
between productive and unproductive aspects of management labour. 
Armstrong reminds us that, in Marxist terms, productive labour is the 
part of labour that creates surplus value whereas unproductive labour is 
the part of labour that serves, among other functions, to direct and 
control productive labour in order to extract surplus value from it. 
Broadly speaking, productive labour refers to workers who ‘produce a 
greater value in goods and services than is represented by their wages’ 
while unproductive labour refers to ‘all of the tasks within the 
administrative apparatus [that have] replaced the functions once carried 
out by the primordial individual capitalist’ (1987: 426). Management, 
along Taylorist lines, is by definition both a part of productive labour 
(since managers perform operational tasks in the production process) 
and a part of unproductive labour (since managers direct and control 
their subordinates in the organizational hierarchy) (1991: 241-4). It 
becomes possible to separate these types of labour, however, once the 
technical component of management is divorced from, and made 
secondary to, the relational component of management. If the former 
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component is viewed as the non-managerial aspect of managers’ work, 
and the latter as the properly managerial aspect, then it is not difficult to 
see how management can be detached entirely from productive labour 
and come to be situated exclusively on the level of unproductive labour 
(1987: 429). A manager no longer requires any technical knowledge 
whatsoever; all they need is knowledge about how to control and 
coordinate staff activities, regardless of the operational area in which 
they work. 
This brings us to a second consequence: the division between 
different levels of management in the organizational hierarchy. While 
middle and lower managers continue to perform specific operational 
tasks in a particular department within the organization (marketing, 
finance, IT, human resources, etc.) in addition to their general 
managerial tasks of coordination and control, top managers are 
concerned almost exclusively with the overall direction of the 
organization and its members. Put simply, the labour of middle and 
lower managers will still be productive whereas the labour of top 
managers will be largely unproductive. As Armstrong notes, it is the 
latter group that serves as the ‘model for managerial excellence’: ‘Thus, 
in the same breath as it celebrates its universality, 
‘management’…comes to identify itself exclusively with the 
administration of the capitalist enterprise and denies the title of 
management to authoritative expertise within the productive process’ 
(1987: 428). The ‘ideal type’ of management, in other words, is now 
wholly identified with the function of agenda-setting and decision-
making at the broadest organizational level, completely disconnected 
from technical expertise. Such a predicament, of course, would have 
been unthinkable for Taylor. It becomes possible only once the 
relational component of management is separated from its technical 
component, and once the unproductive element of management labour 
is divorced from its productive element. 
Finally, a third consequence: the question of professionalization. 
Once management is viewed as ‘always and everywhere the same in 
essence’ (Armstrong, 1991: 247; 1996: 279), it becomes possible to 
develop a common body of knowledge that is applicable in every 
industry and in every department. It is this body of knowledge, 
moreover, that provides the basis on which management can seek to 
gain full professional recognition. This was certainly the ambition of 
British management theorists like Lyndall Urwick (Armstrong, 1991: 
‘Lessons for Managers and Consultant’ 
 67 
250-5; 1996: 279-84). Such a project of managerial professionalization 
serves to undermine the claim made by engineers that they are more 
capable of managing an organization than any other professional group. 
Since performing an operational task is now secondary to dealing with a 
hierarchical relation, engineers are accordingly relegated to a position 
that is subordinate to ‘managerial specialists’ (Armstrong, 1987: 432; 
1991: 258). By the same token, the collective interests of managers, as a 
professional group, are made more secure if management is understood 
not in terms of industry-specific knowledge of the production process, 
but rather in terms of abstract and universally-applicable principles for 
coordinating and controlling staff activities in the organization. 
Armstrong’s historical analysis of management’s technical and 
relational components allows us to bring into focus the meaning and 
significance of Schein’s model of process consultation. The next section 
will show that process consultants have also been able to detach their 
work from the operational tasks of productive labour. This opens up 
the possibility for consultants to position themselves at the top-most 
level of organizational hierarchies and, moreover, to secure their 
collective interests as a professional group on the basis of a body of 
knowledge. To this extent, the model of process consultation mirrors 
the ‘ideal type’ of management. But the divorce of the relational 
component of consultancy from its technical component has profound, 
indeed paradoxical, implications. We will examine these implications by 
describing, first, how the model of process consultation differs from 
conventional content-based consulting and, second, how Schein 
encourages managers to act as ‘their own consultants’ in organizations. 
The Model of Process Consultation 
At the beginning of the first volume of Process Consultation, Schein 
contrasts the model of process consultation with two ‘more traditional 
consultation models’ (1969: 4): the ‘purchase model’ and the ‘doctor-
patient model’. This allows Schein to tell us what is unique and 
distinctive about the model of process consultation in relation to other 
types of organizational consulting. 
The purchase model, Schein says, is based on the idea that the 
client2 purchases a service from a consultant that is based on technical 
expertise in a specific organizational area. This model of consultancy 
assumes that the client knows what the problem is and how it can be 
resolved: ‘The buyer, an individual manager or some group in the 
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organization, defines a need – something he wishes to know or some 
activity he wishes carried out – and, if he doesn’t feel the organization 
itself has the time or capability, he will look to a consultant to fill the 
need’ (1969: 5). This might involve hiring a consultant to find out how a 
group of customers feel, to help in the design of a new plant, or to put 
into operation a new accounting system (1969: 5). The effectiveness of 
this model depends on the client being able to conduct an accurate 
diagnosis and to communicate the organizational problem clearly to the 
consultant. For this reason, Schein says, the purchase model often fails 
to deliver improvements to the client organization (1969: 5). 
The doctor-patient model, meanwhile, involves the client hiring a 
consultant to conduct a general diagnosis, to identify any organizational 
problems, and to propose possible solutions. Schein elaborates: 
One or more executives in the organization decide to bring in a 
consultant or team of consultants to ‘look them over’, much as the 
patient might go to his doctor for an annual physical. The consultants 
are supposed to find out what is wrong with which part of the 
organization, and then, like a physician, recommend a program of 
therapy. (1969: 6) 
This model is based on the notion that the organization is dysfunctional 
in some way and that the client requires a consultant to find out what 
the disorder is and how it can be remedied. Its effectiveness depends on 
the client’s willingness to allow the consultant access to information 
about the organization as well as the client’s disposition to accept or 
reject the consultant’s diagnosis. For this reason, the doctor-patient 
model also often fails to deliver improvements to the client organization 
(1969: 6-7). 
Both the purchase model and the doctor-patient model involve 
some basic assumptions about the relation between the consultant and 
the client. In the first model, the consultant is construed as a passive 
‘seller’ whereas the client is construed as an active ‘buyer’. In the second 
model, meanwhile, the consultant is construed as an active ‘doctor’ 
whereas the client is construed as the passive ‘patient’. Both the 
purchase model and the doctor-patient model, however, are variations 
on the same basic model: in both cases, the consultant plays the role of 
a vendor (as a provider of managerial services) and the client plays the 
role of a customer (as a purchaser of managerial services). In effect, 
‘Lessons for Managers and Consultant’ 
 69 
Schein is outlining the model of conventional content-based consulting, which 
involves the provision of outsourced expertise to a client organization. 
Against the purchase model and the doctor-patient model, Schein 
proposes a third model: ‘process consultation’ (or ‘P-C’).3 In contrast to 
the purchase model and the doctor-patient model, the model of process 
consultation emphasizes the need for a collaborative consultant-client 
relation in order to conduct the joint diagnosis of problems and the 
joint formulation of solutions. As Schein puts it: ‘The client must learn 
to see the problem for himself, to share in the diagnosis, and to be 
actively involved in generating a remedy’ (1969: 8). Since the publication 
of Process Consultation, it has become commonplace for the practitioner 
literature to encourage consultants to establish a collaborative 
relationship with the client. What is novel and interesting about the 
model of process consultation, however, is the fact that it does not 
necessarily involve any technical expertise in a specific organizational 
area.4 Schein explains: 
It should be emphasized that the process consultant may or may not be 
expert in solving the particular problem which is uncovered. The 
important point in P-C is that such expertise is less relevant than are the 
skills of involving the client in self-diagnosis and helping him to find a 
remedy which fits his particular situation and unique set of needs. The 
process consultant must be an expert in how to diagnose and how to 
develop a helping relationship. He does not need to be an expert on 
production, marketing, finance, and the like. (1969: 7) 
While Schein does not discount the possibility that the process 
consultant may well possess technical expertise, he makes it clear that 
this is not a prerequisite for process consultation. The process 
consultant, on this view, need only possess the skills for establishing a 
collaborative consultant-client relation (what Schein calls here a ‘helping 
relationship’) in order to engage the manager in joint problem diagnosis 
and joint solution formulation. The purpose of process consultation, for 
Schein, is to ‘help the manager become a sufficiently good diagnostician 
himself’, since ‘problems will stay solved longer and be solved more 
effectively if the organization solves its own problems’ (1969: 6). The 
process consultant, then, ‘should not work on the actual concrete 
problem himself’, but should instead play ‘a role in teaching diagnostic 
and problem-solving skills’ to the manager (1969: 6). The actual content 
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of the problem is less important, for Schein, than the process by which 
this problem is identified and remedied. 
Schein is actually equivocal about whether or not technical expertise 
plays a role in process consultation at all. Whereas, in the above passage, 
he suggests that the process consultant ‘may or may not be [an] expert’ 
and ‘does not need to be an expert’ in an organizational area – which 
implies that technical expertise can play a role – he later goes on to say 
that it cannot, in fact, play a role in process consultation: 
Actual solutions to management problems…would not be considered 
valid interventions in a P-C model. If I permitted myself to become 
interested in a particular management problem in sales, marketing, or 
production, I would be switching roles from that of process consultant 
to that of expert resource. Once I have become an expert resource, I 
find I lose my effectiveness as a process consultant. (1969: 103) 
Schein says that any application of technical expertise in a client 
organization would detract from the function of the process consultant. 
By solving a particular managerial problem in a specific organizational 
area – such as sales, marketing, or production – the process consultant 
becomes an ‘expert resource’, thus falling into either the purchase 
model or the doctor-patient model. As Schein notes, the application of 
technical expertise in a specific organizational area is, for the process 
consultant, ‘very rare, largely because it violates some of the basic 
assumptions of the process consultation model’ (1969: 118). Such 
comments serve to emphasize the fact that process consultation can be 
– perhaps must be – devoid of all technical expertise. 
Let us pause for a moment to reflect on the consequences of 
Schein’s model of process consultation. We previously said that the 
relational component of management has come to be separated from its 
technical component. Whereas management was once conceptualized as 
practical knowledge of the production process in a particular industry, 
management is now understood as an abstract, universal set of skills 
that is detached from any specific organizational area and therefore 
applicable in any given industry. In the same way, our preliminary 
analysis of process consultation suggests that the technical component 
of consultancy has become divorced from, and made secondary to, its 
relational component. Whereas consultants working within the purchase 
model or the doctor-patient model must possess technical expertise in a 
specific organizational area (such as sales, marketing, or production), 
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process consultants need only possess knowledge about how to 
establish a collaborative relation with their clients in order to engage 
them in joint problem diagnosis and joint solution formulation. This 
means that the model of process consultation is conceptualized by 
Schein as an abstract, universal set of skills that is detached from any 
specific organizational area and applicable in any given industry. In this 
respect, the model of process consultation can be completely divorced 
from the operational tasks of productive labour and come to be situated 
exclusively on the level of unproductive labour. This presents an 
opportunity for consultants to position themselves at the top-most level 
of organizational hierarchies, since it is here that the task of 
management is disconnected from any technical expertise and wholly 
identified with the relational processes of coordination and control. By 
gaining access to and exerting influence over senior executives in 
organizations, process consultants will no doubt be able to raise their 
occupational status and, consequently, secure a higher asking-price for 
their services.5 This could conceivably offer one explanation why Schein 
is so keen to detach the model of process consultation from the 
operational tasks associated with conventional content-based 
consulting. 
But if the model of process consultation does not involve any 
content whatsoever, what purpose does it serve for client organizations? 
The next section will show that process consultation seeks to improve 
interpersonal relations between members of the client staff. For this 
reason, Schein claims that the model of process consultation can be 
applied not only by consultants in relation to clients, but also by 
managers in relation to subordinates. 
‘Lessons for Managers and Consultants’ 
The primary objective of process consultation, as we said, is to establish 
a collaborative consultant-client relation that permits the joint diagnosis 
of problems and the joint formulation of solutions. But that is not all. 
Schein states that such a ‘helping relationship’ is of practical use only to 
the extent that it permits the consultant and the client to deal with 
interpersonal relations in the organization, such as communication 
between individuals, group problem-solving and decision-making, and 
inter-group cooperation and competition (1969: 13). This means that 
process consultation is concerned not with delivering technical expertise 
into the client organization, but with changing the way its employees 
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relate to and communicate with each other. Although Schein initially 
claims that the purpose of developing a collaborative consultant-client 
relation is to help the manager ‘find a remedy which fits his particular 
situation and unique set of needs’ (1969: 7), it is readily apparent that he 
has a very specific idea about the kinds of issues that must be addressed 
in a client organization in order to improve its effectiveness. For the 
process consultant, the organizational problem and its solution will 
always be relational, rather than technical, in nature. 
It should be said that Schein does not deny the merit of making 
operational improvements to a client organization. He emphasizes the 
need, rather, to deal first and foremost with ‘the processes which occur 
between people and groups’ (1969: 11) before dealing with technical 
content. He elaborates: 
I am not contending that focusing on human processes is the only path 
to increasing organizational effectiveness. Obviously there is room in 
most organizations for improved production, financial, marketing, and 
other processes. I am arguing, however, that the various functions 
which make up an organization are always mediated by the interactions 
of people, so that the organization can never escape its human 
processes. (1969: 9; emphasis in original) 
For Schein, there is always an underlying relational dimension to any 
technical problem. On this view, the ‘how’ of management (its process) 
is just as important, if not more so, than the ‘what’ of management (its 
content). Schein admits that this might seem counterintuitive to some 
managers, who ‘tend to focus much more on the content of decisions, 
interactions, and communications’ (1969: 124). In this respect, it is part 
of the task of process consultants to demonstrate to managers that 
‘[human] processes in the organization follow patterns which can be 
studied and understood, and which have important consequences for 
organizational performance’. Managers must be shown, moreover, that 
these ‘processes can be rationally changed and adapted to increase the 
effectiveness of performance’ (1969: 124). Whereas conventional 
content-based consulting – such as the purchase model or the doctor-
patient model – focuses principally on the formal aspects of client 
organizations by seeking to improve technical content, the model of 
process consultation targets the informal aspects of client organizations 
by seeking to improve relational processes between members of the 
client staff. 
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It is for this reason that the model of process consultation can be 
put to direct use not only by consultants, but also by managers. This 
point, it should be said, remains largely implicit in the first volume of 
Process Consultation. But when the second volume appears in 1987, with 
its revealing subtitle Lessons for Managers and Consultants, there can be no 
doubt about the wider applicability of process consultation that Schein 
envisages. In the preface, he describes the genesis of the second 
volume: 
My original intention had been simply to revise the 1969 book. 
However, as I began to write, I realized that most of what I was saying 
was an elaboration and that the new ideas were intended for a much 
different audience. Whereas my original book was a primer for 
consultants, the present book is much more a new approach for 
experienced consultants and a prescription for effective 
management…Line managers often have to function as process 
consultants vis-à-vis their subordinates, peers, and bosses…I believe 
that all managers can become more effective if they adopt some of the 
concepts of process consultation and learn some of the skills associated 
with that concept. (1987: vii-viii) 
While Schein had initially sought only to amend the first volume of 
Process Consultation, he says that the second volume extends beyond that 
work. Most significantly, he came to realize that the model of process 
consultation can be applied by managers as well as consultants. But 
what does it mean for managers to ‘learn some of the skills’ associated 
with process consultation? On a basic level, it means that managers will 
come to deal with their subordinates (as well as their peers and bosses) 
in the same way that consultants deal with their clients, namely, by 
establishing a collaborative relation in order to conduct the joint 
diagnosis of problems and the joint formulation of solutions. The 
purpose of such an undertaking, moreover, is to improve relational 
processes between members of staff in an organization. This allows 
Schein to call the model of process consultation a ‘prescription for 
effective management’ as well as a ‘new approach for experienced 
consultants’. 
Schein admits that managers and consultants appear, on the surface, 
to differ considerably. Managers, on the one hand, exercise formal 
authority over their subordinates and remain inside their organization. 
Consultants, on the other hand, do not exercise formal authority over 
Nick Butler 
 74 
their clients and, on the whole, remain outside the client organization 
(1987: 5). Beyond these superficial differences, however, there are 
certain shared characteristics that belong equally to managers and 
consultants. Schein explains: ‘People who are perceived by their 
colleagues, bosses, and subordinates to be effective managers and effective 
consultants have in common that, when they relate to others whom 
they are trying to influence, they both take the stance of trying to help’ 
(1987: 6; emphasis in original). Managers and consultants both attempt 
to help the people with whom they are dealing, whether these people 
are clients or subordinates; their basic task, therefore, is the same.6 For 
Schein, it is not a case of arbitrarily imposing on managers the model of 
process consultation, but of drawing attention to the similarities 
between managers and consultants in order to improve the effectiveness 
of both: 
Managers reading this book may find at first that some of the ideas 
seem less applicable to them, but the more they think about the 
managerial role, the more they will come to recognize how much of 
their own behaviour resembles that of consultants, and therefore, how 
much they might increase their own effectiveness if they learned some 
of the philosophies, concepts, and skills that consultants, especially 
process consultants, use. (1987: 9) 
Schein seeks to reassure sceptical managers about the feasibility and 
value of adopting the tenets of process consultation. While it might at 
first seem counterintuitive to think of the managerial role as a 
consultancy role, Schein insists that the latter in fact resembles the 
former since they each share the same task of ‘helping’. Managers, on 
this view, can be said already to act as consultants in their own 
organization and should therefore draw on consultancy knowledge to 
improve their managerial effectiveness. Schein emphasizes, moreover, 
that process consultation is his favoured ‘model of helping’, over and 
above the purchase model (now called the ‘expert model’) and the 
doctor-patient model (1987: 8; see also 22-34). We will recall that, in the 
first volume of Process Consultation, Schein said that both the purchase 
model and the doctor-patient model often fail to deliver improvements 
to the client organization and so, for this reason, they should be avoided 
by the consultant. Likewise, in the second volume, Schein asserts that it 
is rarely ever appropriate for the manager to adopt either of these 
models: 
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When should a manager be an expert, a doctor, or a process consultant? 
The formal authority of a manager makes it easy for him to fall into the 
expert or doctor role, especially when help is being sought by a 
subordinate. But if the goals of the manager are to teach the 
subordinate problem-solving skills and to ensure that the solutions 
developed will be the right ones and will be implemented correctly, then 
being a [process] consultant is by far the preferable way to begin. (1987: 
35) 
A manager should not act as an expert or a doctor, then, but as a 
process consultant. This involves establishing a collaborative relation 
with subordinates in order to conduct the joint diagnosis of problems 
and the joint formulation of solutions. It is worth pointing out that 
these problems and solutions will be informal and relational, rather than 
formal and technical, since ‘effective managers spend far more time 
intervening in how things are done than on what is done’ (1987: 39; 
emphasis in original). The consequences are clear: a good manager, for 
Schein, is one who has the ability to be a process consultant. 
What is most striking about Schein’s line of reasoning in the second 
volume of Process Consultation is the way it undermines the conventional 
primacy of management over consultancy. Managers resemble 
consultants, not the other way around. It is no longer enough, it seems, 
for a manager to be effective at carrying out their managerial 
responsibilities; a manager must now also act as ‘their own consultant’ 
in the organization. We might wonder whether an actual consultant 
(such as Schein) needs to be present in the client organization to ensure 
that the manager properly adopts a consultancy role, or whether a 
manager is able to function as a consultant without the help of such an 
external adviser. We might also wonder whether the manager-as-
consultant, if he or she follows the model of process consultation 
strictly enough, will succeed in transferring diagnostic and relationship-
building skills to their subordinates (thus turning them into de facto 
consultants as well). In any case, it is clear that Schein views his model 
of process consultation as a set of guidelines for managers, as well as 
consultants, to draw on in order to improve interpersonal processes in 
organizations. To this extent, the model of process consultation serves 
to modify the relationship between consultancy and management: the 
former, with a curious twist, becomes the ‘ideal type’ of the latter – 




We previously said that management theorists such as Urwick sought to 
develop a body of managerial knowledge that is based entirely on 
abstract and universally-applicable principles for coordinating and 
controlling staff activities in the organization, thus undermining the 
claim made by trained engineers that they are more capable of managing 
an organization than any other professional group. The conceptual 
framework of process consultation can be understood in much the 
same way. Consultancy thinkers such as Schein seek to develop a body 
of consultancy knowledge that is similarly stripped of all technical 
expertise, based solely on abstract and universally-applicable guidelines 
for dealing with interpersonal relations in the client organization. This 
serves to undermine the claim made by managers – from whichever 
background and training – that they are the group most capable of 
managing organizations effectively. On this view, process consultation 
challenges the very grounds of the managerial revolution in the 
twentieth century, namely, the assumption that salaried executives are 
inherently suited to the task of overall agenda-setting and decision-
making in organizations. Although process consultants are by no means 
alone in contesting this assumption – activist shareholders and financial 
intermediaries have also worn away some of the autonomy that 
managers have traditionally enjoyed – what is most interesting about 
Schein’s work is the fact that it explicitly aims to replace the relational 
component of management with the relational component of consultancy. 
The peculiarity of this situation cannot be overstated. On the one 
hand, the model of process consultation seeks to transform the 
traditional manager-subordinate relation into an entirely new relation, 
the ‘consultant-client relation’. This serves to change the way we 
understand modern management by prioritizing the consultancy role 
over and above the managerial role. On the other hand, it is not difficult 
to see how the model of process consultation could become separated 
from the occupational group to whom it properly belongs (i.e. 
consultants) and come to fall securely within the province of 
management. From this perspective, the relational component of 
consultancy would simply turn back into the relational component of 
management as soon as it is installed in the client organization. This 
alerts us to the paradox at the heart of Process Consultation. Schein makes 
the model of process consultation indispensable for managers, thus 
advancing the collective interests of consultants; but in doing so, Schein 
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risks turning the model of process consultation into a form of 
managerial knowledge, thus impairing the collective interests of 
consultants. This paradox does not imply a ‘flaw’ or an ‘error’ in the 
model of process consultation, but in fact provides the source of 
process consultants’ power over managers even as it simultaneously 
threatens to undermine the very basis of this power. 
We would be mistaken to think that this view of consultancy is 
limited to Schein’s work. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly common in 
the practitioner literature for managers to be encouraged to act as ‘their 
own consultants’ in organizations. This implies that the paradoxical idea 
of the manager-as-consultant has become too widespread for it to be 
dismissed as an isolated case. One well-known consultancy textbook 
asserts that ‘a manager can also act as a consultant if he or she gives 
advice and help to a fellow manager, or even to subordinates rather 
than directing and issuing orders to them’ (Kubr, et al., 2002: 3). The 
same point is made by Margerison (2001: 4), who suggests that, like 
consultants, ‘line managers also spend a good deal of time advising and 
using consulting skills’. Markham (1997) also sees the consultancy role 
as one that has a wider applicability in organizations: ‘consultancy skills 
are increasingly seen as an important element of every business person’s 
toolkit’ (1997: xiii). It is not only consultants, then, who are engaged in 
consultancy activities: ‘nowadays, staff functions have increasingly to 
engage with their colleagues in a consultancy fashion. Competence in 
consultancy skills is vital to all’ (1997: 1). Such ‘consultancy skills’ must 
be applied not only by consultants in dealing with clients, but also by 
managers in dealing with subordinates. This approach to management 
consultancy is even more pronounced in Markham’s (2001) edited 
collection How to Be Your Own Management Consultant. The very title of 
this book – which serves as a succinct summation of Schein’s main 
argument in the second volume of Process Consultation – explicitly 
emphasizes the need for managers to adopt the consultancy role in their 
own organization. 
The fact that managers can – indeed, have to – adopt a consultancy 
role suggests that the very meaning of consultancy is currently being 
modified: 
The word ‘consultation’ has always implied giving advice…Today, the 
concept of consultation and consultancy is changing rapidly. It is a set 
of activities designed to improve things. This can be and is done by 
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managers as well as consultants. The role of consultancy is now multi-
faceted. It now involves relationships between manager and subordinate 
just as much as it involves relationships between clients and consultants. 
(Margerison, 2001: 10) 
Whereas management consultancy once referred solely to forms of 
business counselling, it now refers to establishing and maintaining 
relationships in organizations, whether between consultants and clients 
or between managers and subordinates. While this certainly entails a 
shift in the way we understand consultancy, more importantly it also 
implies a shift in the way we understand management itself. A manager 
must draw on consultancy knowledge (such as the model of process 
consultation) in addition to, or even in the place of, managerial 
knowledge. Margerison (2001: 104) directly echoes Schein on this point: 
‘An effective manager is increasingly an effective consultant’. 
Admittedly, the notion of the ‘manager-as-consultant’ represents the 
extreme end of the consultancy spectrum. Most consultants, it should 
be said, simply provide technical expertise to managers in a specific 
operational area and do not seek to transform the traditional manager-
subordinate relation into a ‘consultant-client relation’. But this does not 
detract from the meaning and significance of Schein’s model of process 
consultation. As we have shown, this model provides a way for 
consultants to deal with clients as well as a way for managers to deal 
with subordinates. To this extent, process consultation serves not only 
as the ‘ideal type’ of consultancy but also as the ‘model for managerial 
excellence’. By replacing the relational component of management with 
the relational component of consultancy, however, the model of 
process consultation risks becoming a form of managerial knowledge; 
the power of consultants over managers is thus jeopardized by the very 
same factor that underwrites its success. Such is the real lesson to be 
drawn from Schein’s work, which brings with it both a promise and a 
threat to the future profession of organizational consultancy. 
Conclusion 
In his autobiographical essay ‘The Academic as Artist: Personal and 
Professional Roots’, published in the Management Laureates series, Schein 
(1993: 50) states that ‘[t]he most consistent feedback I get on my writing 
is that I am somehow able to make things clear’. Having examined the 
first and second volumes of Process Consultation, we might wonder 
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whether we would be tempted to give Schein slightly different feedback 
on his work. While his style of writing is certainly clear enough, the 
ideas he expresses in his books are characterized by considerable 
ambiguity. By unsettling the conventional distinction between 
‘consultancy’ and ‘management’, it is impossible for us to say 
conclusively whether the model of process consultation is a part of 
consultancy knowledge, a part of managerial knowledge, or somehow a 
part of both. But perhaps this is the point. As Armstrong reminds us, an 
occupational group must maintain ‘a certain mystique and 
indeterminacy’ around their knowledge base so as to retain exclusive 
control over it, thus preventing other occupational groups from using 
the same set of techniques (1984: 101; 1985: 134; see also Larson, 1977: 
31-2). Analogously, if Schein’s work possesses a somewhat elusive 
quality, then it is not difficult to see how this might allow process 
consultants to retain a monopoly over the model of process 
consultation, thereby rendering it inaccessible to managers – even at the 
same time as managers are entreated to apply it themselves in their own 
organizations. In any case, what is clear from the preceding discussion is 
that Schein’s work is worthy of extensive ‘practical criticism’ in its own 
right (see Armstrong and Lilley, 2008). Such a task, it should be said, 
can be undertaken without either betraying the strictures of a 
disciplinary field (in this case, the sociology of management) or by 
reducing the ‘applied’ intent of Process Consultation. It is in this spirit that 
we have sought to engage with the work of Schein, encompassing as it 
does both the realm of academia and the world of business. 
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Notes 
1 Schein’s original 1969 book was revised and republished in 1988 under the 
title Process Consultation, Volume I: Its Role in Organization Development. 
2 Schein (1987: 117) writes that ‘the question of who is actually the client can be 
ambiguous and problematical’, since a variety of people can be designated as 
‘the client’ in an organization. For the most part, ‘the client’ refers to an 
employee in a managerial position who ‘owns’ the organizational problem and 
who is able to pay for consultancy services with a part of their departmental 
budget (Schein, 1987: 117-8; see also 1997). Our use of the term ‘client’ will 
be restricted to this meaning. 
3 The model of process consultation has its roots in a variety of disciplines, 
including social psychology, sociology, and anthropology, as well as 
organizational areas such as leadership, training, and mentoring (1969: 12-3). 
Unfortunately, there is no space here to describe the interconnections 
between process consultation and these other fields of knowledge. 
4 It is for this reason that Kubr, et al. (2002: 72) assert that ‘[w]hile any 
consulting involves some collaboration with the client, the process approach 
is a collaborative approach par excellence’. 
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5 This is what Armstrong (1984; 99: 1985; 132), following Larson (1977), calls 
the advancement of a ‘collective mobility project’ by an organizational 
profession. 
6 In Process Consultation Revisited, Schein (1999: 1-2) expands this concept of 
‘help’ so that ‘[t]he ability to be an effective helper also applies to spouses, 
friends, managers vis-à-vis their superiors, subordinates, and peers, parents 
vis-à-vis their own parents and children, and teachers vis-à-vis their students’. 
His most recent book pushes the boat out even farther: the concept of ‘help’ 
now applies not only to ‘the consultant trying to improve the functioning of an 
organization’, but also to ‘the friend supplying the word that is on the tip of 
your tongue’, ‘the suicide hotline operator assisting someone in distress’, ‘the 
funeral director helping the grieving family cope with death’, and ‘the nurse 
assisting a patient with the bedpan’ (Schein, 2009: 5-6: emphasis in original). 
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Multiple Failures of Scholarship: Karl Weick 
and the Mann Gulch Disaster 
Thomas Basbøll 
‘If now the dead of this fire should awaken and I should be stopped 
beside a cross…’ Norman Maclean 
Introduction 
The 2006 Academy of Management meeting included a preconference 
professional development workshop (PDW) on ‘richness’. ‘The intent 
of this PDW,’ wrote Sara Rynes, the editor of the Academy of Management 
Journal, ‘was to remedy the paucity of formal instruction in qualitative 
methods at many universities’ (2007: 13). Karl Weick was invited as one 
of ‘the world’s best qualitative researchers in the field of management 
and organizations’ and his contribution (Weick, 2007) was printed in a 
special editors’ forum of AMJ the following year. He chose to talk 
about ‘the generative properties of richness’, and used what Rynes 
described as ‘his own experiences in studying wildland firefighters’ as 
the core of his presentation, the most notable example of which is of 
course his ‘reanalysis’ of the 1949 Mann Gulch disaster (Weick, 1993). 
That paper, which he had originally presented as a keynote address, was 
published in the Administrative Science Quarterly at the request of one of its 
editors (Weick, 2007: 15). The editor has since identified himself as Bob 
Sutton, who recalls that Weick had been hesitant to publish it because it 
was perhaps ‘too weird’ for what Sutton describes as a ‘respectable’ and 
‘rather stuffy’ journal. But Sutton ‘begged a little’, and the paper 
ultimately ‘got rave reviews from distinguished peers and was soon 
published’ (Sutton, 2009). It has since become one of Weick’s most 
famous studies, and is, indeed, often counted among not only his own 
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finest work but, as Rynes (2007: 13) put it, ‘the best of the best’ in 
qualitative methodology. Moreover, following John van Maanen’s 
(1995) use of it in his famous exchange with Jeffrey Pfeffer during the 
so-called Paradigm Wars, the success of Weick’s Mann Gulch analysis 
can be taken as a major contribution to what Michael Rowlinson (2004: 
617) has called ‘the victory of style over theory’ in sensemaking 
research. The paper is in every respect a seminal contribution to the 
managerial sciences, having affected both our perception of 
organizations and our approach to scholarship.  
In the history of wildland firefighting, and in the local history of 
west-central Montana, Mann Gulch, August 5, 1949, marks the time and 
place of the tragic deaths of thirteen young men. The story of the crew 
of smokejumpers who lost their race against the forest fire they were 
fighting has been told and retold, both in prose (Maclean, 1992) and in 
song (Keelaghan, 1995). In the literature of the managerial sciences, 
meanwhile, it represents a ‘cosmology episode’ occasioned by ‘multiple 
failures of leadership’ (Weick, 1993: 650). Although one may always 
quibble about the nuances in an interpretation of a discipline’s 
consensus about a particular event, it is safe to say that the received 
view in the management literature is that the disaster resulted from a 
lack of leadership and, more profoundly, a lack of wisdom. This 
interpretation of the actions and attitudes of Wagner Dodge and his 
crew has been canonized in Michael Useem’s collection of ‘stories of 
triumph and disaster’, The Leadership Moment (1998). Citing both Weick 
and Useem, Glynn and Jamerson speak straightforwardly of ‘Dodge’s 
failure’; he failed ‘quite literally’ to ‘breathe life’ into his organization, we 
are told. Under his leadership, Dodge’s men grew increasingly confused 
and ultimately panicked instead of following his instructions; their 
organization was a mere ‘shell’ that, for lack of ‘heedful interrelating’, 
was disposed to disintegrate at the critical (i.e., leadership) moment 
(Glynn and Jamerson, 2006: 156). If he had taken his role as leader 
more seriously, built his team properly, and maintained his authority 
throughout the ordeal, it is argued, his men might well have survived. 
The lesson that is most often emphasized by readers of Weick’s analysis 
is that what was missing in Mann Gulch was an ‘attitude of wisdom’, a 
kind of epistemic humility. Because Dodge was taciturn about the 
unfolding crisis, his crew was overly confident that they would get the 
fire under control before morning. In his contribution to Cameron, 
Dutton and Quinn’s Positive Organization Scholarship, Weick emphasizes 
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the related ‘breakdown of trust’ (Weick, 2003: 75), which can of course 
be traced back to Dodge’s failure as a leader. In the eyes of organization 
theorists, then, Wagner Dodge must bear a great portion of the 
responsibility for the deaths of thirteen young men under his command. 
Since Dodge himself died only a few years later, long before Weick’s 
article was written, he has not been able to defend himself against the 
charge. Indeed, the author of the most detailed attempt to understand 
Dodge’s situation, Norman Maclean, died before his book, Young Men 
and Fire (1992), had even been published, and that book was Weick’s 
sole source of factual information about the disaster. Interestingly, 
immediately after restating his claim that the Mann Gulch disaster 
resulted from ‘multiple failures of leadership’ that unleashed 
‘senselessness, panic, and cosmological questions’, Weick proposed to 
conclude his analysis ‘just about where Maclean would want us to end’ 
(1993: 650). My aim here is essentially to challenge that closing claim. I 
suspect there are several points at which Norman Maclean would have 
liked Weick to end his analysis, certainly points at which he would have 
encouraged him to pause for reflection. Ultimately, I think he would 
have wanted us to stop well short of concluding that Wagner Dodge 
failed as a leader. Indeed, my rereading of Maclean’s book suggests that 
we must replace our current sense of Dodge’s failure as a leader with a 
much more accurate sense of Weick’s failures of scholarship. 
Mann Gulch and the Leadership Moment 
Maclean’s book is about both social and natural forces, and we can 
provisionally distinguish the Mann Gulch ‘disaster’ from the Mann 
Gulch ‘fire’. The fire started on August 4, 1949, when lightning struck 
the ridge between Mann Gulch and Meriwether Canyon, in the Helena 
National Forest of west-central Montana. It burned for five days and 
spread to over 4500 acres before it was finally brought under control. 
The disaster, meanwhile, occurred shortly before 6:00 pm on August 5, 
1949, when a crew of smokejumpers was caught in a ‘blowup’; three 
survived, thirteen died. The fire had been spotted on August 4 by a 
forest ranger stationed in Meriwether Canyon and, following standard 
procedure, the crew of smokejumpers parachuted into the Gulch at 
around 4:00 pm the next day. It spent its first hour in the Gulch calmly 
collecting its gear in an area that would be covered in flames at the end 
of the second. The crew ultimately had no influence on the 
development of the fire in that time; the firefighters and the fire had 
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simply been brought together at the worst possible moment, a fateful 
one for most of them. It is no wonder, then, that Maclean describes the 
event as a tragedy.  
Weick’s contribution is to construe the tragedy as what Useem 
(1998) would later call a ‘leadership moment’. This is, at first pass, a 
natural way to build on Maclean’s dramatic interpretation of the 
disaster: a meeting of ‘young men and fire’, man and nature. By focusing 
on the leader of the crew, we have a way of personifying the event in a 
‘tragic figure’, i.e., an individual who ‘loses’ what was ultimately a collective 
struggle. The event now becomes his story; it becomes history. Just as 
the Battle of Little Big Horn is Custer’s Last Stand, the Mann Gulch 
disaster has become Dodge’s ultimate failure as a leader, his ‘leadership 
moment’ gone wrong. While Maclean himself makes the comparison to 
Custer’s fateful battle on several occasions, however, he ultimately 
abandons what he calls ‘the disgraced officer’s plot’, which is, he argues, 
more useful for making films than for explaining what actually 
happened in 1949 (Maclean, 1992: 155-6). As Maclean saw it, the events 
in Mann Gulch were best understood, not in terms of organizational 
behaviour, but in terms of what we might call infernal behaviour, i.e., the 
behaviour of the fire. It was Weick’s ‘re-analysis’ – hot off his reading 
Maclean’s just-published book – that appropriated the tragedy for the 
managerial sciences by placing the emphasis on organizing and leadership 
in explaining the deaths of the firefighters. While the fire was caused by 
a lightning strike, ‘the disaster at Mann Gulch,’ says Weick, ‘was 
produced by the interrelated collapse of sensemaking and structure’ 
(2001: 105, my emphasis). This is clearly presented as an empirical 
conclusion that can be drawn from the facts of the case, and we can see 
that it is not a trivial claim by imagining its negation. According to 
Weick, the disaster could have been averted; the sensemaking and 
structure of the crew could have been prevented from collapsing. 
Adequate leadership, which would have fostered ‘resilience’, he argues, 
is what would have made the difference. 
It is this claim that I want to subject to critical scrutiny. To do so, it 
is fortunately not necessary to investigate the facts of the Mann Gulch 
disaster at first hand. After all, Weick claimed only to have read 
Maclean’s book before arriving at his empirical conclusions, and we can 
do the same. On the basis of that book, then, Weick makes two key 
claims about the behaviour of the crew of firefighters. The death of 
thirteen firefighters is explained by their ‘stubborn belief’ (Weick, 1993: 
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636) that the fire they were fighting would be under control by the next 
morning and their subsequent ‘panic’ (ibid.: 637-8) when this belief was 
confronted with the realities of the fire. At the decisive moment, Weick 
claims, with both their role structure and their worldview in ruins, they 
were unable to understand an instruction from their foreman that might 
have saved them. It is easy to see how these two claims support a 
conclusion about an ‘interrelated collapse of sensemaking and 
structure’. It is also easy to see how this analysis might locate a ‘failure 
of leadership’, since a good leader would presumably know how to 
temper the crew’s beliefs about the fire with, say, an ‘attitude of 
wisdom’ and would, certainly, inspire the sort of confidence that would 
be required to keep the crew from panicking. The important question is 
whether Weick’s source, Maclean’s book, licenses the necessary 
conclusions. 
The answer, as I have already suggested, is no – in fact, not at all. 
Weick distorts key facts in Maclean’s account, and omits others, in 
order to get the story of Mann Gulch to serve his ends and thereby 
illustrate his theory of sensemaking in organizations. According to 
Maclean, the fire fighters quickly abandoned their view of the fire as 
one they would soon have under control; they did not panic and, 
indeed, experienced real fear only after it was too late to affect their 
sensemaking. More generally, it is clear that Maclean ultimately 
exonerates the sensemaking of the crew, and Dodge’s leadership, 
finding instead that what happened in Mann Gulch cannot be attributed 
to organizational behaviour but resulted from the behaviour of the fire. 
When all the factors are properly weighed, the crew was essentially 
doomed from the start to be caught up in what Maclean calls a 
‘conflagration of forces’, neither material nor social but, simply, infernal. 
No amount of resilience, sensemaking, or organizing of any kind could 
have saved them. To show this, I will compare Weick’s paper with 
Maclean’s book in regard to their answer to three key questions about 
the Mann Gulch disaster. First, did the smokejumpers panic? Second, 
did ‘positive illusions’ about the seriousness of the fire kill the 
smokejumpers? Finally, would wisdom and heedfulness have saved the 
smokejumpers? Weick answers yes to all three. Maclean, as I want to 
show, clearly answers no. 
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Did the Smokejumpers Panic? 
As mentioned, Weick’s analysis identified two factors that ‘produced’ 
the disaster in Mann Gulch: a collapse of sensemaking and a collapse of 
structure. Though he emphasizes that they are ‘interrelated’, each of 
these general explanations are tied to specific facts that Weick adduces 
about what happened in the gulch. Thus, the collapse of sensemaking 
was tied to ‘positive illusions’ about the seriousness of the fire, which I 
will deal with in the next section, and the collapse of structure 
precipitated panic among the members of the crew, which I will deal 
with here. 
Weick theorizes the ‘panic’ of the crew with a passage from Freud’s 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego that, as Weick puts it, ‘reversed’ 
the then commonly held view that panic causes group disintegration 
(Weick, 1993: 638). Rather, argued Freud, group disintegration causes 
panic; it is when members of a group suddenly lose their role structures 
(such as those tied to command) that ‘a gigantic and senseless fear is set 
free’. This is of course exactly what Weick needs in order to make his 
argument that what went wrong in Mann Gulch was a ‘collapse of 
sensemaking’: poor leadership caused group disintegration, and group 
disintegration caused panic, which, in turn, is tantamount to 
senselessness. Accordingly, he describes the minutes leading up to the 
disaster in terms that resonate with Freud’s account of panic in military 
groups: 
As the crew moved toward the river and became more spread out, 
individuals were isolated and left without explanations or emotional 
support for their reactions. As the ties weakened, the sense of danger 
increased, and the means to cope became more primitive. The world 
rapidly shifted from a cosmos to chaos as it became emptied of order 
and rationality. (Weick, 1993: 638)  
While this does indeed describe the preconditions of panic suggested by 
Freud, it is hard to find support for it in Maclean’s account. Here, for 
example, is his description of the crew at about the same time that 
Weick described as a world quickly shifting ‘from a cosmos to chaos’:  
Now that they weren’t going to hit the fire head on, some of the 
excitement was gone. … The crew, though, was still happy. They were 
not in that high state of bliss they had been in when they expected to 
have the fire out by tomorrow morning and possibly be home that same 
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night to observe tall dames top-heavy with beer topple off bar stools. 
On the other hand, attacking the fire from the rear would make the job 
last longer and mean more money… (Maclean, 1992: 66)  
I will return to this clear indication that the crew’s belief that they would 
have the fire out by morning was anything but ‘stubborn’. What is 
interesting here is that the mood of the crew is described in such 
radically different terms. Like us, Maclean and Weick know that the 
crew is in real danger; indeed, most of them will be dead not much 
more than fifteen minutes later. But in his analysis Weick simply 
projects (to use a Freudian notion) this knowledge onto his 
interpretation of the crew’s emotional state, while Maclean, who has 
formed a detailed sense of what the crew would have thought and felt 
about what they were experiencing at the time, notes that they were not 
only unafraid but ‘happy’, not only not irrational but thinking about 
how they would spend their paychecks when they got back to the base. 
Though it is true that the crew was getting spread out and confused on 
the slope of the gulch (Maclean, 1992: 65), there is simply no indication 
that the group is disintegrating in the manner Freud described. 
The most important difference between Weick’s account and 
Maclean’s is that the former posits both fear and panic in the Gulch, 
and the latter explicitly concludes the opposite. Here’s how Maclean 
discusses the question of whether the crew panicked: 
The survivors say they weren’t panicked, and something like that is 
probably true. Smokejumpers are selected for being tough but Dodge’s 
men were very young, and as he testified, none of them had ever been 
on a blowup before and they were getting exhausted and confused. 
(Maclean, 1992: 72)  
Rumsey and Sallee say the men did not panic, but by now all began to 
fear death and were in a race with it. (ibid.: 93) 
The first quote describes how they felt at the beginning of their race 
with the fire; the second quote how they felt as they neared the end. 
Perhaps the most categorical rejection of the panic thesis, however, 
comes in Maclean’s conclusion. We here find all the relevant notions of 




As the smokejumpers went up the hill after leaving Dodge it was like a 
great jump backwards into the sky – they were suddenly and totally 
without command and suddenly without structure and suddenly free to 
disintegrate and free to finally be afraid. The evidence is that they were not 
afraid before this moment, but now great fear suddenly possessed the empty 
places. (ibid.: 297, my emphasis) 
Freud’s theory (and therefore Weick’s) requires that the crew be without 
command, without structure, free to disintegrate, and free to feel fear 
before reaching Dodge and his famous escape fire, which the crew, in its 
panic, did not understand. Maclean tells us quite clearly that these 
preconditions for panic only arose after it was too late. According to 
Weick’s only source of information about the disaster, then, it was not 
‘produced by a collapse of structure’, as he claims. In any case, contrary 
to Weick’s major empirical claim, the evidence suggests that the crew 
did not panic. 
Did ‘Positive Illusions’ Kill the Smokejumpers? 
We saw above that Maclean mentions in passing that the crew was ‘not 
in that high state of bliss they had been in when they expected to have 
the fire out by tomorrow morning’ (1992: 66). With this in mind, 
Weick’s second major empirical claim becomes quite puzzling. 
According to Weick, the crew maintained a ‘stubborn belief that it faced 
a 10:00 fire’ (1993: 636), i.e., a fire that it would have under control by 
ten o’clock the next morning. Part of the confusion that ultimately led 
to disaster, he argues, is that the crew grew uneasy because the imagined 
ten o’clock fire ‘did not act like one’ (ibid.: 635). Even in the face of 
this, he says, ‘People rationalized this image until it was too late. And 
because they did, less and less of what they saw made sense’ (ibid.: 635). 
He takes this as ‘a powerful reminder that positive illusions can kill 
people’ (ibid.: 636). Maclean’s account, meanwhile, contradicts this 
explanation of what happened on virtually every point. 
Weick argues that if the crew had not been so stubborn in its belief 
that the fire would be under control by ten o’clock the next morning 
they would have communicated more about what was going on:  
It is striking how little communication occurred during the three and a 
half hours of this episode. There was little discussion during the noisy, 
bumpy plane ride, and even less as individuals retrieved equipment 
scattered on the north slope. After a quick meal together, people began 
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hiking toward the river but quickly got separated from one another. 
Then they were suddenly turned around, told to run for the ridge, and 
quickly ran out of breath as they scaled the steep south slope. (Weick, 
1993: 644)  
We must note in passing that Weick here gets the slopes of the Gulch 
wrong. The crew fled up the north slope of the Gulch, not the south 
slope (though perhaps he means the south slope of the ridge). What is 
much more important is that a crucial conversation did take place while 
the cargo was collected and the meal was eaten. Dodge and a fireman 
who was already on the scene decided that the vegetation on the south 
slope (where the fire was) posed a danger to the crew. They then 
abandoned the idea of fighting it head on like a ten o’clock fire and 
decided to get out of what Dodge described as a ‘death trap’ (Maclean, 
1992: 63-65). It should be noted that these details are in Weick’s 
account of the incident (Weick, 1993: 628-9) but are then ignored in his 
analysis. One must conclude that Weick likes the drama of words like 
‘death trap’ but would not grant that this showed that Dodge (and the 
crew) had revised their opinion of the fire and their situation. When we 
read Maclean for ourselves, however, we learn quite unambiguously that 
they had no ‘stubborn beliefs’ and no ‘positive illusions’.  
Perhaps the source of Weick’s misreading lies in a sentence on page 
34 of Maclean’s book. Like most fires, the Mann Gulch fire began as a 
‘ground fire’ and the basic approach to fighting such a fire is to get to it 
early, while it is still small, surround it (by clearing flammable materials 
around it), and then keep it contained until it burns itself out. ‘Until an 
hour before the end, that is what the smokejumpers expected the fire to 
be—hard work all night but easing up by morning’ (Maclean, 1993: 34). 
This sentence must be understood in the context of the timeline of 
events for the whole disaster, however. Taken out of context, it does 
seem like the crew ‘held onto’ a belief in a fire they would have out by 
morning until the end of the ordeal (i.e., the final hour). But to properly 
understand its significance we must keep in mind that they did not 
begin to approach the fire during their first hour in the gulch. More 
importantly, they had been in the gulch only two hours when disaster 
struck. That is, as soon as the crew began to engage with the fire, they 
realized it would not be out by morning. Moreover, even at that time 
there was no objective indication of anything other than the risk of a 
blowup, and that risk was immediately spotted by Dodge and the forest 
ranger on the scene; they evaluated the situation together and took the 
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only appropriate course of action. In fact, the phrase ‘ten o’clock fire’ is 
less an expression of an empirical assessment of a fire, as Weick seems 
to think, and more an expression of an attitude (Maclean, 1992: 19), a 
kind of watchword, and, in fact, a policy (Omi, 2005: 94); it was simply 
their job to do everything they could to get the fire under control before 
morning. Weick distorts, not the times themselves, but our sense of the 
timing of events, by getting us to think that the whole last hour was an 
unfolding crisis. What in fact happened, as Weick fondly cites (but does 
not understand) Maclean to say, was that ‘the upgulch breeze suddenly 
[turned] to murder’ (Maclean, 1992: 217; Weick, 1993: 641). This 
happened at a moment when they did not have a clear view of the fire, 
which means that they were at first, and unwittingly, walking towards 
the fire, and then forced to turn around and run away from it.  
While the crew did not hold positive illusions about the fire, then, 
they did lack knowledge and, for a few unavoidable minutes, perceptual 
input. At the time, fighting forest fires was a relatively new trade, and 
there was little scientific research into the behaviour of fire in a wildland 
setting. Tellingly, while Weick (1993: 650) notes the possibility that an 
‘inadequate understanding of leadership processes in the late [19]40s’ 
may share part of the blame, he leaves Maclean’s observations about fire 
science out of the account. Maclean notes, for example, that early fire 
researchers worked with relatively simple models based on what were 
essentially laboratory experiments to test how various materials burn. 
This leaves many complexities out of account and, as Maclean puts it, 
you end up trying to ‘approach infinity with nothing more than a 
mishmash of little things you know about a lot of little things—certainly 
with nothing that could have been put in a hand calculator and dropped 
with Wag Dodge into Mann Gulch to avert his tragedy’ (Maclean, 1992: 
262). Dodge was approaching infinity with decidedly finite means and at 
this clear marker of the limits of his knowledge we may turn to the 
question of his judgment. After all, Weick often leaves us with the 
impression that ‘sensemaking’ is tantamount to ‘wisdom’ (see Weick, 
2004, for example). 
Would Greater ‘Wisdom’ have Saved the Smokejumpers? 
Weick defines wisdom as ‘an attitude taken by persons toward the 
beliefs, values, knowledge, information, abilities, and skills that are held, 
a tendency to doubt that these are necessarily true or valid and to doubt 
that they are an exhaustive set of those things that could be known’ 
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(Weick, 1993: 641, quoting Meacham, 1983: 187). We have already seen 
that the crew revised its beliefs about the fire and was now working 
with the (unfortunately all too valid) idea that they should get out of the 
way of the fire as quickly as possible. Indeed, Dodge wanted to get to 
the river (instead of the top of the south ridge as originally planned) 
because he wanted a good escape route: ‘If worse came to worst and the 
wind changed and blew downgulch, the crew could always escape into 
the river’ (Maclean, 1992: 64). This was clearly a rather ‘wise’ view, 
which took into account that he could not know exhaustively how the 
wind and, consequently, the fire would behave. Wisdom could not have 
made difference because, on Weick’s own definition, the crew and its 
leader were already wise. 
But there is a still deeper problem with the call for greater wisdom 
among smokejumpers. Weick ties the lack of wisdom to the lack of 
communication among the members of the crew. Simplifying 
somewhat, the received view is essentially that Dodge should have been 
more talkative (Useem, 1998: 54; Jamerson and Glynn, 2006: 156). Since 
Maclean is Weick’s only source of information about Mann Gulch one 
would expect him to consult Maclean’s book for suggestions about 
whether things like ‘the attitude of wisdom’ and ‘heedful interrelating’ 
would have worked there. More specifically, we want to know whether 
more ‘communication’ would have helped the crew? As it turns out, 
Maclean deals with this possibility in his discussion of how Mann Gulch 
changed how crews were selected and trained: 
the greatest concern was to remove the contradiction between training 
men to act swiftly, surely, and on their own in the face of danger and, 
on the other hand, training men to take orders unhesitatingly when 
working under command. On a big fire there is no time and no tree under whose 
shade the boss and the crew can sit and have a Platonic dialogue about a blowup. If 
Socrates had been foreman on the Mann Gulch fire, he and his crew would have been 
cremated while they were sitting there considering it. Dialogue doesn’t work well 
when the temperature is approaching the lethal 140 degrees. (Maclean, 
1992: 220, my emphasis)  
This clear rejection of the subtler and more nuanced forms of 
communication that Weick proposes might have strengthened 
‘sensemaking’ in Mann Gulch is left entirely out of Weick’s discussion 
of the case, although it appears in the only book on the subject he had 
at that time read. It is not for me to decide whether it is Maclean or 
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Weick who is right; as a reader, however, one expects to be told when a 
conclusion conflicts with the conclusions of relevant experts. Indeed, 
my complaint here is not that Weick does not understand what 
happened in Mann Gulch; it is that he does not respect the views of the 
very expert he props his own authority up with. He does not 
understand, and does not seem to care, what is happening on the pages 
of Maclean’s book.  
The Disgraced Officer 
Let us return to the question of where Maclean would have wanted us 
to end. Weick tells us that the essential components of his analysis 
‘flowed from a single book [he] consumed while acting as an armchair 
ethnographer’ (Weick, 2007: 16). It is easy to imagine how this approach 
might get a number of critical details wrong, and in his book Maclean 
mentions another account that does just that: a movie ‘supposedly 
based on the Mann Gulch fire’ called The Red Skies of Montana. It fuses, 
he says, ‘small broken pieces of truth’ with a ‘worn-out literary 
convention’ (Maclean, 1992: 155) and it was his goal to recover the 
truth that had been covered over with convention, myth, and legend, 
supported only by the ‘immortality’ that accrues to a story that is ‘rerun 
several times a year on TV’. There is a tendency, he noted, to impose a 
plot. 
This added life-giving plot is the old ‘disgraced officer’s plot’, the plot in 
which the military leader has disgraced himself before his men, either 
because his action has been misunderstood by them or because he 
displayed actual cowardice, and at the end the officer always meets the 
same situation again but this time heroically (usually as the result of the 
intervening influence of a good woman). By the way, this plot has often 
been attached to movies and stories about Custer Hill. Perhaps this is a 
reminder to keep open the possibility that there is no ending in reality 
to the story of the Mann Gulch fire. If so, then let it be so—there’s a lot 
of tragedy in the universe that has missing parts and comes to no 
conclusion, including probably the tragedy that awaits you and me. 
(Maclean, 1992: 155-6) 
The ironies accumulate here. Jamerson and Glynn speak of how 
Dodge’s leadership should have ‘quite literally … “breathed life” into 
[his] organization’ (2006: 156), while in fact rehearsing what Maclean 
disparages as the ‘life-giving plot’ of a ‘worn-out literary convention’. 
They may, perhaps, be excused for taking Weick’s analysis on trust, as 
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Barbara Czarniawska (2005: 273), for example, says we must. Indeed, 
Weick assures us that Maclean’s ‘data’ not only ‘combat 12 of the fifteen 
sources [of invalidity] listed by Runkel and McGrath and are only 
“moderately vulnerable” to the other three’, they are also drawn from 
the work of ‘an experienced woodsman and storyteller [i.e., Maclean], 
who has “always tried to be accurate with the facts”’ (Weick, 1993: 632; 
quoting Runkel and MacGrath, 1972: 191 and Maclean, 1992: 259). But 
after all Maclean’s hard work, Weick’s reanalysis returns us squarely to 
the tired plot we can see on TV, not just about firefighters, but police 
officers, soldiers, school teachers, and every other hero we might 
imagine. Maclean urges us to leave other possibilities open because, as 
he puts it, ‘there’s a lot of tragedy in the universe that has missing parts 
and comes to no conclusion’. Weick will not ‘let it be so’. In his 
armchair, the Mann Gulch Disaster is once again Dodge’s Leadership 
Failure, as the Battle of Little Big Horn is Custer’s Last Stand. 
Indeed, since Weick is trying to locate the cause of the disaster in 
the organizational sensemaking of the crew, he does very little to help 
us to understand the fire itself. This despite the fact that Maclean’s 
conclusion is actually that Useem’s ‘leadership moment’ is not very 
relevant in the case of Mann Gulch. Instead of retelling the cinematic 
plot of the ‘disgraced officer’, Maclean spent years trying to understand 
both the organizational and infernal behaviour that produced the 
outcomes that day. On this basis, he explains that the members of the 
crew were, for too long unwittingly, participants in a simple race against 
the fire. When they jumped, ‘they were leaving an early station of the 
cross, where minutes anywhere along the way would have saved them’ 
(Maclean, 1992: 57, my emphasis). It was only at the very last minute 
that ‘leadership’ might have been an issue, and at that same moment, as 
Maclean makes clear, neither causes nor responsibility can be 
confidently assigned to human agency or natural forces (1992: 289, see 
below). 
Instead of noticing this, Weick makes an elaborate effort to establish 
the obvious point that a crew of firefighters is ‘an organization’ (1993: 
632). He also dwells a bit strangely on the question of whether to 
describe the crew as an ‘outfit’ or ‘nondisclosive intimacy’ (ibid.: 647-8) 
– strange because these ‘alternatives’ are not grammatically 
interchangeable (and may be empirically compatible). Most surprisingly, 
however, he makes no effort at all to understand the relationship of the 
crew to the larger organization of the U.S. Forest Service, nor, though it 
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turns out to be a relevant part of how they make sense of their job, the 
relationship of the firefighters to the U.S. government (Maclean, 1992: 
51-2). While it ultimately made no difference, the disaster would have 
been easy to understand from an organizational point of view simply by 
noting the U.S. Forest Service’s budget at the time (Maclean, 1992: 40-
1). Crews were selected to fight particular fires by choosing names off 
the top of a list and seeing if they were currently in camp. After fighting 
a fire, the fire fighter was moved to the bottom of the list. The reason 
for this way of doing things is that they did not have the budget to keep 
crews together and on call in camp, but had to send individuals (not 
whole crews) out of camp to do various more menial tasks while waiting 
for fires to break out. This fact about the larger organizational structure 
in which Dodge’s leadership was embedded is mentioned in passing in 
Weick’s analysis and then, it seems, ignored in drawing his conclusions.  
Although Maclean tells us about the ‘prohibitive costs’ (1992: 40) of 
alternative organizational schemes, this fact is left entirely out of 
Weick’s study. This is a significant oversight, one would think, in the 
pages of the Administrative Science Quarterly. Indeed, while Maclean (1992: 
41) notes that ‘you don’t have to be an administrative genius, to see in 
this organizational scheme of things the possibility of calamity in a 
crisis’, Weick leaves the economics of the disaster entirely on the side, 
including, as is apparent in the quote above, the role of money as a 
motive for the firefighters. Indeed, the motives of the firefighters do 
not figure very seriously in Weick’s analysis at all. This is unfortunate 
because the key moment in the episode, at least as history remembers it, 
is perhaps best understood by reference to the reasons the firefighters 
gave themselves for participating in such dangerous work, their 
‘character’ if you will. 
Only one or two minutes before the men died, Dodge invented a 
possible means of escape. As they ran out of the trees and into an open 
area of dry grass, he stopped and lit a match, with which he set the grass 
on fire. This cleared an area of flammable material where the men could 
lie down (albeit in still hot ashes), and this is in fact what Dodge did. It 
saved his life. But his crew did not heed his orders to follow him into 
the space cleared by his escape fire. Some may not have heard him and 
others may have believed that Dodge had lost his mind. This is 
significant because, as Maclean suggests, there was both a widespread 
belief and a ‘high probability’ that some smokejumpers were ‘at least a 
little bit nuts’ (Maclean, 1992: 20). Additionally, as we have seen, there 
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was a necessary tension between a respect for authority (following a 
superior’s orders) and the need for smokejumpers to ‘act swiftly, surely, 
and on their own in the face of danger’ (Maclean, 1992: 219). Only a 
particular kind of organization, would employ such men and organize 
them in the manner that it did. There is good reason, then, to believe 
that Mann Gulch was what Perrow aptly called a ‘normal accident’. That 
is, given the organizational constraints (both psychological and 
economic) wildland firefighting was bound to face tragedy and disaster 
on occasion. It is only in the movies that the actions of a single 
participant make the difference between success and failure. Maclean, in 
any case, did not find the organizational issues, and certainly not the 
leadership issues, especially important or difficult to understand. By the 
time the story reaches Glynn and Jamerson (2006) through Useem 
(1998), however, Mann Gulch can unequivocally be referred to as 
‘Dodge’s failure’.  
I have been arguing that this is not just a dramatic simplication but a 
radical distortion of the facts. Interestingly, Maclean is very certain that 
much the story of what happened in Mann Gulch has been covered up 
or distorted by interested parties, and is in general very suspicious of the 
U.S. Forest Service, despite his overwhelming respect for the men and 
women who work for it. Weick, however, makes almost nothing of the 
subsequent efforts of the U.S. Forest Service to make sense of the 
disaster, nor of Maclean’s struggle to come to terms with a difficult and 
elusive truth. (By contrast, he has no reservations about impugning the 
honesty and self-respect of firefighters (Weick, 2003: 75)). So while 
Weick finds ‘Then Dodge saw it,’ (Maclean 1992: 70) to be ‘the most 
chilling sentence in the book’ (1993: 629) – so chilling, indeed, that he 
embellishes it with an exclamation point that is not found in his source 
– an organization theorist might have found another sentence more 
salient: ‘The Forest Service knew right away it was in for big trouble’ 
(Maclean, 1992: 146). After all, it is here that we get an indication of the 
organizational problem implicit in the disaster rather than its Hollywood 
potential. It is ironic that Maclean, who took a much more critical view 
of the organizational structures that were involved in the Mann Gulch 
disaster, ultimately found that it was the behaviour of the fire, not the 
behaviour of the men, that needed explaining. It is less ironic that an 
‘armchair ethnographer’ (Weick, 2007: 16) who is happy to rely on 
‘moves of the imagination made within soft constraints’ (Weick, 2004: 
654) would then leave his source’s analysis and conclusions entirely on 
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the side and essentially make up a story of his own to validate his 
theory. 
Conclusion 
Recalling everything he had learned through his study of the Mann 
Gulch disaster, Maclean offers a sobering thought experiment to prime 
the reflections of the would-be analyst. ‘If now the dead of this fire 
should awaken and I should be stopped beside a cross, I would no 
longer be nervous if asked the first and last question of life, How did it 
happen?’ (1992: 87) These words remind us that there is a human, even 
moral, dimension to the stories we tell about each other, especially 
stories about how people die. Can we, as organization scholars, the heirs 
of Weick’s reanalysis, pretend not to be nervous about the prospect of 
meeting the dead young men of Mann Gulch? After all, as Mark 
Anderson (2006) has noted, organization scholars are not often critical 
of Weick’s results. His equivocations and hedges notwithstanding, 
Glynn and Jamerson’s (2006) perfectly reasonable, if wholly uncritical, 
reading of his analysis, for example, puts the blame squarely on Dodge. 
On Weick’s version of the story, it was Dodge who failed to keep his 
men together; this failure was fatal, and the men died because they lost 
their heads in a crisis. Is that what we would tell them if they stopped us 
beside one of their crosses on the slope of Mann Gulch? 
According to Maclean, the men were doomed from the moment 
they landed in the Gulch. As I noted above, abandoning the gulch at 
any moment, even a few minutes sooner ‘anywhere along the way 
would have saved them’ (Maclean, 1992: 57). Tragically, they had no 
way of knowing that that is what should have done. Even at the one 
point where Dodge had in fact been accused of erring, namely, his 
possibly endangering the crew by lighting the escape fire, Maclean 
settles on an aptly infernal image: a conflagration of causes. Shortly after 
the escape fire was lit, 
…no component any longer had any individual responsibility for the 
simple reason that in a moment there were no individual components. 
Just conflagration. What was happening was passing beyond legality and 
morality and seemingly beyond the laws of nature, blown into a world 
where human values and seemingly natural laws no longer apply. 
(Maclean, 1992: 289) 
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It is the sort of verdict that perhaps only ‘an experienced woodsman 
and storyteller, who has “always tried to be accurate with the facts”’ 
(Weick, 1993: 632; quoting Maclean, 1992: 259) can make. And it is 
here, I think, and not with a judgment about Wagner Dodge’s failure as 
a leader, that Maclean would have wanted us to stop, if at all. Though it 
took Weick a few hours in his armchair to ‘make sense’ of the tragedy 
(Weick, 2007: 16), Maclean himself never did stop trying to understand 
it. Perhaps that was because he half-expected one day to be held 
accountable before the ghosts of the men who died that day. Or 
perhaps he simply hadn’t suffered from a ‘paucity of formal instruction 
in qualitative methods’ when he went to school. 
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In this chapter I will address the explicit assumptions about the nature 
of man as stated by Jensen and Meckling (1994). I have chosen their 
‘Nature of Man’ article for a close reading because of the influential 
position that Jensen and Meckling occupy in agency theory and because 
of the effects of agency theory on organization theory. This article 
clearly shows the behavioural assumptions behind that theory and the 
effects of the way they use these behavioural assumptions to construct a 
tautological theory of organization. 
Jensen and Meckling’s ‘The Nature of Man’ (1994) is widely read 
and often cited. It was first published in the top-tier Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance and was then reprinted in two widely used textbooks: 
Foundations of Organizational Strategy (Jensen, 1998) and The New Corporate 
Finance – Where Theory Meets Practice (Chew, 2001). Today it is also 
available through the Social Science Research Network online 
repository. Its influence no doubt owes much to the position that 
Jensen and Meckling themselves occupy in the economic discipline. 
Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 article ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ is widely credited 
with first formulating the nexus of contracts theory (Bolman and Deal, 
2008). They have pioneered new methods for determining executive 
compensation, especially the idea of linking their performance to stock 
market performance (Cassidy, 2002). Jensen has published on a number 
of occasions with Fama, on stock pricing (Fama and Jensen, 1969) and 
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the separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and 
has also published with Black and Scholes (Black, Jensen and Scholes, 
1972). These articles are widely cited in the areas of corporate 
governance and finance. ‘The Nature of Man’, then, is interesting in 
terms of its behavioural assumptions and the influences these 
assumptions have had on wider economic scholarship. 
The article is also of interest to organization scholars, because it is 
very explicit in its statements on organizations and the way these 
assumptions relate to behavioural assumptions about individuals. In 
1976, Meckling stated that 
there is a real possibility for developing ‘A Science of Organizations,’ a 
unified body of social science theory. It will be unified by use of the 
same model of the individual across organizations. Indeed, if I were 
certain that freedom to pursue social science research would survive the 
next 100 years, I would confidently predict that this is where the social 
sciences would go, hopefully, with a very sophisticated REMM. 
(Meckling, 1976: 559) 
Indeed, the ‘Science of Organizations’ that Meckling describes has come 
to be. When Jensen and Meckling state in their introduction to ‘The 
Nature of Man’ that their ideas about the ontological status of 
organizations and the relation of individuals to organizations constitute 
‘the foundation for the agency model of financial, organizational, and 
governance structure of firms’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 1), they are 
not exaggerating. The REMM (Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximizing 
Model), which lies at the heart also of ‘The Nature of Man’ has become 
an important basis for thinking about organization in economics, 
finance and legal scholarship and has thereby fostered a common basis 
from which the REMM can be used across these disciplines. This can 
be seen in the various contexts in which the wider assumptions 
underlying the text have been exported. According to a list provided in 
the article, these assumptions have also been used in the fields of 
political studies to explain voter behaviour and the behaviour of 
regulators and bureaucrats (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 35). In 
particular, it has been used to understand the constitution of the firm 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Arrow, 1971) where it informs issues of 
governance (Butler, 1989; Fama, 1980; Williamson, 1996) and intra-firm 
structures (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). More generally, the building 
blocks provided by REMM have been influential in economic and legal 
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scholarship through their use in agency theory (Bratton, 1989). 
Considering this wide influence, Jensen and Meckling’s understanding 
of the ‘nature of man’ then becomes important to consider, both for its 
behavioural assumptions and for its assumptions about the nature of 
organizations. 
The Nature of Man 
Jensen and Meckling’s model of the nature of man is based on REMM: 
the Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximizing Model. This model ‘best 
describes the systematically rational part of human behaviour.’ (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1994: 1). In this model 
individuals are resourceful, evaluative maximizers. They respond 
creatively to the opportunities the environment presents, and they work 
to loosen constraints that prevent them from doing what they wish. 
They care about not only money, but about almost everything — 
respect, honor, power, love, and the welfare of others. The challenge 
for our society, and for all organizations in it, is to establish rules of the 
game that tap and direct human energy in ways that increase rather than 
reduce the effective use of our scarce resources. (Jensen and Meckling, 
1994: 1) 
REMM thus consists of a number of postulates regarding their nature: 
the individual cares and is an evaluator; each individual’s wants are 
unlimited; the REMM is a maximizer, who ‘acts to enjoy the highest 
level of value possible’, and the REMM is a resourceful individual (the 
slippage from ‘model’ to ‘individual’ is in Jensen and Meckling’s article). 
Rather than the mechanical behaviour that is generally attributed by 
economists to economic agents who follow the first three assumptions, 
REMM is gifted with ingenuity and creativity. On the basis of these 
postulates, they posit the existence of four different models of the 
nature of man: the economic, sociological, psychological and political 
model. These are ‘pure types’ described ‘in terms of only the barest 
essentials’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 2-3). According to Jensen and 
Meckling, all these models are reductionist in one sense or another. The 
sort of reduction that is applied takes out essential characteristics of the 
models that have been developed so far and do not capture the essence 
of the Nature of Man: 
The usefulness of any model of human nature depends on its ability to 
explain a wide range of social phenomena (…) We want a set of 
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characteristics that captures the essence of human nature, but no more. 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 2)  
The question then becomes how Jensen and Meckling reject these 
models, how their own alternative model is constructed and what type 
of reductionism they apply to capture the essence, but no more. 
They start by addressing the economic model of man. According to 
Jensen and Meckling, their REMM is very different from the short-run 
money-maximizer. The traditional economic model is just ‘a reductive 
version of REMM’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 15) because REMM is 
willing to trade off short-run gains for long-term gains, including non-
financial ones. However, the examples provided in the economic and 
psychological model fail to show how exactly REMM deals with or is 
concerned with ‘goods’ such as solitude, companionship, honesty, 
respect, love, fame, immortality, art, morality, honour, power, love, and 
the welfare of others (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 1, 4, 15, 35). 
Moreover, the kind of creativity employed in their examples does not 
set the REMM apart from the standard economic model as a creative 
individual. Given the examples provided, the ‘creativity’ of REMM is 
constrained to the function of creating ‘new opportunities’ and mainly 
applied to circumvent the constraints of law or policy on human 
behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 5). REMMs are therefore guided 
by a very narrow set of behavioural constraints, which we will also find 
in its economic nature.  
In REMM, the word ‘need’ and its emotional impact is substituted 
by ‘want’ or ‘desire’ in order that we focus on ‘alternatives, substitutes, 
and costs in a productive manner.’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 10). 
Removing the word ‘need’ creates never satiated individuals who are 
always willing to substitute. As a result, it is only cost that determines 
the amount of want, desire or demand for a good (Jensen and Meckling, 
1994: 10). ‘Needs’ can then be considered in light of the want or desire 
of the asking party, rather than the need of the party ‘selling’. In this 
way, everything becomes a negotiable object, as long as the right price is 
offered.  
The acronym REMM fulfils two roles. Initially, it is a model for a 
complete description of human behaviour as a Resourceful, Evaluative, 
Maximizing Model. Through the addition of ingenuity and creativity, 
REMM turns out to be a description of individuals who need to make 
choices as well. REMM thus turns into a Model of generalized 
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behaviour, conflated with the actions and nature of very concrete 
individuals in very particular settings. In this way, REMM as a model 
assumes that the behaviour of individual human beings can be mapped 
and used for a complete description of an (economic) system, while 
REMM as a description of individuals making individual choices 
simultaneously assumes that these individual human beings also express 
traits that escape this modelling exercise. The acronym REMM then 
assumes that it is both a complete description of a system, based on 
behavioural assumptions, while it simultaneously assumes the position 
of red-blooded individuals that somehow escape this model, 
presumably by those same behavioural assumptions. 
This double setup with REMM is mirrored in the nature of man that 
Jensen and Meckling assume to be the basis of ‘the sociological model’. 
Jensen and Meckling depict sociology as a system-approach, reducing 
individuals to system agents. The existence of social theory itself works 
to keep people in a state of lack of responsibility by the fact that social 
theory has either given the legitimation for or actually held them in a 
position where they would not take responsibility. Rather than 
providing a critique of social theory, ‘sociological man’ itself is turned 
from a theoretical system agent into a concrete individual through 
several examples. Sociological man turns out to be a victim by the fact 
he has been made able by sociologists to reduce himself to a victim, 
which then leads to an automatic disavowal of responsibility. Social 
theory itself, then, is responsible for a lack of responsibility on the part 
of the actors that it posits and for the state of the lives of those actors. 
According to Jensen and Meckling, their observations on the 
consequences of social theory and the nature of sociological man are 
based on social science literature and on public discussion (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1994: 2). However, they reference not one basic textbook that 
underpins these theoretical insights. 
Like REMM, the sociological model is thus rendered as a simplified 
set of behavioural assumptions, which is then conflated with the actions 
of a red-blooded ‘sociological man’. Unlike REMM, the behavioural 
assumptions that are projected onto sociological man leave no room for 
the same escape route through ingenuity and creativity. 
From the sociological model it is a small step to the political model. 
We are warned to be extremely wary of this political model, since its 
logic does not withstand ‘careful scrutiny’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 
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28). When government steps in, it is because individuals do not take 
responsibility for themselves (which can largely be attributed to the 
same behavioural assumptions underlying the sociological model) or 
because it is in the self-interest of politicians and bureaucrats (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1994: 29). The concept of the state subordinates human 
individuals, providing ‘an example of the most extreme anti-individualist 
position, one which makes the organization itself the ultimate end.’ 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 23). As a result of this subordination 
‘Individual purpose is not only unimportant, it is an evil that must be 
stamped out.’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 23), a view that they trace 
back to Platonic origins. It must be noted, moreover, that ‘Plato’s views 
are not very different from those of most Marxists.’ (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1994: 23). The circle is then closed by stating that ‘In the 
Marxist model, individuals (…) behave according to the sociological 
model.’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 23). The philosophical-political 
alliance between Plato and Marx therefore leads to a sociological model 
that is meant to subordinate human individuals to organizations and 
states (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 23).  
In the light of this philosophical-political alliance and the 
antecedents of the sociological model it is not surprising that neither the 
state nor professional planning can be entrusted with economic matters. 
Instead, the price mechanism should determine how to relate needs or 
wants to available manpower, plant and material (Jensen and Meckling, 
1994: 11). It is not made clear in this article, how these ideas relate to 
the fact it is still the state that is obliged to take necessary strong action 
to keep REMMs in check through harsh penalties on undesirable 
behaviour. As they state: ‘as [education and rehabilitation programs] are 
accompanied by a reduction in the penalties and other “costs” of 
criminal behavior, we should not be surprised to find that REMMs 
more frequently choose to be criminals… it is not surprising from the 
viewpoint of REMM that Singapore has no drug problem… as 
illustrated by the recent caning of an American youth for vandalism, 
punishment for infraction of Singapore law is carried out swiftly and 
publicly’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 20). The interesting upshot from 
these remarks is, that criminal behavior is apparently a rational and 
defensible choice from the point of view of the REMM in the face of 
reduced costs for such behaviour. Moreover, this quote clearly shows 
the kind of ‘costs’ that Jensen and Meckling have in mind to effectively 
deter an individual REMM from criminal behaviour. 
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The article thus posits a Nature of Man that first pays lip service to 
an expansion of the economic model of man, then denounces the 
sociological, psychological and political models of man, finally to return 
to an REMM that functions both as a model and as an individual. This 
REMM in the end answers uncannily well to the behavioural 
assumptions that ordinarily underlie economic modelling (Bratton, 
1989). REMM, then, appears very much like a construct that filters out 
sociological, psychological and political aspects from an ideal-type actor, 
assuming that ingenuity and creativity can only be applied to the 
remainder. Since REMM can be seen as a construct that hardly deviates 
from the standard behavioural assumptions that underlie economic 
modelling, the remainder that ingenuity and creativity can be applied to 
is simply the economic part of this ideal-type actor. REMM is therefore 
created by Jensen and Meckling through a crude sort of economic 
behaviourism at the expense of other scholarly disciplines.  
However, the question remains why the explicit disavowal of 
organizations is necessary and how the conjunction of this disavowal 
with these behavioural assumptions is related to the wider success of 
agency theory in organization studies and more specifically in theories 
of governance. For these questions I will turn to the second part of the 
article. 
A Science of Organizations 
In the second part of the article, the postulate of ‘creativity’ and the 
straw man version of social theory turns into a denial of the existence of 
organizations. According to Jensen and Meckling, the general failure of 
the social sciences is that individuals are reduced to system-agents or 
‘atoms’. The undesirability of this position provides the hinge for a 
discussion of the nature of organization with methodological 
individualism as an ontological starting point. Methodological 
individualism posits that the agency of all associations, including the 
state, should be understood as attributable to individuals only in social 
science (Elster, 2007). In legal scholarship, this approach takes the 
human individual as the sole possessor of rights and duties. For this 
reason ‘the only real starting point for political or legal theory is the 
individual’ (Horwitz, 1985: 181). 
In ‘The Nature of Man’, Jensen and Meckling invoke 
methodological individualism not to prioritize the theoretical attribution 
of agency to human individuals, but rather to dispel the organization 
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itself. They posit that preferences cannot exist on the level of 
organizations or groups, but only on the level of individuals. In their 
view, organizations are purely conceptual artefacts and cannot really 
have purposes (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 24). In addition, 
organizations do not want, need or suffer; organizations or groups of 
individuals cannot have preferences; organizations cannot be exploited, 
have conflicts, make war or be objects of compassion (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1994: 11). Jensen and Meckling are very insistent that all these 
properties should be attributed to individuals only: 
Concepts such as exploitation and conflict can be used in a group 
context to refer to more than one individual, but such language has 
meaning only in terms of individuals. Organizations cannot be exploited 
any more than machines or rocks can be exploited. Only individuals can 
be exploited, can suffer, can make war; only individuals can be objects 
of compassion. Organizations are purely conceptual artifacts, even 
when they are assigned the legal status of individuals. In the end, we can 
only do things to and for individuals. (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 24) 
The central statement is therefore that ‘organizations are purely 
conceptual artifacts’.  
The question is why Jensen and Meckling would be so vocal about 
this issue in an article on the Nature of Man and why they would 
explicitly add the statement ‘even when they are assigned the legal status 
of individuals’. An answer to this question can be found in the wider 
assumptions about governance and the nature of man in agency theory. 
In agency theory, it is assumed that any type of organization can be 
constructed as a nexus-of-contracts. At the basis of the nexus of 
contracts approach stands the contract. All types of relations within any 
type of organization are predicated on a contractual basis. This position 
advocates a free functioning of contracting individuals (including 
corporations) to order their affairs how they choose. The law then only 
sets rules, which actors can follow or choose to contract around. The 
‘firm’ thus consists of a collection of rational contracting individuals 
with equal starting positions: ‘(…) the nexus of contracts consists of 
discrete contracts among rational economic actors, and the firm springs 
up as a spontaneous productive order.’ (Bratton, 1989: 451). The 
‘organization’ or ‘firm’ is now no longer an entity that exists in itself and 
can no longer be attributed with agency. As a result, the type of 
contractual agency that first adhered to the ‘agents’ can then be 
The ‘Nature of Man’ and the Science of Organization 
 111 
prioritized to establish the organization itself as a contracting ‘nexus’. 
The image of the contracting individuals then reflects the REMM, both 
as a model of man and as a model of organization. Agency theory thus 
constructs a particular view of organization by explicitly rejecting the 
organization itself as a valid level of analysis.  
This rejection of the organization becomes even more interesting in 
the context of Jensen and Meckling’s addition of the words ‘even when 
they are assigned the legal status of individuals’, which means that 
agency theory not only attempts to construct the corporation as an 
aggregation of contracting individuals, but wants to reduce the separate 
legal entity that is created by incorporation in the same way. This is 
important, because the separate legal entity is not the same as the 
emergent identity of an aggregation of individuals constituting the 
corporation. The separate legal entity is different because it is a reified 
singular representation that sues, hires, fires and generally contracts in its 
own name. As a result, this representation of ‘the firm’ has a singular 
type of contracting agency. However, in the language of agency theory, 
the separate legal entity (understood as the nexus) can be reduced in the 
same way as any type of organization. As a result, it does not appear as a 
reified entity, but rather as a ‘convenient fiction’ (Bratton, 1989). 
This idea is such a ‘convenient fiction’ for a number of reasons. 
First, it denies the fact that the separate legal entity as a contracting 
entity positions the separate legal entity as a type of contractual agent 
that is fundamentally different from other agents in the nexus. the 
separate legal entity appears as a ‘legal fiction’ with a singular 
contracting agency. The use of methodological individualism 
subsequently introduces the assumption that the separate legal entity 
itself has a theoretical position, comparable to that of a human being as 
a singular contracting agent. This leads to a position that both entities 
are equal and contract from an equal starting position. This equality in 
contracting possibilities is not reflected in business practice, where the 
constitution of the separate legal entity means that it can contract from 
a very different position to an individual human being in terms of 
agency, ownership, legal protection, liability, lifespan, access to 
information and access to organizational resources. The dismissal of the 
separate legal entity as a ‘convenient fiction’ therefore prioritizes the 
separate legal entity as a contracting agent over others by making 
human actors and the separate legal entity equal in theory, although 
their de facto economic and legal position are quite different.  
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Second, if the separate legal entity is dispelled as a ‘fiction’, this 
allows the corporation to be constructed as a generic ‘firm’, consisting 
of voluntary contractual relations between homogeneous and equal 
partners. By focusing on such voluntary contractual relations between 
ontologically homogeneous actors, this position effectively dispels the 
special position of the managerial conception of the corporation and 
the connected centralization of power and hierarchical connections 
within the corporate structure (Bratton, 1989). The intriguing remark of 
Jensen and Meckling that neither the state, nor professional planning can be 
entrusted with economic matters (Jensen and Meckling, 1994: 11) 
makes sense in this regard. 
Third, the ownership of the corporation is held in legal theory by 
the separate legal entity in itself. The fact that the separate legal entity is 
a reified concept and is specifically what allows for a number of 
attributions, like those of ownership and purpose to this entity (Berle, 
1997). Since the attribution of ownership is based on the legal 
reification of the separate legal entity, its implicit dismissal leads to an 
attribution of ownership to a constituent group within the corporate 
structure, rather than to the separate legal entity itself. In agency theory, 
this is used to argue for shareholder primacy on the basis of their 
‘ownership’ of the corporation. The attribution of ownership to 
shareholders is a very debatable claim, because the increasing distance 
between the shareholders and their factual position within the 
corporation was the reason for the use of the separate legal entity in the 
first place (Ireland, 1999). Moreover, this attribution of ownership to a 
constituent group, rather than to individuals, is hardly compatible with 
methodological individualism. 
Fourth, the use of the separate legal entity as a reified entity is what 
makes the concept of the holding company possible (Horwitz, 1985). 
To obfuscate the existence of the separate legal entity dismissal 
therefore means that the principles underlying the holding company 
become virtually invisible, both in economic and in legal discourse. 
The separate legal entity thus fulfils a large number of important 
functions in economic theory. However, an explicit acceptance the 
separate legal entity as a reified construct would undermine the 
homogeneity of actors and agency that agency theory assumes and 
threaten the level playing field between all contractual actors in the 
market or in the firm. This undermines the reconstitution of the 
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management corporation into a flat firm of voluntary contractual 
relations and it the attribution of ownership to a singular group within 
the corporate constituency. It is therefore necessary for agency theory 
to argue that the separate legal entity is ‘merely’ a convenient fiction in 
order to retain the homogeneity of its actors and to create a very 
specific theory of governance that disregards the specifics of the 
corporation.  
Methodological individualism is therefore not the philosophical 
starting point for agency theory, but rather a necessary complement that 
is used to create a tautology: by denying the reification of any type of 
organization, an alternative idea of organization can be created that is 
simply the reflection of the assumptions posited on the level of the 
individual. This is where the double position of the REMM as both a 
model of red-blooded human individuals and as a model of 
organizations shows its importance. By conflating the two, Jensen and 
Meckling can invoke methodological individualism to produce this 
tautology. 
The rejection of the organization in combination with this particular 
usage of methodological individualism has one more effect that should 
be noted. As argued above, the fact that the separate legal entity is 
included in the same capacity as human beings into legal and economic 
scholarship as a singular representation means that they can be 
constituted as equal entities. As a result the notion of a singular 
economic or legal ‘actor’, ‘agent’, ‘person’ or ‘entity’ can shed any 
explicit reference to a human being by reference to all types of agents as 
similar contractual system-agents in a legal and economic system 
(Macey, 1991). This notion turns the idea of a ‘person’ around, because 
the category of the ‘person’ now includes the incorporated entity unless 
otherwise posited. The representation of the ‘person’ in a legal and 
economic setting is then similar to, but not necessarily the same as that 
of a human being. The representation of singular legal representations 
as contractual agents through their legal and economic representations 
becomes the primary and inevitable shared mode through which the 
representation of both the individual human being and the separate 
legal entity is constructed.  
All legal and economic ‘persons’ can then be reconstituted as 
contracting agents that answer to a narrow set of behavioural and 
political constraints (Bratton, 1989). In this way, ‘persons’ become 
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reconstituted as their ideal-type economic counterparts, producing a 
representation of rational, informed, economically motivated, utility-
maximizing agents that can be used as a representation for human 
beings and the separate legal entity alike: ‘(…) rational economic actors 
denuded of significant human characteristics’ (Bratton, 1989: 462). As a 
result, the definition of the ‘individual’ or ‘person’ and its agency in legal 
and economic scholarship shifts towards that of a paradigmatic legal 
and economic contractual legal subject (Naffine, 2003). Agency theory 
thus constitutes the person as an ideal-type contractual agent in a very 
one-sidedly defined economic-legal system (Ireland, 2003).  
The reconstitution of the notion of the legal and economic ‘person’ 
then creates a very versatile idea about how human beings and separate 
legal entities create ‘firms’ as contractual ‘agents’, operating in a level 
contractual playing field. In the larger economic landscape, these ‘firms’ 
again contract in a similar capacity with individual human beings and 
‘firms’ around them. Both the internal governance of the corporation 
and the wider marketplace thus become constituted in terms of ideal-
type legal and economic actors. In this way, the assumptions behind 
REMM become unavoidable building blocks for the understanding of 
organizations and society, just as Meckling predicted in 1976.  
Conclusion 
What is called ‘the nature of man’ by Jensen and Meckling becomes the 
nature of purely conceptual agents with very narrow behavioural 
constraints in a closed theoretical system. These conceptual agents are 
legal and contractual entities that are ‘denuded of any human 
characteristics’ (Bratton, 1989: 462). Because the constitution of the 
organization cannot be understood beyond the agency of these entities, 
the organization becomes the tautological result of these economic and 
legal ‘agents’. Jensen and Meckling’s ‘Science of Organizations’ thus 
introduces the REMM as an ideal-type actor that constitutes the Nature 
of Man as well as the Nature of Organization.  
When used for the separate legal entity REMM becomes much 
more than a descriptive model of the Nature of Man. Jensen and 
Meckling construct an idea of organizations and their representation 
through the use of methodological individualism, explicitly dismissing 
all types of representation over and above the human individual. 
However, in the context of incorporation they cling to the reified 
separate legal entity with singular agency for its ‘convenience’. This 
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pragmatic exception produces a reification of the separate legal entity 
against a theoretical and normative background that explicitly prohibits 
the acceptance of such reifications.  
Jensen and Meckling therefore produce a theory of organizations 
that initially refers to methodological individualism to deny all types of 
reification of representation, but is quick to abandon this theoretical 
position when the reified separate legal entity with singular agency 
shows its ‘convenience’ in issues like hierarchy, power relations, unequal 
contracting positions, the continued existence of holding companies 
and the attribution of ownership. The use of methodological 
individualism in agency theory is therefore not meant to understand all 
aspects of organizations and governance through the agency of human 
individuals, but rather to take the focus away from the separate legal 
entity as a constitutive factor in the governance structure of the 
corporation and to refocus on the specific rules for organizing that 
appear in the postulates of REMM. 
Considering the aspirations of Jensen and Meckling to develop a 
‘Science of Organizations’ and the success they have had in producing 
an ideal-type contractual actor for legal and economic scholarship, 
considering that this ideal-type actor is produced at the expense of a 
gross reduction of human agency and a lack of evidence for its 
behavioural assumptions (Bratton, 1989), considering that their ideal-
type actor is produced by using politically charged statements and by a 
simplistic and unfounded dismissal of other scholarly disciplines, 
considering that the theory behind REMM amounts to an abuse of 
methodological individualism in the light of the specifics of the separate 
legal entity, considering that REMM leads to a gross misrepresentation 
of the governance of the corporation in organization theory and finally, 
considering that Jensen and Meckling produce a one-sided attack on the 
state and its institutions, while defending a privileged position for the 
corporation as a reified representation of association for its 
‘convenience’, it becomes clear why the acceptance of the ‘Nature of 
Man’ article in textbooks on finance and strategy is important to study 
for its effects on theories of organization and governance.  
It is time to rethink these behavioural and political assumptions and 
work on a Science of Organizations from a perspective that understands 
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From J.L. Austin to Judith Butler 
Alan McKinlay 
Introduction 
‘Performativity’ is fast emerging as a key concept in critical management 
studies. Yet while the concept’s originator, J.L. Austin, is often cited 
there has been no serious engagement with his concept, far less how it 
has made the perilous journey from mid-century philosophical debate, 
through literary and then feminist theory, to arrive in the business 
school. We begin by providing a summary and discussion of J.L. 
Austin’s concepts of ordinary language philosophy. Specifically, we 
outline the development of Austin’s concept of ‘performativity’. 
Austin’s notion of ‘performativity’ stressed the necessary entanglement 
of words and action in everyday speech. We will ask why this term has 
travelled such a distance from its origin as a highly specific 
philosophical intervention to contemporary studies of, for instance, 
esoteric economic instruments. We then turn to Judith Butler, by far the 
most influential post-Foucault theorist, again someone whose work on 
gender and identity is increasingly being appropriated by organizational 
studies. Here we summarise Butler’s key concepts and suggest where 
they draw on Austin and where they go beyond his concept of 
‘performativity’.  
Foucault’s importance to Butler has been much discussed but much 
less well understood is Austin’s contribution to her thinking, despite her 
repeated acknowledgement of her debt, particularly in Excitable Speech 
(1997). Finally, we offer some preliminary, critical comments on the 
ways that the term ‘performativity’ has been assimilated into 
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organization studies. We contrast Austin’s philosophical imagination 
and literary wit with the highly partial and confused version of 
‘performativity’ that is becoming common currency in critical 
management studies. Understanding the subtleties of Austin’s 
reflections on how to categorise ordinary language philosophy is 
important not just in tracing the development of Judith Butler’s 
theorising of identity but should also sound a cautionary note against 
bastardised notions of ‘performativity’ claiming Austin as an authority. 
A Few Poorly Attended Lectures? 
You are more than entitled not to know what the word ‘performative’ 
means. It is a new word and an ugly word, and perhaps it does not 
mean anything very much. But at any rate there is one thing in its 
favour, it is not a profound word. (Austin, 1970: 233) 
Why have a dozen lectures delivered at Harvard about linguistic theory 
by an Oxford philosopher in 1955 provided a central concept for 
contemporary social sciences? After all, Austin published little during 
his short life (1911-60), and only a little more posthumously (Warnock, 
1989: 1-10). His most famous book – How To Do Things With Words – 
began as a lecture series, rewritten but still bearing the hallmarks of 
public oratory. Nor was Austin a public intellectual, although he was 
massively influential within his Oxford circle and did make the odd 
foray into the mass media. In his bearing and manner he was a man of 
his time and place, thoroughly wedded to the conventions of Oxford 
philosophy: ‘J.L Austin… tended to write and speak of Aristotle as 
though he were an interesting but slightly exasperating colleague living 
on the next staircase’ (Harris, 1994: 233). There is little to suggest that 
Austin used philosophical controversy to seek fame or notoriety beyond 
Oxford. Indeed, Austin claimed that he had little interest in launching 
his own school of philosophy. During his closing remarks to what was 
left of a dwindling audience for his Harvard lectures he claimed, 
perhaps disingenuously, that his aim merely had been to clarify some 
important points of linguistic philosophy ‘rather than proclaiming an 
individual manifesto’ (Austin, 1975: 164). Of course, this is precisely 
what he intended. Colleagues and critics, notably his life-long adversary, 
A.J Ayer, were not convinced by Austin’s claim to modesty. Indeed, 
Ayer’s return to Oxford was partly motivated by his desire to counteract 
Austin’s hegemony (Ayer, 1984: 160; Annan, 1990: 410-11; Ignatieff, 
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1998: 84). And with good reason: Austin was advocating a particular 
type of linguistic turn that spoke to academic philosophy’s inability to 
hear the profound moral and ethical issues of everyday life and, most 
importantly, that were understood, conveyed and contested through 
ordinary language. Moreover, analytical philosophy was not just 
indifferent to its inability to hear ordinary language but dismissive of the 
need to address the philosophical complexities of ordinary language 
(Laugier, 2005: 97). Of course, these were not merely philosophical 
controversies but bound up with ferocious personal rivalries amongst 
Oxford philosophers. Famously, Ayer – publicly, personally and later in 
print – accused Austin of being nothing more than a destructive critic: 
‘you are like a greyhound that refuses to race but bites other greyhounds 
to prevent their racing either’ (Ayer, 1977: 160; Berlin, 1980: 109). 
Similarly, Ayer argued that Austin gathered Oxford’s young, ambitious 
philosophers to regular Saturday morning seminars to cement his 
influence, not to stimulate debate (Ayer, 1977: 295-6). One admirer of 
Austin saw this practice not just as a continuation of a pre-war Oxford 
tradition but as a direct result of his career in army intelligence: well-
drilled investigators working steadily through minutely detailed tasks in 
order to uncover important, large truths (Warnock, 1969: 12-3). 
However, even one of Austin’s most ardent – and life-long – admirers, 
Stanley Cavell, conceded that the many charms of Austin’s writing were 
a poor guide to the lack of warmth he demonstrated during his informal 
Saturday salons: 
Austin was, in my eyes, a forbidding, cold man. He famously gathered 
the young teachers of philosophy at Oxford together each week for a 
session of Austinian exercises and some of them, some very brilliant 
young thinkers, chafed under the treatment. (Cavell, 1995: 73)  
Austin extended his practice of convening informal Saturday morning 
seminars for young faculty during his stays in America. We can gauge 
something of the intellectual and emotional intensity that these seminars 
were designed to produce from Cavell’s reflections on his agonised 
reading of his own interactions with the man he referred to as ‘my 
teacher’ throughout his career (similarly, Pitcher, 1973: 20-1). During 
one session, one of Cavell’s papers was the subject for discussion. Or, 
rather, Austin placed Cavell’s typescript in front of him at the start of 
the seminar, and then studiously avoided discussing it. Initially disturbed 
by his mentor’s silence, Cavell much later discovered that Austin had 
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approved of his work and had even recommended it to other Oxford 
scholars. This proved to be cold comfort for Cavell. For many years, 
Cavell pondered the way that his work was initially – and so intimately – 
passed over, and, later, publicly praised in his absence, with no apparent 
thought to its impact on the young American philosopher or even if this 
praise would ever reach his ears, far less compensate for his silence 
during the Saturday seminar. Austin’s deliberate, hurtful – literal – 
speaking over, but not through Cavell’s words during the seminar, was 
not, he concluded, a slight or sign of disapproval; rather, it indicated 
that ‘Austin’s silence was …establishing a private and sincere moment 
of acceptance of the work I had done. Perhaps I found this behaviour 
too formal or hidden, to take in at a glance; but I seem to have found it 
also too familiar to take kindly, since my reaction on hearing of his 
praise was anger: Just like my father, I told myself; public praise and 
private denial’ (Cavell, 1994: 56-7). We will never know whether Cavell’s 
reading of ‘my teacher’ was accurate or well wide of the mark, not that 
this mattered much to Austin. Nor can we know whether Austin’s 
behaviour was a haughty slight, a harsh form of moral education or a 
mere oversight. Contemporary accounts of Austin tell us of an intensely 
private man, besotted by order and detail to the point of easy caricature, 
and not someone prone to mistake the meaning attached even to small-
talk (Rogers, 2000: 146). Cavell’s huge emotional investment in trying to 
understand the meaning of this exchange provides a sense of the 
intensity of the relationship for the younger man whose exposure to 
Austin and his ideas redefined him as a follower and a son as much as a 
philosopher.  
The structure of Austin’s famous Harvard lectures traced the broad 
definitions of two forms of ordinary language: ‘constative’ and 
‘performative’. The Harvard lectures were not, however, conventionally 
structured, moving from critique to hypothesis, then drawing to a 
definitive conclusion. Rather, Austin moved obliquely, developing what 
seemed to be a series of powerful, definitive statements, only to almost 
immediately erode any sense of certainty by hesitation, question and 
uncertainty. He finished each lecture expressing doubts, not 
conclusions. This structure was a deliberate attempt to signal both the 
radical and provisional nature of his proposals. Nevertheless, Austin 
defined two categories of ‘utterance’ – he deliberately limited himself to 
the spoken word – ‘constative’ and ‘performative’. Constative 
utterances are descriptive and so amenable to empirical verification. For 
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Austin, constatives are not philosophically interesting or, more 
accurately, have constituted philosophy’s foreground since the ancient 
Greeks, a pre-eminence that merely reflected ‘the philosophers’ 
preferred sense of simply uttering something whose sole pretension is 
to be true or false’ (Austin, 1975: 72). While constative utterances were 
not necessarily substantively banal they were most definitely 
philosophically uninteresting. As Austin was well aware, to accept his 
straightforward definition of constative redefined truth as an empirical 
rather than a philosophical question, a move which called into doubt 
the central planks of western philosophy. Even on this central issue 
Austin hesitated. Towards the end of his lectures Austin even disowned 
this foundational distinction by defining all utterances as performative. 
Constatives then become a sub-set of performatives, in that the 
function of the declarative statement is not descriptive but brings an act 
into being (Fish, 1989: 37-67). However, we do not need to follow 
Austin in dispensing with the distinction between constative and 
performative (Recanati, 1987: 20, 67-70; Bach, 1975). A performative is 
always more than words. Quite simply, a performative is not a 
description ‘or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it’ (Austin, 1975: 5-
6; Furberg, 1971: 193-200). Of course, the paradigmatic case is to make 
a promise. As Junge (2006: 286) puts it, ‘it is not the will that creates the 
obligation, but the utterance of the promise, may we will it or not. The 
performative act itself creates the motive to honour the promise 
…Whenever we say something that somehow affects others, we might 
be held responsible for having said it, and knowing this, we will feel 
committed to our words’. To issue a performative, then, is both ‘a 
creative and a mapping operation’ (Graham, 1977: 85). Performativity is 
inescapably social since it establishes, confirms, questions, or subverts a 
social relationship. Austin concluded on the impossibility of a clear, 
abstract, and sustainable definition of ‘performativity’. Being forced to 
coin such ‘a new and ugly word’ was doubly disappointing for Austin 
(Austin, 1970: 232). First, to resort to technical terms or, much worse, a 
clumsy neologism, was to risk the premature closure of philosophical 
debate. Second, each new conceptual coinage was, in no small measure, 
to admit a defeat for ordinary language, to register that ordinary 
language had been tried and found wanting in terms of clarity or 
precision. As a mainstream Oxford philosopher, a thoroughgoing 
empiricist and pragmatist, Austin was suspicious even of his own 
conceptual innovation. Austin thought of language in an empiricist, not 
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abstract way. This is not to say that his logic is commonsensical, no 
matter how prosaic his exemplars or how determinedly peculiar his 
metaphors. 
Through the course of his twelve Harvard lectures Austin rehearsed 
the possible grammar of performatives: active verb, indicative, first 
person, present tense. This grammatical form makes performativity 
explicit and obvious but, concluded Austin, these conditions are neither 
grammatically necessary nor socially sufficient. For the first, well-
attended, half of Austin’s twelve Harvard lectures he pondered such 
linguistic issues, then, at every opportunity, unpicked his initial 
solutions: six or so inconclusive lectures is more than enough for even 
the most patient audience (Petrie, 1990: 118-9). The collapse of 
attendance was not due to Austin’s poor delivery: even Austin’s bitterest 
critics acknowledged that he was a gifted public speaker, albeit one with 
a flat, toneless voice (Rogers, 2000: 255). Through the second six – and 
ever-more sparsely attended – lectures of the series, Austin turned to his 
attempt to produce a working definition of performativity. Austin 
puzzled at just what grammatical structures were both necessary and 
sufficient for a statement to be performative. This was an issue that he 
failed to resolve to his satisfaction. The deterioration in Austin’s 
Harvard audience was surely only partly offset by the ardour of some of 
those that remained, and can be attributed to his cautious, inconclusive 
style of posing problems, suggesting solutions, only for these to be 
found wanting and discarded. Perhaps, on the other hand, the 
intellectual and personal challenge of Austin’s approach to the 
preoccupations of analytical philosophy, was dawning on his audience. 
His aim in his study of performatives is at once to lift the 
nondescriptive or nonessential or nonconstative gestures of speech to 
renewed philosophical interest and respectability, and to bring, or 
prepare the ground on which to bring, the philosophical concern with 
truth down to size. (Cavell, 2005: 180-1) 
A performative is more than a statement but is also an action 
appropriate to time, place and wider social context. The statement is 
immanent in the action and vice-versa; both are essential and necessary 
one to the other and neither makes sense independently. The entire 
performative must conform, to a greater or lesser degree, with social 
convention. All performatives, in other words, must have a social as well 
as a linguistic content, be comprehensible, and ‘felicitous’ – in Austin’s 
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phrase – in a given social context. All performatives are, then, socially 
contingent rather than definable exclusively by their grammatical 
structure.  
In all his writing and, just as importantly, his lecturing, Austin used 
an Oxford ‘house-style’ form of plain prose. Complex philosophical 
points were conveyed in stripped down terms, accompanied by 
everyday homilies and commonplace expressions. Ironically, many of 
the phrases Austin used to illustrate his lectures retain their warmth and 
charm but can also seem arcane, outmoded or reeking of donnish 
sensibilities. But it is a rare etymologist that illustrates ‘a putative 
description of a physical action’ with putting in a golf tournament 
(Austin, 1970: 258). In this case, he was – perhaps – making very erudite 
mischief at the expense of his arch-rival Ayer (1952: 35) who used the 
phrase ‘putative proposition’ in a central passage about the verifiability 
of truth – and the futility of listening for philosophical meaning in 
ordinary speech – in his most important book, Language, Truth and Logic. 
There was, then, much more to this terrible pun than artifice: Austin’s 
peculiar metaphors and striking phrases are central to how he developed 
his argument, engaged his audience and allowed his readers to follow 
his line of thinking. Or a much simpler explanation is possible: Austin 
was both a golfer and a philosopher (Stroll, 2000: 163). It is perfectly 
plausible to read Austin as deliberately using jokes to draw attention to 
areas where he felt his ideas were not fully worked out or where 
paradoxes remained (Felman, 2002: 71-5). In person as well as in prose, 
he occasionally took a childlike, but never malicious, delight in the 
absurd or in gently leading questioners into untenable or ridiculous 
positions (Picker, 1973: 19-23). Donnish humour was always polished 
and generally had an acerbic, sly quality that could not easily be 
mistaken for charm or naivete, certainly not by other Oxford insiders, 
perhaps the only audience that really mattered to Austin. Cruel slights 
and juvenile puns were rehearsed, polished and retold in this insular 
world (Mitchell, 2009). Austin was notorious for his rigour and his 
austere debating style but stood apart from the refined cruelties of high 
table conversation. When rehearsing a disagreement about the nature of 
truth he suggested that ‘comments on comments, criticisms of 
criticisms, are subject to the law of diminishing fleas’ (Austin, 1970: 
154). Nor was this an affectation that he dropped when confronted with 
a high-minded professional audience. Throughout his Harvard lectures 
Austin revelled in playful and accessible language. Elsewhere, during a 
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typically intricate discussion of ‘responsibility’ and ‘intentionality’, one 
discovers that to feed peanuts to a penguin is to endanger their life: ‘Did 
I feed the peanuts intentionally? Beyond a doubt: I am no casual peanut 
shedder’ (Austin, 1970: 275). During an aside pondering the distinction 
between ‘inadvertently and ‘automatically’, we learn that he was ‘partial 
to ice cream’ and often day-dreamed about the limits to self-control and 
his liking for a second helping of dessert while at high-table dinners 
(Austin, 1970: 198). Of course, there is no way of knowing whether 
Austin is allowing us a glimpse of his personality and life-style or 
whether his personal asides were no more than stylistic conceits. Such 
ambiguities are inherent in Austin’s theory as much as in his style. Even 
the title of his most famous work, How to Do Things with Words, can be 
read as both a promise and a description: 
How to Do Things with Words is a great work of ironic philosophical 
speculation. It demands and repays the closest attention to its details of 
language. Meanwhile, on the brink of that, Austin’s title hovers there on 
the cover or title page, faintly smiling, enigmatic, quizzical, ironical, a 
little like the photograph on the fron cover of the paperback edition of 
his Philosophical Papers. That photograph shows Austin as the patriarch, 
grandfather, or capo of speech-act theory. Austin’s title for How to Do 
Things with Words is the first joke among many jokes in this admirable 
joke book. One wonders if any library or bookstore has ever filed this 
book among the how-to books. That would no doubt have pleased 
Austin. (Miller, 2001: 11)  
To be sure, these moments of levity served an immediate purpose: they 
were designed to put his audience at ease but they were also the prelude 
to the deconstruction of his metaphor or example. In a famously 
acerbic denunciation of the dead hand of linguistic philosophy, Ernest 
Gellner (1959: 260) condemned Austin’s pathological pedantry and his 
espoused reverence for ordinary language as a smoke-screen for a 
retreat from the world rather than an engagement with it: ‘a philosophic 
form eminently suitable for gentlemen. …no vulgar new revelation 
about the world, no guttersnipe demands for reform’. The use of 
exemplars also signalled the philosopher’s conventional means of 
discussing first principles and not a substitute for even the beginning of 
empirical analysis. Every metaphor has a precise purpose: to consider, 
refine, or reject a way of thinking through the metaphorical clarification 
of a philosophical issue. Austin’s superficiality was deliberate, measured 
and used to signal, if seldom to resolve, new issues that his approach 
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had surfaced. Equally, by leavening his Harvard lectures with classical, 
poetic, literary and philosophical allusions – in several languages – 
Austin left no doubt about the weight of his learning, no matter how 
lightly borne (Cavell, 1994: 124-5).  
Speech act theory stands to one side of the opposition between 
structuralism and post-structuralism. For speech-act theory regards 
society and speech acts as mutually constitutive, in much the same way 
as Marx considered his infamous metaphor of ‘base-superstructure’ 
(Sayer, 1983). Speech act theory escapes from the prison house of 
language and the solipsism of psychoanalysis by accepting the collective 
determinants of human speech and actions. The validity of 
performatives cannot be assessed in terms of their correspondence with 
an action or event in the same way as a constative. That is not to say 
that performatives cannot be assessed for their validity or, as Austin 
would have it, their ‘appropriateness’. ‘Appropriateness’ simply signalled 
that the performative statement must be appropriate to its social 
context. The limit case is easily identified. To reverse two of Austin’s 
most famous illustrations: it would be as ridiculous to say ‘I do’ when 
naming a ship as it would to say ‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’ 
during a wedding ceremony. However, Austin was not content to rely 
on absurdities and proceeded to carefully elaborate six conditions that 
must be met for a performative to be entirely successful: there must be 
a robust framework of conventions; all participants must act according 
to these conventions; complete the act and live out its consequences; 
and their behaviours must be paralleled by an endorsement of the 
thoughts or feelings demanded by convention (Austin, 1975: 15). 
So, Austin established a complex and comprehensive set of 
necessary conditions for a speech act to be performative: he was careful 
not to suggest that even if all these necessary conditions were met that 
this was sufficient for an utterance to be deemed performative (Searle, 
1969: 137-40). For Austin, typologies of this sort were always imperfect, 
always incomplete and their categories never mutually exclusive. Given 
such a demanding set of conditions performatives can only rarely, if 
ever, be fully successful. My lack of clarity here is deliberate for, as we 
shall see, this is an issue which has intrigued later readings of Austin. 
Parenthetically, we would add that although Austin offers neither 
guidance nor comment here, it is the manner of their failure that offers 
the most room for theoretical development and empirical debate in 
organization studies. Some performatives are only partially successful 
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due to, flawed acts or misunderstandings or bad faith by one or more 
participants. In highly ritualised ceremonies, an incomplete or flawed 
performative is extremely rare: again a marriage or the launch of a ship. 
But these are hardly everyday occurrences. Equally, minor flaws in a 
ritual need not undermine its meaning or prejudice its outcome: a 
groom may stumble over his vows or a bride may have private 
reservations, but that seldom halts the ceremony although it may later 
alter the course of the marriage. In 1956 Austin provided a British radio 
audience with an unscripted but clearly well-rehearsed example of the 
difficulties associated with the classification of infelicities. Again, Austin 
used one of his favourite examples, the naming of a ship, an explicit 
performative. 
Suppose that you are just about to name the ship, you have been 
appointed to name it, and you are just about to bang the bottle against 
the stern; but at that very moment some low type comes up, snatches 
the bottle out of your hand, breaks it on the stern, shouts out ‘I name 
this ship the Generalissimo Stalin’, and then for good measure kicks away 
the chocks. Well, we agree of course on several things. We agree that 
the ship certainly isn’t now named the Generalissimo Stalin, and we agree 
that it’s an infernal shame and so on and so forth. But we may not agree 
as to how we should classify the particular infelicity in this case. (Austin, 
1970: 239-40)  
Elements of the ceremony were fully felicitous. Even the ‘low person’s’ 
words were grammatically and socially, if not politically, correct, except 
for the fact that he was not authorised to say them. There is a further 
possible reading, however. The ‘low person’s’ disruption would certainly 
have run counter to the normal conventions of a launch. Neither 
conformity of word nor deed alone is sufficient for a performative to be 
felicitous. Indeed, the invocation of the wrong name, quite apart from 
the nature of the invader, could invalidate much of what followed. For 
the ship would be launched but the vessel’s name would always be 
followed by some smiling, perhaps incredulous, reference to its 
temporary ‘alternative’ name and the principals would never quite 
outlive the memory of their part in the day’s events. In that sense, 
Austin depicts the launch as unambiguously ‘unfelicitous’ in word and 
deed. Of course, here felicitousness depends on the politics of whoever 
is applying Austin’s tests: for the energetic young communist and her or 
his comrades would surely regard this as an audacious assertion of an 
alternative set of conventions, entirely contrary to the immediate 
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context of the ceremony and established authority more generally. ‘Low 
persons’ might laugh and applaud the felicitousness of their comrade’s 
intervention, just as it was being rued by the launch party and 
deprecated by stuffy Oxford philosophers. Here we collide with 
Austin’s peculiar sense of the fixity of the social: he begins from an 
understanding that the felicity of performatives is assessed against deep-
set social conventions. Here Austin seems uncomfortably aware that he 
is straying over the boundaries of his discipline into, as he puts it, 
anthropology. He recognises that he cannot settle this to his satisfaction 
and it seems as if he decides almost to put this matter to one side. He 
does this by invoking a conservative kind of social Darwinism that 
asserts that long usage embeds social conventions: only those that fit 
some purpose and display sufficient practical precision survive in the 
long-run. Austin is conscious of the conservatism of his position but 
regards it as consistent with the logic of ordinary language philosophy 
and, indeed, the robust subtlety of everyday speech. 
our common stock of words embodies all the distinction men have 
found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth 
making, in the lifetimes of many generations; these surely are likely to 
be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood the test of the 
survival of the fittest, and have subtle, at least in all reasonably practical 
matters, than any you and I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an 
afternoon – the most favoured alternative method. (Austin, 1970: 182)  
To say the least, this leaves Austin unable to think about ways that 
authority may be challenged by acts – words and deeds – that flout 
established power in the most visible way possible. To usurp the launch, 
to name a ship after a communist rather than the monarch, especially at 
the height of the cold war, is to cleave open a space for dissent, albeit 
momentarily. Now, Austin would reply that this moment of resistance 
would be closed down immediately, not just by the ‘low type’ being 
manhandled off the launch platform by security, accompanied by the 
catcalls or, at least, the horrified gasps of the crowd. To Austin there 
would be little likelihood of any cheers for the mischievous, perhaps 
threatening, interloper. As the platform party regained its composure, so 
the weight of authority was reasserted. Indeed, perhaps the dignified 
bearing of the launch party in the face of such adversity would enhance 
the authority of the ceremony. The same disruption to the same 
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performative ceremony can, therefore, be judged to have quite different 
forms of meaning and felicity.  
More generally, then, Austin’s definition – and his illustrations – 
suggest that performatives are often associated with – or are essential to 
– rituals and that there is an almost infinite variety of ways in which 
performatives can be flawed without failing completely. Nonetheless, 
flaws, whether slight or serious, are not restricted to words but could 
just as easily involve actions, demeanour, or thoughts. The performative 
can, in other words, be undone by thought, speech or deed, or, indeed, 
by inaction. As a former army officer, Austin would be acutely aware of 
the potency of the dumb insolence of subalterns. Nor is this 
vulnerability restricted to relatively unscripted everyday life. The most 
profound ceremonies can be compromised if not wholly undone by the 
smirk of a cynical groom or the laughter of a nervous bride. Here 
Austin raises a point that was to move centre-stage during 
contemporary discussions of identity. In general, utterances have to be 
‘serious’ for them to be performatives. This is a crucial philosophical 
point. The word is not an outward sign of ‘an inward or spiritual act: 
from which it is but a short stop to go on to believe or to assume 
without realising that for many purposes the outward utterance is a 
description, true or false, of the occurrence of the inward performance’ 
(Austin, 1975: 9). One can safely infer that for Austin ‘identity’ was 
necessarily socially constructed, socially enabled and collective by 
nature, even though it is normally experienced – and most often 
articulated – individually.  
Austin’s main concern was to identify the conditions necessary for 
‘felicitous’ or ‘happy’ performatives. Identifying would-be performatives 
that violate all of his conditions is straightforward: ‘it is like a marriage 
with a monkey’ (Austin, 1975: 25). Necessarily, then, he recognises that 
not all performatives fully satisfy these conditions but do not fall 
completely short. While he takes the fact of failure for granted, the nature 
of this failure can take many forms. Austin does not allow this 
recognition to delay him in his clarification of performative speech acts. 
Nevertheless, almost parenthetically, he uses several terms for 
performatives that fail to satisfy these conditions: unhappy, abuses, 
misfires, disallowed, botched, void, without effect, purported, hollow 
(Austin, 1975: 14-5, 17-8).  
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Austin provides a rich and provocative account of what it is to be 
social. He provides a way of rethinking the operation of ordinary 
language that demands that we attend to its conditions of possibility – 
social as much as linguistic; that the most subtle ethical questions are 
asked – and answered, however partially – in everyday life; and that 
understanding ordinary language should be the prime objective of 
philosophy rather than a second order matter. That said, Austin leaves 
critical issues unresolved. This he acknowledged, indeed signalled, 
throughout his Harvard lectures. First, the force of any performative is 
not determined by its internal logic but by its congruence with its social 
setting. So there is uncertainty over who judges the felicity of a 
performative (see Massen, 2006: 170-1). Determining such issues is an 
empirical, not theoretical, matter. Austin offers a few methodological 
hints about how one would conduct empirical research but he does not 
take this very far. Second, there is an instinctive conservatism in Austin 
that does not just recognise but positively values the stability of ordinary 
language, a stability that he regards as a precondition of the subtle and 
robust ethical judgements that can be made through ordinary language. 
As we shall see, this conservative stress on the internal and social 
stability of ordinary language has been turned on its head by 
contemporary theorists, most notably Judith Butler.  
Butler and Performativity 
Performativity or, more generally, speech acts formed one of the key 
battlegrounds for literary theory for over two decades before the ‘theory 
wars’ abated in the mid-1980s. Indeed, it would have been all but 
impossible for a literary theorist of Judith Butler’s generation to avoid 
becoming embroiled in the paradigm wars around speech-act theory in 
its various, sometimes virulent, forms. Butler played little direct part in 
these debates, and while her texts often critically engage with other 
scholars, this is always performed in a measured tone, bereft of personal 
or political invective. That said, there is none of Austin’s playfulness or 
quirky use of metaphors in Butler. Quite the reverse: her prose is dense 
and unforgiving. A charitable reading would locate Butler’s work in a 
hostile academic and political climate and so register her prose as 
marked by a constant wariness, a guardedness that each point had to be 
made meticulously lest it become a hostage to political opponents We 
should be wary, then, of criticising Butler solely in terms of style for this 
can often be a code for a deeply conservative disdain for any deviation 
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not just from plain prose, but from entrenched – and politically 
deadening – commonsense (Lakoff, 2000: 58-9; Ferguson, 2003: 17-9). 
For it is precisely such unspoken, commonsensical assumptions about 
gender that Butler is trying to disrupt. Nevertheless, Butler makes few 
concessions to her reader: there is little chance of finding an aside about 
the digestive weaknesses of penguins, far less her fondness for ice 
cream.  
Butler arrived at Austin via Derrida’s interpretation of 
performativity, an interpretation that, observed Stanley Cavell (1995: 
44), lay somewhere between ‘an attack’ and ‘a sort of celebration or 
homage’. Philosophically, Derrida was drawn to Austin’s open, and his 
elliptical, yet precise, style. Derrida is far from unique in being 
enchanted by Austin as a writer of literature as much as a philosopher 
of language. In an important sense, Derrida’s commentary was much 
closer to eulogy than critique. And we know that Derrida was capable 
of the most withering of criticisms. Indeed, the title of Derrida’s 
collection of essays – Limited Inc – can, perhaps, be read as a pun on one 
of Austin’s most celebrated essays, ‘‘Three Ways of Spilling Ink’. 
Derrida’s comments on Austin were part of a contribution to a 
conference on communication. In one sense, Derrida offers a summary, 
albeit selective, of Austin’s ordinary language philosophy. He develops 
his contribution by contrasting the performative utterance which, unlike 
the constative 
does not have its referent (but here that word is certainly no longer 
appropriate, and this precisely is the interest of the discovery) outside of 
itself or, in any event, before and in front of itself. It does not describe 
something that exists outside of language and prior to it. It produces or 
transforms a situation, it effects; and even if it can be said that a 
constative utterance also effectuates something and always transforms a 
situation, it cannot be maintained that that constitutes its internal 
structure, its manifest function or destination, as in the case of the 
performative. (Derrida, 1988: 13) 
Derrida compliments Austin for ‘an analysis which is patient, open, 
aporetical, in constant transformation, often more fruitful in the 
acknowledgement of its impasses than in its positions’ (Derrida, 1988: 
14). 
The hesitations that thinned out Austin’s Harvard audience were 
precisely what Derrida found most attractive. But he was much less 
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convinced by Austin’s retention of the self-aware individual at the 
author of the performative. What Austin took to be unlikely, the 
moments which rendered a performative infelicitous, should, countered 
Derrida, be considered quite differently. For Derrida, the possibility of 
failure is a necessary and defining element of every performative, not just 
those that proved infelicitous. So, Derrida argued, Austin regarded 
failure as an external ‘trap into which language may fall or lose itself as 
in an abyss situated outside of or in front of itself?’ (Derrida, 1988: 17). 
Derrida mocked this timidity: language becomes something surrounded 
by risk, a kind of ‘perdition which speech could never hope to leave, but 
which it can escape by remaining ‘at home,’ by and in itself, in the 
shelter of its essence or telos?’ Risk – infelicity – is not, insists Derrida, 
external to language but internal and a condition of its possibility. All 
performatives are flawed in some way or other, to a greater or lesser 
extent. The truly successful performatives offered by Austin – the 
naming of a ship – or by Derrida – Paul Ricouer calling a meeting to 
order – are exceptional, highly ritualised, with scripted roles for all, and 
clearly structured authority. For Derrida, these are not exemplars of 
performatives in general but limit cases. Derrida marks the importance 
of context for Austin’s notion of performative but retaining 
intentionality and the singularity of meaning renders Austin a 
metaphysician of the ordinary. Derrida’s reading of Austin is by no 
means uncontested. On the contrary, Culler (1983: 114) insists that 
Austin regards the possibility of failure as an integral part of 
performatives and, indeed, that ‘something cannot be a performative 
unless it can go wrong’. Substantively, however, we can differ from 
Derrida’s reading of Austin and agree with his suggestion that some 
degree of risk – or danger – of failure is inherent in every performative 
utterance. Certainly, it is this sense of infelicity inscribed in every 
performative that Butler adopts from Derrida’s comments on Austin 
(see Felman, 2002: 44-5). It is precisely the possibility of failure that is 
inherent in the unremarkable routines that define gender from which 
Butler derives political hope.  
Irrespective of the path to How to Do Things with Words, a close 
reading of Butler reveals just how great is her debt to the Oxford 
philosopher. This debt was made explicit in Excitable Speech (1997), in 
which she explores and develops Austin’s notion of performative, a 
term that does not appear in her previous work (Lloyd, 2006: 36). This 
is not to say that Austin and performativity are not implicit and 
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pervasive in how she had considered gender previously. For Butler, 
gender is not constative – a fact to be confirmed – but always, to some 
extent, performative, a way of speaking and a way of acting in and on 
the social world. Gender identity is not a more or less accurate referent 
of the real but something that is made through words and deeds. Now, 
only a gross misreading of Butler would conclude that she proposes that 
only words produce gender: subjectivity arises with, through and against 
gestures, routines, the stuff of gender in everyday life. Indeed, Butler’s 
novelty was in taking sociality seriously (Cusset, 2003: 210-12). In two 
important respects, then, Butler remains close to Austin. First, Butler, 
like Austin, emphasises the open-ended, the potentiality inherent in all 
identities. Second, Butler stresses the inescapable role of the social in 
the construction of identity, an echo of Austin’s (1970: 178) insistence 
on social context and his scepticism of excessive materialism, of any 
sense of an ultimate, even visceral, practice being a sufficient 
explanation of discourse. In important way, Butler both remains faithful 
– felicitous – to Austin and uses his notion of performativity as a 
starting-point. Butler remains close to Austin in her emphasis on the 
indeterminancy and contingency of language, action and meaning. 
Identity is always unfinished business. She shares with Austin a belief in 
the importance of the taken-for-grantedness of everyday life and the 
ways it shapes identity (Loxley, 2006: 14). Importantly, this is where 
Austin stops and where Butler begins. Butler employs Austin to 
consider the nature of gender as a social grammar. 
Echoing Foucault’s instinct and – sometime – methodology, Austin 
(1970: 179-80) looked to the unusual, the abnormal, to ‘throw light on 
the normal, will help us to penetrate the blinding veil of ease and 
obviousness that hides the mechanisms of the natural successful act’. 
Similarly, in his remark that aesthetics should occasionally put aside ‘the 
beautiful’ to explore ‘the dainty and the dumpy’ of the everyday, so 
Austin asks us to consider the extraordinary riches of ordinary language 
(Austin, 1970: 183). In seeking to establish the necessary conditions – 
the conditions of felicity – for ordinary language (Cavell, 2002: xx), 
Austin is on similar terrain to Foucault who sought the linguistic 
categories and institutional logics that produced certain behaviours, 
certain subjectivities. Of course, Foucault’s histories often involved a 
double move, placing the ‘abnormal’ centre-stage while turning 
unquestioned routines of, say, prisoners or army cadets into something 
strange. In Excitable Speech Butler uses empirical material to develop her 
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theoretical position. Specifically, she examines public testimonies of one 
kind or another, as forms of confession, moments which, of course, 
Foucault regarded as symptomatic of modernity. Butler’s political 
objective is to question and help destabilise gender identities. Again, 
there is a consistency with Foucault, in that both sought to overcome 
what they regarded as the stultifying effect of Marxist politics, in favour 
of the proliferation of identities and resistance, a kind of hyper-radical 
pluralism (Gaussot, 2006: 86-7).  
What then did Butler make of her relationship with Austin? Like 
many others, she found Austin’s writings charming and amusing. In 
Excitable Speech (1997) she points to at least three important senses in 
which her notion of performativity accords with that of Austin. First, 
and this is a point that is explicitly reinforced several times in the text, 
that a performative utterance is not simply discourse but has some kind 
of impact on the world, even if only to reinforce existing conventions, 
hierarchies and identities. Second, that she shares Austin’s stress on the 
absolute need to contextualise speech and much of his uncertainty 
about how this could be done theoretically and empirically. Again, this 
insistency on the sociality of speech means that she remains faithful to 
Foucault in escaping the illusion of the sovereign individual (Butler, 
1997: 3, 16, 80-2). Third, and bearing in mind the importance of 
Derrida’s reading of Austin for the development of Butler’s theory, she 
goes beyond Austin in highlighting the ambiguity and instability of 
performativity. Austin points to the ambiguity and instability of 
performativity as an analytical category which Butler summarises as, 
‘actions that are performed by virtue of words, and those that are 
performed as a consequence of words’ (Butler, 1997: 44). This tension 
at the centre of every performative Butler takes to the heart of every 
identity. Identities become deeply performative, expressed, reinforced 
and projected by every felicitous gesture and brought into question by 
every ill-chosen joke or gesture. Of course, the sense of self-doubt 
inherent in every identity, the way individuals and institutions monitor, 
police and manage identity is the crucial connection she makes between 
Austin, Foucault and psychoanalysis. Fourth, the authority of every 
performative utterance is determined by social structure and 
convention, by the power and legitimacy bestowed by consistent and 
unremarkable repetition. Even here, Butler is careful to stress the 
provisional nature of every performative, no matter how dully 
uncontroversial (Butler, 1997: 51).  
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For Butler, gender is performative in the sense that ‘it is real only to 
the extent that it is performed’ (Butler, 1990: 278-9). This has led to 
much serious misunderstanding since it collapses performativity into 
performance. Butler is arguing that what we say about ourselves and 
how we act does not represent a fixed underlying identity. Our words, 
gestures and actions are not expressions of – or even merely 
constitutive of – who we are. In fact, Butler’s controversial and, she 
later added, somewhat ill-chosen account of drag was presaged by 
Austin on forms of ‘pretending’, especially exaggeration (Austin, 1970: 
258). In no small measure, her – later regretted – conflation of 
‘performance’ and ‘performativity’ betrays the Derridean route she took 
to Austin. That is, Derrida’s partial reading of Austin stresses 
performance in an extremely literal sense that is incompatible with the 
balance of his writings (Hammer, 2002: 158-62). For Austin, 
‘pretending’ involves some degree of extemporisation, perhaps 
spontaneity, a knowing approximation rather than guileless mimicry, 
and a readiness to drop the pretence, not to extend it indefinitely nor 
even necessarily to await discovery. To pretend is, then, neither a 
disguise nor a serious attempt at deception. Here Austin (1970: 268-9) is 
sensitive to the ambiguities of pretence. Similarly, far from drag being a 
deceit, it is a pretence that is intended not just to blur perceptions of 
gender but to compel everyone to consider these ambiguities: whether 
they be an actor, watcher or participant; whether with empathy, delight, 
uneasiness or revulsion.  
Another reading of Butler’s remarks on drag, however, produces a 
different kind criticsm, and one that is not so easily disposed of. Even if 
one discounts Butler’s commentary on drag as an ill-advised metaphor, 
this does not eliminate the sense of constant change, of the instability of 
identity that pervades her work. This instability is politically important 
to Butler since it allows questioning, resistance, and change. 
Theoretically, the cost of Butler’s tight focus on the moment is a peculiar 
ahistoricity. She is left with a theoretical and stylistic difficulty that is by 
no means unique to Butler but which is, nonetheless, particularly acute 
in her work. That is, how to maintain a robust constructivist position 
while at the same time acknowledging the inescapable, visceral, fragile 
materiality of the body (Kirby, 2006: 66). 
In Gender Trouble, there is no mention of Austin but the notion of 
performativity, refracted through Derrida, is clear enough in her 
insistence that conventional gender identities are endlessly, inventively 
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generative and inherently unstable: ‘The injunction to be a given gender 
produces necessary failures, a variety of incoherent configurations that 
in their multiplicity exceed and defy the injunction by which they are 
generated’ (Butler, 1990: 145). In an important sense, Butler’s 
voluntarist position represents the other side of the coin from Austin’s 
linguistic conservatism, his position that the structures of ordinary 
language – and the conventions of ordinary life – were, if not timeless, 
then certainly changed only at the most glacial pace. Butler implicitly 
acknowledges the difficulties of her position and draws on Derrida’s 
essay on Austin to provide a way out of her theoretical dilemma. In this 
important sense, Butler goes beyond Austin by offering concepts about 
how speech acts reproduce established conventions, social structures and 
identities. Following Derrida, Butler argues that the key is the repetition 
of the thoroughly unremarkable daily routines of gender which both 
produce a sense of individual choice and reproduce conventional 
identities and hierarchies (Lloyd, 2007: 61-6; McKinlay, 2010). Butler, 
like Austin, stresses the sociality of identity, not its psychology. 
Establishing and sustainining – far less modifying – an identity is a 
complex process of negotiating and reflecting upon, innumerable, 
demanding routines. Understanding that process, insists Butler, is a 
theoretical process that cannot begin from the individual, the moment 
of performance, or abstract notions of ‘structure’. 
Conclusion: The Peculiar Journey of ‘Performativity’ 
If J.L. Austin coined the concept ‘performativity’ as a way of 
understanding the social embeddedness of everyday language, then this 
proved to be only the beginning of the concept’s journey. If much of 
Austin’s initial appeal lies in the verve and humour of his writing then 
its lasting influence is attributable to its open-endedness. However, for 
all the ease with which some of Austin can be read and enjoyed this 
never detracts from the care he took about the substance of his 
argument or the intensity and precision of his thinking. Austin’s 
Harvard lectures were an illustration of what he meant by 
performativity and, as it turned out, were themselves performative in 
their effect on all forms of literary and social theory. Performativity is a 
simple enough idea, plausible as a theory and is intuitively convincing in 
terms of everyday experience. And it is this ease, the taken-for-
grantedness that has allowed Austin’s original concept to travel so far 
from his very specific grammatical objective. ‘Performativity’ was a key 
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term in the paradigm wars that revolutionised literary theory, is 
inescapable in any contemporary discussion of gender and is becoming 
increasingly common in organization studies. In particular, 
‘performativity’ is becoming an important term in ‘critical management 
studies’. In some ways this is not surprising. Perhaps the two defining 
characteristics of ‘critical management studies’ has been its openness to 
new ways of theorising management, work and organization and, 
second, an insistence that they way we talk about our working lives, 
employment and organization is the way we come to understand and act 
upon ourselves and each other. Naturally, Judith Butler, J.L. Austin and 
their ‘shared’ concept of performativity are becoming increasingly 
important resources for critical management studies. Indeed, in an 
important intervention Spicer, Alvesson and Karreman (2009) issue a 
clarion call for a simultaneous rethinking and remaking of critical 
management studies. Performativity – as a concept and as a practice – is 
placed at the centre of this project. Their aim is nothing less than to 
provide a unifying intellectual and political agenda for critical 
management studies. Critical management studies has adopted 
something of a cynical distance from political or ethical engagement, 
distrustful or dismissive of anything that smacks of assuming a 
‘normative’ position. The alternative to being against performativity – 
the dominant position in critical management studies – is, they argue, to 
embrace performativity and render it critical, engaged and pragmatic. In 
short, they demand that critical management studies will become more 
performative. Now, one can only applaud this rekindled appetite for 
political engagement, however ill-defined. But we can question their 
reading of performativity which, despite their attempt to distance 
themselves from the disengaged mainstream of critical management, 
remains unchanged. Disappointingly, Spicer, Alvesson and Karreman 
(2009) offer only a bowdlerised notion of performativity that owes 
much more to Lyotard than it does to Austin. Admittedly, in a footnote 
Lyotard claims proximity to and distinctiveness from Austin’s notion of 
performativity: ‘the two meanings are not far apart. Austin’s 
performative realizes the optimal performance’ (Lyotard, 1984: 88). In 
Lyotard, then, performativity is a catch-all term that refers to any system 
that maximises outputs as it minimises inputs. This is close to the 
meaning of performative that so exercises Spicer, Alvesson and 
Karreman (2009), but it is far from consistent with Austin. Following 
Austin, one can be no more ‘anti’ performative than one can be ‘against’ 
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verbs or give only qualified approval to nouns. There is a real danger 
that doing things with words is morphing into doing anything – 
everything – with his word, performativity. This abuse of Austin would 
surely have tested the limits of his prickly Donnish civility. If critical 
management studies must define new ways of political, ethical and 
pragmatic engagement, then it surely must also attend to the ethics of 
scholarly production, an ethics which demands that we take care with 
our appropriation of concepts. There is more to this than scholarly nit-
picking. The power of Austin and Butler lies in the way they prepare the 
ground for historical and empirical research, the way that both avoided 
premature theoretical closure and, in Butler’s case, acknowledged the 
obstinate power of established gender identities as she celebrated their 
inherent uncertainties and malleability. The ways that performatives fail 
are their most interesting theoretical and empirical feature, not the limit 
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Four Close Readings on Introducing the 
Literary in Organizational Research 
Christina Volkmann and Christian De Cock 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will make a case that organization studies texts have 
tended to reduce literary theory to a static repository of concepts from 
which argumentative ‘tools’ or theoretical ‘back-up’ can be picked up as 
and when necessary. A discrete field of study like literary theory thus 
becomes a kind of supermarket full of material from where individual 
aspects are taken to reflect on methods for researching organizational 
‘reality’ or to theorize on organization in general. Examples include 
using literary theory as a text-structuring device (e.g. through a 
‘checklist’ or a set of labelling devices), as a way of distinguishing ‘good’ 
from ‘bad’ texts, or as a fixed status symbol by alluding to a string of 
theorists, novelists or poets whose writings only readers with a sound 
knowledge of literary theory will be able to appreciate fully and which 
presupposes a degree of consensus amongst literary scholars which does 
not exist.  
The initial focus of our close reading will be on three texts published 
in respected organization studies journals during the 1990s (respectively 
Easton and Araujo, 1997; O’Connor, 1995; Hatch, 1996). Here the 
authors argue for different, open research approaches and discuss the 
implications of not being able to fix organizational reality in a way akin 
to the natural sciences. Yet, at the same time the texts under 
consideration tend to treat literary theory as a fixed entity which 
provides an infinite amount of typologies and frameworks (including 
2x2 matrices!), thus denying the very implications they aim to discuss 
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for their own discipline. This reduction seems to be symptomatic of the 
quest for some solid ground to anchor the field of organization studies 
to. However, because the reduction is just that, and because it fails to 
take into account the complexity and constant flow and flux within the 
discipline it is ‘using’ (in this case literary theory), the attempt to find 
solid ground is doomed to failure.  
We will then move on and perform a fourth close reading on the 
‘application’ of the work of Wolfgang Iser in organization studies; a 
body of work which explicitly aims to move beyond typologies in order 
‘to produce an alternative pattern that can do justice to literature, the 
fictive, and the imaginary by bringing their limitless aspects into focus’ 
(Iser, 1993: xiv). Iser’s work (e.g. on Reception Theory/Reader 
Response Theory or Games/Play in the literary text) stands out in that 
it seems to be quoted frequently from paper to paper with a lack of 
argumentative purpose, thus excluding it from further engagement and 
consigning it to a kind of shorthand or code for ‘those in the know’. 
Examples we will investigate in some detail include Golden-Biddle and 
Locke (1993), Czarniawska (1999) and Linstead (2000). 
Overview of Terminology 
In the knowledge of possibly oversimplifying literary terms, we shall 
attempt a brief clarification of our terminology. Literature denotes 
fictional texts such as novels, unless stated otherwise, for example, 
when ‘literature’ might stand for the body of texts produced on a certain 
subject, as in ‘the literature on discourse’. Literary theory will refer to what 
is thought, written, and debated about literature, and the person 
engaged in such activity will be referred to as ‘literary scholar’. Culler 
provides the following definition in a classic text: 
Literary theory is […] the study of problems about the nature of 
literature: its forms, its components, their relations. Literary theory is 
not a set of competing methods for the analysis of literary works – 
methods that are to be judged by their relevance to problems […] any 
more than linguistics is a set of competing models that are to be judged 
by their success in helping puzzled listeners understand obscure 
utterances. (Culler, 1981/2001: 244) 
A term related to, and indeed often used synonymously with, literary 
theory is that of literary criticism. Following Culler’s definition, however, 
we view the latter as closer to a ‘set of competing methods for the 
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analysis of literary works’ and hence prefer the broader term of literary 
theory. Moreover, the term literary criticism is often ambiguous as it can 
suggest a degree of terminological closeness to specific theoretical 
directions such as New Criticism1 with its text-immanent interpretation. 
Such connotation would be unfortunate, especially as the somewhat 
opposing concept of Reception Theory/ Reader Response Theory (RRT) will 
be discussed later. Literary criticism is also often connected with the 
evaluation of literary texts as good or bad literature, a connotation we 
wish to avoid.  
It is in connection with RRT that the concept of the reader will be 
considered, with ‘reader’ referring to the way the reader is inscribed in a 
text, the way in which the text only happens when being read. Our 
discussion of the reader and RRT in Organization and Management 
Theory (OMT) texts represents another example of the way in which 
this concept is used in an isolated way. In organization studies, the 
concept of the reader is a potentially complex one in that it comprises 
several ‘readers’: Managers (or employees in general) ‘read’ 
organizations, and so do researchers in the field. There is an interesting 
twist here in that organizational researchers read as text what managers 
and employees produce (and read).2 The researchers are in turn readers 
of the texts in their academic community, texts that they themselves 
contribute to.  
Our preliminary reflections on terminology also have to draw 
attention to a concept central to literary theory and also to organization 
studies, that of the text. Nünning gives the following definition: ‘[Text 
is] an instrument of communication through language; colloquially used 
for the coherent written representation. […] It comprises the written, 
printed, spoken word, pictorial illustrations, or linguistic conventions 
which are interpreted by literary scholars’ (Nünning, 2001: 625-626; our 
translation). 
In our chapter ‘text’ denotes two things, covering both aspects of 
this definition, although we point out here that we do not wish to 
conflate literary and non-literary texts. The first aspect is that of ‘text as 
organizational reality’. This follows DeVault’s (1990: 888) idea of 
‘examining society as text’ and also Atkinson and Coffey (1997: 46), 
who point out ‘the pervasive significance of documentary records, 
written and otherwise, in contemporary social settings’. Secondly, ‘text’ 
describes the works discussed in this chapter and, more generally, the 
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writings in the field of organization studies, which, it could be argued, in 
turn form a ‘society as text’, only that ‘society’ in this case is largely 
limited to the academic community. Whilst we can find several 
examples of academic articles which study organizational reality as text 
(Brown, 2000; Gephart, 1993; Ng and De Cock, 2002; Phillips and 
Brown, 1993), it is without doubt the field itself that has taken centre 
stage in the past decade and a half, with a focus not so much on the 
‘primary text’, but instead on a ‘second order’ text where the field talks 
about itself (cf. Van Maanen, 1998 or Weick, 1999 for insightful 
commentary on this reflexive turn). 
The use of Literary Theory in Organization Studies Texts: Three 
Close Readings  
1. ‘Management Research and Literary Criticism’ (Easton and Araujo, 1997) 
Geoff Easton and Luis Araujo explore directly the potential of literary 
theory for the field of organization studies:  
If a critical approach is required to examine a body of theory, if its 
quality is to be evaluated, if it is to be judged, then it seems sensible to 
borrow some of the ideas that already exist to help the process along… 
By literature we mean a written work of art which is intended not only 
to divert and entertain but to provide greater understanding of the 
world. (Easton and Araujo 1997: 100) 
Here Easton and Araujo refer to Horace’s famous definition of the 
purpose of poetry, namely that poetry should aut prodesse aut delectare 
(quoted after Zapf, 1991: 45), i.e. that it should either be 
useful/instructive or should delight/entertain, and at best combine the 
two by instructing through entertainment. Interestingly, the ‘use’ of 
literature, the prodesse, is already defined by Easton and Araujo as ‘to 
provide a greater understanding of the world’. It seems that their stated 
goal of providing a ‘somewhat radical alternative’ in the ‘debate around 
the issue of whether the field of management studies and its marketing 
subdiscipline are sciences’ (Easton and Araujo, 1997: 99) might prove 
elusive. If literature has to ‘provide a greater understanding of the 
world’, then it is natural to conclude that some form of evaluation is 
required that would allow to indicate success or failure in providing this 
understanding of the world. In the case of literature, Easton and Araujo 
see ‘literary criticism’ – here used loosely in the context of theory-
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building – as the authority to pronounce on what is deemed to be good 
or bad literature and to do so in a well-defined system that it is possible 
for management research to emulate: ‘Literary criticism […] has 
developed techniques, modus operandi [sic], theoretical underpinnings. 
Critics must have a basis upon which they can judge what is good 
literature, what is ‘valid’. It would be helpful to novice critics such as 
ourselves if we had some sort of taxonomy of critical theories’ (Easton 
and Araujo 1997: 101; original emphasis). 
Easton and Araujo present the body of ‘literary criticism’ as a well-
mapped foreign territory into which students of organization can ‘foray’ 
in order to bring back pearls of wisdom. Whilst it might be tempting to 
draw parallels with European colonialism and improvise around a 
theme from Joseph Conrad here, the straightforward point we want to 
make is that such ‘uses’ of literature tend to resemble the activities of a 
raiding party, plundering the wealth of the humanities in order to bring 
it back to the home discipline. The authors make this altogether plain 
when they continue: ‘[T]he schema developed by Abrams (1981) serves 
our purpose best since it is well articulated and allows us to place within it 
the forms of criticism we had already identified a priori’ (Easton and Araujo, 
1997: 101; our emphasis). Self-effacingly denying that what they 
propose is tantamount to a ‘paradigm shift’, Easton and Araujo’s ‘foray 
into literary criticism’ leads them to five conclusions about how to do 
organization studies: to do more epistemology, to talk more with fellow 
academics, to read more sociology of knowledge, to read fewer papers 
more carefully, to be explicit about the criteria by which we critique and 
to be more reflexive about research and writing (1997: 105). Plus ça 
change then… 
Using individual concepts such as Horacian literary theory, a specific 
definition of ‘literary criticism’, or a theoretical classification scheme by 
Abrams is in itself not necessarily problematic.3 However, here these 
concepts are constructed in a way that suggests that – in contrast to 
organization studies – literary theory as a discipline has solved its 
epistemological and methodological problems, that it has, for example, 
achieved closure on whether or not literary theory is a science. This is 
not the place to discuss either the ongoing epistemological or 
methodological debates in literary theory or to explore the question 
whether or not to achieve ‘science status’ would indeed be desirable for 
any humanities discipline. What should have become clear, however, is 
that the absence or even denial of such issues from texts like the one by 
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Easton and Araujo poses problems for the way the field of organization 
studies sees itself. As much as the authors proclaim their desire to 
revolutionize their own discipline through an encounter with literary 
criticism, the ground of organization studies remains remarkably stable 
and the ‘other’ that they are importing is reified and fixed in a single 
identity. 
2. ‘Paradoxes of Participation: Textual Analysis and Organizational Change’ 
(O’Connor, 1995) 
Whereas Easton and Araujo refer to themselves as ‘novice critics’, 
O’Connor openly declares her credentials in connection with literary 
theory at the end of her article: ‘This paper positions a literature Ph.D 
into the social science field […] Here I had a work which I was 
confident would have earned me praise in my discipline of origin, but 
the reviewers of this journal challenged the validity and reliability of my 
interpretations’ (1995: 792). At the outset, O’Connor makes plain her 
goal: ‘This paper applies literary theory, concepts and methods to four 
accounts of organization [sic] change’ (1995: 769). She also aims to 
‘demonstrate that attention to language, and specifically attention to it in 
the form of literary analytical methods, reveals the process of cultural 
production in organizations’ (ibid.), whereby her case studies are 
considered as texts.4 Somewhat incongruously, her introductory remarks 
are then followed by an overview of the literature covering the long 
tradition of the ‘interpretive approach’ in the social sciences, so that the 
three theoretical approaches that she chooses, namely theory of 
rhetoric, narrative, and metaphor, seem already well embedded into the 
social science literature and are no longer ‘direct imports’ from literary 
theory (O’Connor, 1995: 772-773). With this structured threefold 
approach, literary theory appears to form a solid foundation on which 
observations on organizational change can be based. This impression is 
confirmed when O’Connor later refers to a kind of checklist that 
‘literary criticism’ purportedly provides: ‘I meet the criteria that 
Bazerman articulates for literary criticism: my interpretations are 
consistent with (1)[…] (2)[…] (3)[…]’ (O’Connor, 1995: 795). She also 
takes care to defend herself against the possible accusation of 
arbitrariness, revealing what almost looks like mistrust of the possibility 
of multiple interpretations: ‘This paper is no accident; it is to some 
extent the story of my professional life, but neither is my reading of the 
texts a Rohrschach [sic]’ (O’Connor, 1995: 795). 
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O’Connor’s own references to literary theory seem rather less well 
structured. Our example is taken from the section on the ‘Analysis of 
the Texts’ (1995: 775 ff.). The context is the ‘Theory of Metaphor’. No 
fewer than seven literary theorists, poets and philosophers are 
mentioned in the space of the two paragraphs opening the section: 
As Saint Augustine observed, language does not present – rather, it 
represents. […] The very phenomenon of language itself is metaphor 
(Shelley […]). Burke, citing Bentham, states that language follows from 
the concrete to the abstract […]. Brodsky’s observations about poetic 
language may be applied more universally to language as a whole […] 
“Metaphor”, says Aristotle, “is the application of the name of a thing to 
something else” […] This movement in language, or turn, is described 
by de Man as error […]. (1995: 787) 
Here the general references to famous names open up scope for 
misunderstanding rather than clarify the concept of metaphor. For 
example, the reference to Shelley triggers a whole set of possible 
associations with Romanticism in general, or in particular Shelley’s view 
of language and the nature and possible function of literature in his 
Defence of Poetry of 1821 (comp. Zapf, 1991: 110-115). For literary 
scholars these references encompass a vast area of study and very likely 
one of considerable debate, too. Quoting a string of famous names 
closes the concept of metaphor by referring it to ‘authorities’. It also 
looks rather like short-hand or a code for ‘those in the know’, which – 
now again on the meta-level – says more about the textual strategies the 
author feels she needs to employ than about metaphor. 
3. ‘The Role of the Researcher: An Analysis of Narrative Position in Organization 
Theory’ (Hatch, 1996) 
Mary Jo Hatch’s article draws on literary theory to address an 
epistemological problem, namely the ‘crisis of representation [that] 
finally reached organization theory in the early 1990s’ (Hatch, 1996: 
359). It may seem odd for Hatch to ‘consult’ literary theory in this 
context because she sees it as having at least partly brought the crisis 
about, a crisis with ‘roots that extend to philosophy and literary theory, 
the deepest of which run to linguistics’ (1996: 359). And yet, she states 
emphatically: ‘I believe […] that application of literary theory to 
organizational text and issues opens organizational enquiry to new 
possibilities’ (1996: 360; our emphasis). She then shifts her focus away 
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from ‘organizational text and issues’ to the person of the researcher, 
thus moving to a different position in the imaginary triangle of 
Author/Narrator–Text–Reader. It is the narrative theory of the French 
literary scholar Gérard Genette that Hatch chooses as the central 
theoretical concept for her argument: 
This study continues exploration of narration in organization theory by 
focusing on the literary concept of narrative position as developed by 
Genette (1980, 1982, 1988, 1992) in his theory of narratology. […] My 
thesis is that application of Genette’s theory can help us to more clearly 
formulate the role of the researcher by identifying it with the 
positioning of the narrator of a literary text. (Hatch, 1996: 361) 
This approach is very different to O’Connor’s who had referred to a 
number of literary theory concepts in order to support her argument. 
We have criticised O’Connor’s ‘use’ of literary theory as unhelpful, 
thereby perhaps inadvertently implying that the opposite, i.e. the 
reference to a specific model, would be more successful, and it is from 
this angle that we will now consider Mary Jo Hatch’s approach. With 
‘Four Narrative Positions’5 which she organizes into a matrix ‘in 
Relation to Voice and Perspective’, Hatch provides a considerable 
amount of detail in adapting, or in her words, ‘applying’ Genette’s 
narratology (Hatch, 1996: 362, comp. Fig. 2). Given that the ‘researcher as 
narrator’ is the focus of Hatch’s study, it strikes us as curious that in this 
matrix she twice conflates narrator and author (‘Agatha Christie 
narrating Hercule Poirot’ and ‘Fielding in Tom Jones’; 1996: 362),6 
which is certainly unusual and which sits uneasily with Hatch’s 
specialised exposition of narrative theory in connection with the ‘role of 
the researcher’. 
Genette’s pioneering development of a terminology and of a 
structuralist taxonomy of narrative theory is generally seen as his main 
contribution to literary theory. Whilst his work is generally well-
accepted amongst narrative theorists, it is nevertheless extremely 
complex and difficult to understand for non-experts and therefore a 
rather curious choice for ‘application’ to a different discipline. In his 
Narrative Discourse (1980), one of the titles Hatch refers to, Genette takes 
the narrative of Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu as the text basis for 
the explication of his narrative theory; certainly not an easy text, even 
for a reader well-versed in French literature. Moreover, the application 
here of theories of the fictional or literary text to texts in organization 
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studies would, in our view, necessitate at least some theoretical 
consideration.  
In view of the extensive use Hatch makes of the ‘Four Narrative 
Positions’, it is perhaps precisely the taxonomies and terminologies in 
Genette’s theory that appeal to her as an organization theorist who has 
set out to ‘prove’ that the researcher is not (any longer) an objective 
observer. If this were the case, however, she would be reintroducing 
‘through the back door’ the scientific objectivity she claims to refute. In 
this context, Deetz (1996) not only criticises Mary Jo Hatch’s textual 
strategy, he also points out its implications for the field of organization 
studies: 
Hatch’s own explicit rewriting of literary theory into the 
subjective/objective discourse happens throughout the article […]. The 
interest in examining the Hatch piece is in seeing how she accomplishes 
translations, which reinstate older epistemological battles and remove 
the more radical impact of new conceptions. […] Such translations 
isolate organizational theory from the deeper challenges of 
contemporary social theories […]. (Deetz, 1996: 388) 
Rather than opening ‘new possibilities’ for organization studies, 
Genette’s narratology, in Hatch’s case, provides the author with a 
textual-strategic tool for the support of her arguments, be they in the 
context of the subjectivity of the researcher, the ‘editorial suppression 
of what are essentially subjectivist narrative styles’ (Hatch, 1996: 368), or 
the possible ‘direct benefit for managers’ of her analysis (1996: 372). 
The strategy is likely to appear successful because Genette’s model 
(although naturally not the only view of narrative theory) is well-
accepted and sufficiently uncontroversial within literary theory to be 
rejected, a fact that may make it more ‘applicable’ to the field of 
organization studies. At the same time, however, this model is likely to 
be too complex and inaccessible for the fellow organizational 
researcher/reviewer/editor to raise questions about or to discuss in 
detail. In a later article on complexity theory and organizational 
complexity, Genette’s theory resurfaces without adaptation or change 
(Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001: esp. 997, 1000). This rather confirms our 
suspicion that the literary theoretical concept is deployed as a textual 
device instead of being allowed to contribute to any theoretical debate 
in hand.7 
 
Christina Volkmann and Christian De Cock 
 152 
Reflecting on the Reader with Wolfgang Iser 
Thus far, we have explored three examples to illustrate how OMT texts 
make use of literary theory, either as a discipline in general (Easton and 
Araujo, 1997; O’Connor, 1995), or by referring to the work of an 
individual literary theorist (Genette’s narratology in Hatch, 1996 and 
Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001). We will now extend our exploration to a 
concept that reoccurs in OMT texts and at the same time constitutes a 
major area of literary theory: the reader. Wolfgang Iser and Reader 
Response Theory (RRT) are likely to be the name/term most often 
associated with the concept of the reader:8 ‘Through the concentration 
on the role of the reader, [RRT] was mainly a counter-reaction to 
formalist and structuralist approaches […] as well as to the 
representation aesthetics of the New Criticism’ (Nünning, 2001: 549; 
our translation).  
There seems to be a marked difference between the way in which 
RRT is treated in the OMT texts we consider here and the uses of 
literary theory we have discussed above. RRT and related concepts are 
not so much called upon explicitly but seem to permeate the texts in a 
curious way. For Karen Golden-Biddle and Karen Locke, for example, 
the reader is the ‘researcher reader’ mentioned above: ‘Viewing the 
written work as ‘text’ highlights how rhetoric and the interactive 
researcher-text and reader-text relationships are inseparable from the 
discussion of convincing’ (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 1993: 596). In this 
context, the authors also refer to Wolfgang Iser to support their 
argument regarding the ‘interactive researcher-text and reader-text 
relationships’: ‘The discussion is informed by a long tradition of 
scholarship in the humanities, especially literature and the discipline of 
literary criticism (cf. Booth 1961, 1967; Iser 1989), which rhetorically 
analyzes written work as ‘texts’ to be constructed and interpreted’ (1993: 
596). 
Barry and Elmes (1997: 438) also refer to ‘the perspective of 
reader/response theory (cf. Iser 1989)’ in their narrative analysis of 
strategic discourse. They state: ‘The interplay of text, author, and reader 
suggests that the interpretation of a text is both pluralistic and dynamic, 
reflecting the author’s intent and the reader’s construction of meaning’ 
(1997: 438). Note that ‘a text’ here is separated from the context of the 
literary and applied in the authors’ exploration of ‘strategic management 
as a form of fiction’ (1997: 429). The references to Iser are not 
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elaborated upon in either article, yet at the same time they open up a 
vast field of possible reference points, some of which we shall attempt 
to sketch out in this section.  
Iser’s 1989 book, Prospecting: From Reader Response to Literary 
Anthropology, which both articles refer to, develops Iser’s ideas about the 
role of literature, the reader and the text. The term literary anthropology 
was first used by F. Poyatos in 1977, for whom ‘literatures [are] archives 
of anthropologically relevant data’ (Nünning, 2001: 374; our 
translation). Within literary theory, the concept is controversial because 
many theorists reject the idea of literary texts as a source of data. 
Wolfgang Iser discusses this theoretical approach from a different angle, 
exploring areas such as the ‘Fiktionsfähigkeit’ (fiction-ability) or the 
‘Fiktionsbedürftigkeit’ (the need for fiction) in human beings. Theoretical 
considerations of this kind, although related, appear to be somewhat 
removed from the relatively simple statement in which they are 
referenced in the articles cited above.  
Golden-Biddle and Locke also refer to one of Iser’s by now ‘classic’ 
texts, namely The Act of Reading. A Theory of Aesthetic Response 
(1976/1978), again, as in the passage discussed above, without further 
explanation: ‘Finally, the metaphor of the text suggests that because all 
texts are addressed to an audience, that is are intended to communicate, 
they are rhetorical (Burke 1950, Booth 1961, Iser 1978)’ (Golden-Biddle 
and Locke, 1993: 597). At the beginning of the following paragraph they 
state: ‘The above discussion emphasizes that reading is an interactive 
process in which readers not only receive the text and its appeals to 
engage it [sic] and find it convincing, but also act on the text to create 
interpretations’ (1993: 597). Although Wolfgang Iser is not directly 
referenced here, elements of his theory are nevertheless recognisable, 
for example in the ‘interactive process of reading’ or the ‘appeal of a 
text’.9 ‘Die Appellstruktur der Texte.’ [The Appeal Structure of Texts.] 
was the title of Iser’s 1967 inaugural lecture in Konstanz, and it was 
here that he formulated first what later became the central ideas of his 
theories. For Iser, the ‘real’ or historical reader is not identical with the 
Implied Reader, which is a theoretical construct designed to move away 
from the ‘interferences of the socio-psychologically coded reality of the 
historic author and the (real) reader’ (Nünning, 2001: 375; our 
translation). The reader is inscribed in the text as a Leerstelle (gap or 
indeterminacy): ‘Unlike the real historical or contemporary reader, 
unlike the fictive reader whom the author addresses in a novel, the 
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implied reader is a theoretical construct without empirical existence, for he 
represents the entire potential of a text that may unfold in the course of 
the reading process’ (Zima, 1999: 74; original emphasis). 
Barbara Czarniawska (1999) refers to Wolfgang Iser and Stanley 
Fish in a context similar to that of Golden-Biddle and Locke (1993). In 
her discussion of ‘The Narrative in Social Sciences and Organization 
Studies’ (Czarniawska, 1999: 14ff.), she critiques their view of how 
ethnographic texts convince their readers: ‘Unfortunately, like the 
positivist criteria they criticize, these are again ostensive criteria of a text’s 
success – that is, the attributes of a text can be demonstrated and 
therefore applied a priori to determine a text’s success’ (Czarniawska, 
1999: 27; original emphasis). Interestingly, the only reference to 
Wolfgang Iser and RRT in her book follows immediately afterwards: 
Reader-response theory has counteracted such objectivist reading 
theories (Iser 1978),[10] but, in turn, it tries to subjectivize the act of 
reading and therefore neglects the institutional effect. […] The 
pragmatist theory of reading to which I adhere, best known in the 
rendition of Stanley Fish but here represented by Rorty […] gives 
preference to performative criteria. (1999: 27)11 
Mentioning Iser’s theory does not seem to serve any purpose in 
Czarniawska’s book. Indeed, it is Rorty whom she continues to refer 
to.12 Also, it is curious that the reference should occur in the passage 
critiquing Golden-Biddle and Locke’s views who had themselves 
referred to Iser. In view of the complexities of Iser’s theoretical edifice 
and its potential implications for OMT, it is somewhat puzzling to find 
it referenced more or less ‘in passing’. The situation here is similar to 
that of Hatch’s use of Genette’s theory where the latter was a textual 
strategic device (as RRT seems to be for Czarniawska). In Golden-
Biddle and Locke, the references are ‘just there’, permeating the text. In 
this form, literary theory is hard to engage with in terms of its relevance 
to OMT precisely because of the vagueness of the reference. The 
opportunity for theorising the reader in terms of RRT is hence largely 
lost. 
In defence of Czarniawska, it has to be said that ten years on she 
offers a much more careful reading of Iser (Czarniawska, 2009). For 
example, she points out Iser’s central concern with ‘fictionalizing acts’ 
(2009: 358) and emphasizes the crucial point that  
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Iser would have liked the models to vanish altogether, as he clearly 
preferred “operational” to “architectural” theories. His aims were of 
course, connected to the aims of literary theory, and not organization 
theory; a literary anthropology would, among other things, answer the 
question of why literature exists. (Czarniawska, 2009: 360) 
Whilst we are not necessarily convinced either by her defence of the 
realist novel or her argument that ‘there is a strong similarity between a 
researcher reading an annual report and a literary critic reading a 
novel’,13 at the very least her engagement with Iser’s work provides a 
basis that makes possible a critique of or disagreement with arguments 
put forward.  
Iser developed his theories, first on the reader/RRT and later also 
on literary anthropology, over more than three decades, with his last 
theoretical contribution, The Range of Interpretation, published in 2000.14 
One particular theme permeates his work, indicating how broadly Iser 
conceives of the reader concept: ‘Already motivating Iser’s reader-
response theory, the question of why we need fictions links the different 
phases and decades of Iser’s work and continues to inform his recent 
turn to literary anthropology’ (Schwab, 2000: 74).  
Iser’s work has also generated a substantial amount of discussion. 
For example, in 2000 New Literary History published a special issue on 
Iser. Thomas (2000) charts in detail the reception of Iser’s earlier works 
in the United States and in Britain, with a particular focus on the attacks 
on Iser by Fish and Eagleton, which Thomas views as having 
contributed to a lack of reception of Iser’s later works. Thomas points 
out that these often clarify ‘some of the confusion that his earlier work 
on the act of reading generated’ (Thomas, 2000: 14). What becomes 
very clear in this later work is Iser’s ‘resistance to manifestation’ and his 
‘insistence on the irreducible openness of the aesthetic realm’ (Schwab, 
2000: 74, 78). This seems to suggest that in engaging with Iser’s texts it 
is important to view them as dynamic structures rather than as a 
finished theoretical edifice from which individual aspects can be taken 
at will. Although it might mean stating the obvious, it is worthwhile 
pointing out in this context that Iser is concerned mainly with literature, 
with fiction, with the ‘aesthetic object’ and with the relation of these to 
human beings. Explanation, such a core concept in the social sciences, 
helps Iser to describe literature ex negativo: ‘[L]iterature is not an 
explanation of origins; it is a staging of the constant deferment of 
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explanation’ (Iser, 1989: 245), and the same goes for fiction, the theme 
so central to his work: ‘The more fiction eludes an ontological 
definition, the more unmistakably it presents itself in terms of its use. If 
it is no longer confined to an explanatory function, its impact becomes 
its most prominent feature’ (Iser, 1989: 267).  
When organizational scholars simply ignore the rich texture of Iser’s 
work, we encounter some perverse applications. One such 
unfortunate15 example is Linstead’s (2000) use of concepts from Iser’s 
work on games/play in a text (ag!n, alea, mimesis, ilinx) in his rhetorical 
analysis of a letter written to all staff of the Asia Pacific Institute of 
Technology by their President. It is worth quoting Linstead at some 
length: 
In texts, and I am arguing in human organization more generally, of 
which texts are a part and an exemplar, these prototypes combine, 
merge, and dominate each other in different ways. Iser (1993: 259-73) 
explores in some detail the ways in which the various games may 
combine, and particularly the effects of combination on the differences 
between results-oriented games (agon, alea) and process-oriented games 
(mimicry, ilinx). For our purposes here it is not necessary to present his arguments 
in detail, but we can return to our consideration of the President’s letter 
to identify some of them in play. What dominant game was the 
President playing in writing what he did? I read it as primarily a 
combination of agon and mimicry […] The fact that the rules are not 
well understood or obvious, and that there is an unvoiced opposition to 
which the President’s letter is both anticipation and reply, lends the 
subversive shadow of ilinx to the piece […] It is, however, most 
important for him to attempt to exclude wherever possible elements of 
alea (chance) and ilinx (anarchy) which would undermine his portrayal 
of a measurable world in which quality was unequivocal […]. (Linstead, 
2000: 76-77; our emphasis) 
Here Linstead ignores Iser’s explicitly stated objective that ‘play’ 
pertains particularly to the literary text, that it is precisely what 
distinguishes the literary text from other text forms: ‘[…] embodying 
different types of interaction between the fictive and the imaginary […] 
independently of their practical functions in the worlds of discourse’ 
(Iser, 1993: 271). Indeed, rhetorical analysis is precisely what Iser wants 
to get away from, as Thomas (2000: 25) argues: ‘Specifically, Iser’s 
theory challenged the tendency to treat literature as operating like all 
other forms of rhetoric, that is as a mode of persuasion […] Literature 
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in Iser’s model is a rhetorical means to question the adequacy of present 
constructions of rhetoric’.  
Iser’s development of a heuristics for human self-interpretation 
through literature has the potential to make organizational scholars 
rethink fundamental concepts (such as, for example, ‘explanation’, 
‘representation’, ‘fact’, ‘fiction’) and the relationships between them. Yet 
a direct projection of Iser’s theory onto the texts of organization theory 
would pose considerable theoretical and practical/methodological 
difficulties. However text is defined in organization studies (either as in 
the academic community writing about organizations, or as text 
produced in organizations), it will not fall into the realm of literature or 
the aesthetic as Iser sees it. Organizational texts are always written for a 
particular purpose (this seems to be an institutionally defined 
requirement), and in order to be effective they have to deny their 
fictionality. The text we are dealing with in organization studies is what 
is external to the literary text; it is part of what the literary text is there 
to reflect on. Literature allows us to cope with the world, to ‘gain 
shape’, and it ‘tends to be a kind of institution that undermines all 
institutionalizations by exhibiting what both institutionalizing acts and 
definitions have to exclude in view of the stability they are meant to 
provide’ (Iser, 1993: 303). Armstrong (2009) encounters precisely such a 
practical difficulty in trying to use Iser’s theory to question institutional 
reality. In his ‘fictional encounter between Ian McEwan and Wolfgang 
Iser’ he pays particular attention to the Imaginary dimension of the 
triadic relationship between the Real, the Fictive and the Imaginary which 
is so central to Iser’s later work. Armstrong (2009: 189) explores the 
possibility that a radical imaginary could emerge from reading literary 
fiction – ‘[…] fiction of this kind works by inviting the reader to create 
an imaginary in which their taken-for-granted views of the world are 
called into question’ – which in turn could interrogate institutional 
rationality. However, he has to acknowledge the limitations of 
marshalling Iser’s theory for the construction of such a critical 
imaginary since ‘Iser’s reception theory guarantees nothing about how 
real readers respond to the literary text’. For Armstrong, Iser’s Imaginary 
fails in the critique of institutional rationality, ‘not because [it] is 
conservative in principle, but because it is too open to the possibility of 
turning out to be so […]’ (ibid.: 198). Perhaps this is not so much a 
‘failing’ on Iser’s part (in fairness, Armstrong calls the failing ‘generous’) 
than an inevitable consequence of organizational (or political) scholars 
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asking something from literature that it cannot deliver. We have tried to 
capture the tension between expectations and limitations of literature in 
the two contrasting epigraphs of our concluding section. 
Final reflections 
Literature, against which a good many sociologists have […] thought 
necessary to define themselves in order to assert the scientificity of their 
discipline […], is on many points more advanced than social science, 
and contains a whole trove of fundamental problems […] that 
sociologists should make their own and subject to critical examination 
instead of ostentatiously distancing themselves from forms of 
expression and thinking that they deem to be compromising. (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992: 208) 
[…] if literature is all that stands between us and suicide, then we might 
as well commit suicide. (Eagleton, 2003: 170) 
For any interdisciplinary discussion to be significant, it must stand in a 
relationship with an entire body of discourse, a collective endeavour 
already in place. However, in its earliest encounters with literary theory, 
the field of organization studies has been most interested in what are 
particular constructs that emerged at a particular moment in time for a 
particular purpose but which were often mere punctuations in an 
ongoing dialogue, never meant to be ‘endpoints’ or ‘frameworks’ to be 
simply imposed like a grid. Of course, a discursive community can 
assign any meaning it wishes to particular concepts such as fiction or 
Reader Response Theory if the community thinks that such a meaning helps 
in addressing certain practical or theoretical problems. What we take 
issue with, however, is the ossification of literary concepts and theories, 
a process by which they become solid bricks in an ever expanding ‘wall 
of knowledge’ and where the context in which these concepts and 
theories have lived and continue to evolve is never explored in a serious 
fashion. Now that the field of organization studies is becoming 
increasingly interested in literature (cf. Elsbach et al., 1999; De Cock 
and Land, 2006; Land and Sliwa, 2009) it is important that early texts 
exploring the potential of literary theory do not stand unchallenged, lest 
they acquire some kind of canonical status and entice a new generation 
of researchers to adopt rather dubious practices. 
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In reading Iser’s work it is inspiring to see him grapple with the 
dissolution and fluidity which is a consequence of his embrace of a 
post-foundational approach (thus dispensing with the need for 
ontological grounding of his key concepts), without facile recourse to 
any ‘authorities’ or intellectual trends. It is somewhat ironic that 
organizational scholars refer to literary theorists such as Iser in order to 
establish some ‘solid ground’ and thus artificially import closure from 
literary theory (as a kind of deus-ex-machina). When engaging truly with 
Iser’s thinking, it is very much in his ‘honest grappling’ that the literary 
theorist acts as a source of inspiration. Fixed frameworks, lists, criteria 
and other such devices that refer difficult or contested issues to ‘the 
authorities’ and which have monopolised the strange encounter 
between organization theory and literary theory have ultimately little to 
contribute to the improvement of our intellectual practices. 
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1 New Criticism describes the theoretical approach that dominated literary 
theory (especially in the USA) from ca. the 1920s to the 1960s. New Criticism 
was not a homogenous movement, but a similarity between the different 
directions is the focus on the text itself, without any reference to the historical 
circumstances of a literary work’s creation and reception or to the biography 
of the author. In this theoretical view the meaning of a literary text can be 
revealed by solely studying the text itself (Comp. Abrams, 1993: 264ff.; 
Eagleton, 1996: 38-46).  
2 Also compare Atkinson and Coffey (1997: 46): ‘If we wish to understand how 
such organizations work and how people work in them, then we cannot 
afford to ignore their various activities as readers and writers.’ 
3 The main body of Easton and Araujo’s text is based on a reading of Abrams’s 
important but not uncontroversial book from 1953 The Mirror and the Lamp 
(for a critical review see Culler, 2001: Chapter 8). 
4 Later, she proposes a broader concept of text that would have been closer to 
the organizational reality she was looking at: ‘My analysis has been severely 
limited by its focus on language and text. Interviews and surveys would no 
doubt have illuminated other facets of change, particularly as regards the 
rhetorical functions of the texts, but this is not my expertise’ (O’Connor, 
1995: 795). 
5 These are: ‘The Narrator Tells the Story as an Objective Observer’ (Hatch, 
1996: 362f.), ‘The Narrator as a Minor Character in the Story’ (363f.), ‘The 
Main Character Tells the Story’ (364-366), and ‘The Omniscient Viewpoint’ 
(366f.). 
6 An obvious example of why author and narrator are not the same is Anna 
Sewell’s Black Beauty where the narrator is a horse. We admit that in the case 
of Tom Jones the narrative position is less obvious because of the frequent 
change of narrative perspective. Hatch also contradicts herself somewhat 
because she later states that ‘[i]n literature, the narrator is typically accepted as 
 
Four Close Readings on Introducing the Literary in Organizational Research 
 163 
 
fictional, whereas in social science the narrator is more likely to be confused 
with the author’ (Hatch, 1996: 365). 
7 We note that in a more recent article Hatch leaves literary theory behind and 
turns to painting for opening up organizational research to new possibilities, 
aligning Rembrandt and Pollock with ‘realists’ and ‘interpretivists’ respectively 
(Hatch and Yanow, 2008). The authors borrow their title from John Berger’s 
famous book Ways of Seeing (1972) to highlight ‘the importance of 
(re)presentation in research’ (Hatch and Yanow, 2008: 24) without engaging at 
all with that book or Berger’s broader body of work. Whilst it is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to examine the article in depth, it suffices to say that the 
critique put forward of the three examples – a colonial approach to the ‘other’ 
field, spurious referencing, and a predilection for neat categories – equally 
applies here.  
8 Reader Response Theory is also referred to as “the Anglo-Saxon variation” of 
Rezeptionsästhetik [reception aesthetics] or Reception Theory. (Comp. Nünning, 
2001: 549) 
9 Also compare the title of the article: ‘Appealing Work: An Investigation of 
How Ethnographic Texts Convince’ (our emphasis). 
10 In what is probably an oversight, though in this context a curious one, 
Czarniawska (1999) references Iser’s book as ‘The Art [sic] of Reading: A Theory 
of Aesthetic Response.’ The actual title of Iser’s book is The Act of Reading 
[German: Der Akt des Lesens]. 
11 This passage in its context also occurs verbatim in an earlier book 
(Czarniawska, 1998: 70). 
12 Compare Index, s.v. “Rorty, Richard” (Czarniawska, 1999: 131). 
13 Indeed, Czarniawska herself seems to highlight a certain tension when she 
ascribes a difference to the “function” of fiction in literature and 
organizational life but a similarity to the study of that “functioning”: ‘The 
fiction of accounting has a different function than does literary fiction, but 
their emergence and functioning can be studied in a similar way’ (2009: 361). 
14 How to Do Theory (2006) was his last published book (Iser died in 2007), but it 
is a sophisticated textbook rather than a research monograph, thus offering 
no new theoretical contributions. 
15 Unfortunate because elsewhere Linstead is much more careful in his 
treatment of literature and literary concepts (e.g. Linstead, 2003). 
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From Bourgeois Sociology to Managerial 
Apologetics: A Tale of Existential Struggle 
Peter Armstrong 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the ‘reconstructed’ labour process approach to 
the analysis of management proposed by Willmott (1997). Willmott 
argues that both the ‘bourgeois’ pluralist approach and that of 
‘orthodox labour process analysis’ are deficient, the first because it 
neglects the primacy of the capitalist social relations of production and 
the second because it reduces the work of managers to an execution of 
the economic functions of capital. In their place he proposes a 
theorization in which the capitalist social relations of production are 
mediated by managerial subjectivities and in which those subjectivities, 
through a search for meaning and identity, react to the commodification 
of managerial labour in such a way as to incline managers against the 
prioritization of capital accumulation. The result, so he claims, is a 
theory which recognizes that the work of managers is conditioned by 
their position in the social relations of production but which avoids the 
tendency towards structural determinism which he finds in orthodox 
labour process analysis.. 
Despite his best efforts, Willmott’s trawls through some of the 
major workplace ethnographies produced by 20th century social science 
reveal no evidence of the search for existential significance on which his 
theory hinges. Instead, and as if it were a substitute for such evidence, 
he repeatedly castigates the authors of these studies for their failure to 
produce any. Beyond that, his depiction of managerial subjectivities 
depends on an implausible and empirically unsupported assumption 
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that managers react to the surveillance and control of their work by 
rejecting the purpose behind those controls. He then misconceives the 
nature of the capitalist social relations of production to such an extent 
that these are seen as mutable by this non-compliance on the part of 
managers. 
Many of the difficulties of Willmott’s theory, and his persistent 
tendency to misread work of other authors, stem from the logical 
impossibility of the task which he sets himself: that of finding some way 
between a bourgeois pluralism which does not recognise the primacy of 
the capitalist social relations of production and a Marxist/ labour 
process approach which does. Faced with the obdurate fact that these 
alternatives exhaust the relevant field of possibilities, Willmott seeks to 
create space between them by constructing a parodied version of 
‘labour process orthodoxy’ in which managers are depicted as doing 
nothing but perform the functions of capital. It is into this imagined space 
that he seeks to insert his own theory of a managerial contrariness 
driven by a proletarianisation of their conditions of employment. The 
ironic result is a labour process approach to management which 
neglects the role of managers in the labour process. 
The chapter concludes with a brief suggestion that a better theory 
both of managerial practices and managerial subjectivities can be 
constructed by recognizing the contradiction between the roles which 
managers play within the labour process and the role which they play as 
the agents of capital in the extraction, realization and allocation of the 
surplus values created by that labour process. The one requires the 
establishment of co-operative relationships, in the ordinary way at least, 
whilst the other depends on the treatment of labour as a commodity. 
Many of the tensions and anxieties experienced by managers in the 
course of their work, it is suggested, can be traced to this contradiction 
between co-operation and exploitation (or complicity in exploitation) 
rather than some universalized search for existential significance. 
Although by no means original, such a theory has at least the merit of 
accommodating the surely undeniable fact that most managers accede 
to the controls to which their work is subjected rather than rebel against 
them. 
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Subjectivities and the ‘Transformation’ of Capitalist Social 
Relations 
As set out in Willmott (1997), his theory of managerial subjectivities is 
fairly simple. The exposition, however, is complicated by his concern to 
distance himself from ‘bourgeois forms of analysis’ on the one hand 
(Willmott, 1997: 1340) and on the other from what he variously refers 
to as ‘Marxian theory’ (ibid.: 1333) or ‘orthodox labour process analysis’ 
(ibid.: 1351, footnote). Concerning bourgeois analysis, his objection is 
to an indiscriminate pluralism which fails to acknowledge the ultimate 
dominance of the capitalist social relations of production (ibid.: 1333) 
and to an assumption that the consciousness of individuals stands 
outside the historical conditions of its formation (ibid.: 1340). 
Concerning labour process orthodoxy, he seeks to avoid such 
theoretical misdemeanours as ‘treating human agents as personifications 
of economic categories’ (ibid.: 1333, 1341) ‘reducing managerial work to 
the execution of capitalist functions’ (ibid.: 1339) and a ‘tendency 
toward determinism and reductionism’ (ibid.: 1351 footnote).1 How far 
these features are actually characteristic of the mainstream labour 
process tradition is a question which will be addressed later. 
For reasons which will appear presently, Willmott’s 1997 paper is 
additionally complicated by his need to argue an ontology which equates 
the capitalist social relations of production to their local enactment 
(Willmott, 1997: 1340) and by a tussle with ethnographic data which 
stubbornly resist the interpretations which he wishes to put upon them 
(ibid.: 1348-1353). 
Willmott’s wish to differentiate his approach from that of the 
conventional non-Marxist sociology of management is expressed at the 
level of rhetoric by his repeated reference to the latter as ‘bourgeois’ 
(e.g. Willmott, 1997: 1340, 1342), though whether the implied other of 
‘bourgeois’is to be taken as ‘proletarian’, ‘radical’ or merely ‘critical’ is a 
matter for conjecture. At the level of substance, the attempt at 
differentiation takes the form of a repeated insistence that a recognition 
of the primacy of ‘capitalist social relations’ (and similar) must lie at the 
heart of any adequate analysis of managerial work. On the face of it, this 
appears to be convincing. Testifying to the antipathy which such forms 
of words arouse in the hearts of bourgeois social scientists – and hence 
to his theoretical distance from their approach – he is able to quote 
Whittington’s ringing denunciation of his own work, ‘Managerial 
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authority need not rely upon capitalist resources; managerial action need 
not be directed towards capitalist ends’ (Whittington, 1992). The 
rhetorical effect is marred only slightly by the thought that these are 
sentiments which could have been expressed by any Marxist of a 
minimal sophistication. 
It is only when one looks more closely at the meaning which 
Willmott attaches to such phrases as ‘social relations of production’ that 
doubts begin to creep in. In essence, he depicts those social relations as 
the moment-by-moment outcome of social action with the happy 
implication for his preoccupation with managerial subjectivities that 
these become consequential for the social structures within which they 
are produced (e.g. Willmott, 1997: 1340). For Willmott, it is important 
that ‘relations of production are accomplished through the existential 
media of human conduct’ and that they cannot, in consequence, be 
‘deemed to exist independently of the individuals or agents whose 
conduct is the medium of their reproduction (and transformation)’ 
(ibid.: 1344). For this reason, ‘It is necessary but insufficient’ as he puts 
it, ‘to focus on the “objective” conditions of action’ – insufficient unless 
it is also recognised that ‘the “micro” processes of enactment through 
which the “macro” structures of capitalism are reproduced (and 
transformed)’ (ibid.: 1340, italics in original). But if the social structures 
of capitalism are so pliable that they can be transformed by the micro 
processes of interaction (my own italics this time – and the phrasing 
cannot be accidental because Willmott repeats it), one’s first impulse is 
to question whether they are social structures at all, and to wonder of 
what they might consist. Certainly, Willmott cannot be referring to the 
ownership by capital of the means of production nor to the exchange of 
labour power against capital. Nor, by inference, can he be referring to 
the consequences which follow as a matter of logic from such bedrock 
features of the capitalist social formation, consequences both for the 
practice of management and for the labour process as it is managed. 
The ‘“objective” conditions of action’ mentioned by Willmott 
himself (the scare quotes are his own) are labour’s real subordination to 
capital and the execution of capitalist functions by management. The 
first of these is not a definitive structural feature of capitalism because 
capitalist enterprises and indeed entire capitalist societies can exist 
perfectly well in the absence of detailed controls of the labour process. 
Concerning the second, it is certainly essential to the capitalist social 
formation that someone – either the owners of capital themselves or 
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their agents – must attend to the economic functions of capital, most of 
the time at any rate. That does not mean, however, that those functions, 
either taken together or separately, have to be performed by managers, 
still less by particular managers and even when by particular managers, 
not all the time. In the particular locales wherein the micro processes of 
enactment are played out, both of Willmott’s ‘objective’ conditions of 
action – the precise degree to which labour is ‘really subsumed’ and the 
extent to which managers are involved in the economic functions of 
capital – may well vary according to that enactment, but neither, by the 
same token, are they core structural features of capitalist society and 
nor, within wide limits, need they impact against those core structures. 
In Mouzelis’ terms (1995: 19ff), what is lacking in Willmott’s schema is 
any sense of how the micro and macro levels of analysis might 
articulate, in default of which he simply conceptualises the social 
relations of production in terms which are susceptible to the vagaries of 
local enactment. 
Apart from a prioritization of those local social structures which he 
identifies as those of capitalism, in fact, Willmott’s conception of the 
relationship between social action and social structure is remarkably 
similar to that of Giddens (1984). In one respect this comes as no 
surprise since he had earlier recommended the approach as ‘a valuable 
alternative conceptual framework for advancing critical empirical 
research into managerial work’ (Willmott, 1987: 265). If we go back a 
little further, however, it is a surprise since he was also party to the 
identification of an ‘analytic void’ at the heart of structuration theory 
which, so he and/or his co-author argued, renders it incapable of 
connecting concrete manifestations of social conflict with the structural 
contradiction between private appropriation and socialized production 
(Knights and Willmott, 1985: 31). Such a connection, the co-authors 
claimed at the time, could be achieved through a consideration of the 
‘strategies of securing self through social identity’ (ibid., italics in original). How 
these strategies or indeed the identities which they are intended to 
secure, might themselves connect with the structural contradiction in 
question remain matters for conjecture. 
The real problem with Willmott’s (and Giddens’) duality of 
structure, is not so much its lack of a social psychology but that it 
ignores those macro structures which are not directly instantiated at the 
local level, but which nevertheless underlie the contingently derived 
substructures which are the subject of instantiation. The ownership by 
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capital of the means of production is a case in point. This is not re-
enacted as such in most workplaces, not even at the level of rhetoric. 
What is routinely re-enacted is a particular version of the managerial 
prerogatives deriving from, but not determined by, the delegated 
powers attaching to ownership. Though these are certainly aspects of 
local social structure in the sense that they constitute rules and 
resources available to those involved (Giddens, 1984: 19-25), they are 
also susceptible to change either through the creep of custom-and-
practice (Brown, 1972) or as a result of direct challenge. But – they can 
change without touching the basic social structure which underlies 
them. 
The point in the end is a simple one: that the social structures which 
make up a given social formation exist at different levels of 
embeddedness.2 At the ‘surface’ level, there are those which exist 
through their enactment and can by the same token be changed through 
that enactment. It is structures of this kind which are recognised in the 
theory of structuration. Underlying these immediate and local 
structures, however, there are those which are more pervasive and 
persistent. These are missed by structuration theory because they are 
insulated from changes in any one of their particular manifestations, 
partly because they are anchored in so many others and partly because 
their articulation with their surface manifestations often allows for some 
degree of slack. Such is the case, to repeat the earlier example, with the 
ramified institution of private property as it exists in capitalist societies. 
This means that Knights and Willmott (1985) are perfectly correct in 
their diagnosis of a void in structuration theory and, by implication, of a 
similar void in Willmott’s (1997) partial replication of it. As it stands, 
both versions of the theory do indeed fail to connect the routines of 
structuration with the possible development of pressures for change in 
core social institutions. The nature of the void, however, points towards 
the need for a theory of how the structures at various levels might 
articulate, rather than the social psychology of identity envisaged by 
Knights and Willmott. Such a theory might begin in a rough way by 
visualising core structures as setting limits to the variability of those 
through which they are articulated at the surfaces of social interaction. 
Through some custom-and-practice drift of the processes of enactment, 
these limits might become more frequently and more widely 
encountered and thereby become the objects of conscious reflection. 
Demands for the democratization of the workplace, for example, might 
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progress by degrees from those which can be accommodated within the 
core property relationships of capitalist society to those which cannot, 
with the result that these structural elements become the subjects of 
explicit critique and political action where they had once formed the 
taken-for-granted basis behind the rules and resources of Giddens’ 
processes of structuration (c.f. Mouzelis, 1995: 119). This, of course, is 
just one possible mode of articulation between social structures at 
different levels of embedding, but to develop such conjectures further 
would take us too far from the matter in hand. 
Willmott’s ideas on the change-through-enactment of capitalist 
social relations, meanwhile, can only properly apply to those which exist 
at the level of surface manifestation. His repeated references to them, 
however, always in the abstract and always in general terms, have the 
effect of blurring the important distinction between surface and deeper 
structures and doing so in ways which favour his belief in the 
consequentiality of managerial subjectivities. For if what is true of the 
immediate employment relationship – that it is susceptible to the 
reworkings of structuration – is also true of the deeper structures which 
underlie it, he can argue a version of managerialism in which the greater 
part of the capitalist social order is subtended by nothing more than the 
play of subjectivities at the level of middle and junior management. 
Pushed this far, the argument self-evidently auto-destructs on the 
rampages of private equity and other predations of finance capital. 
Possibly, this is why Willmott, when he ceases his talk of the 
transformation of capitalist social relations, contents himself with the 
relatively modest claim that attention to the subjectivities of managers is 
necessary for a ‘more adequate’ understanding of the work which they 
perform. 
Control and Resistance in Middle and Lower Management 
But how far is he justified even in this? He obviously has right on his 
side to the extent that the states of mind of managers and everyone else 
involved in the capitalist social order are a legitimate object of interest 
in their own right. The more testing questions, however, concern the 
extent to which managerial subjectivities influence what managers 
actually do, and how far what managers actually do influences the lives 
and doings of the managed. 
These are matters on which Willmott has opinions, if not always 
very decided ones. The subjectivities of most middle and lower 
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managers, he maintains, do not just influence the manner in which they 
interpret their assigned roles in the processes of capital accumulation; 
they actually incline them against those aspects of their work. More, he 
also believes – most of the time at any rate – that these managers 
possess sufficient power and autonomy to act on these inclinations to 
the extent that their recalcitrance is a ‘basic problem’ for senior 
management (Willmott, 1997: 1348-9). Elsewhere he is not so sure. On 
the one hand, he points out that management control systems indicate 
the potential for ‘misbehaviour’ at the more junior levels (ibid.: 1338, 
1348), though he does not make it clear whether or not he thinks this 
potential survives the imposition of the controls in question. On the 
other hand, he notes that the same controls leave managers with 
‘comparatively little “space” (or inclination it might be added) to pursue 
strategies which are overtly antagonistic to the “bottom line”’ (ibid.: 
1335). Even if the stress in this last quotation is on ‘overt’, with the 
implication that managerial resistance is mostly covert, there remain 
contradictions. How can there be even covert resistance to capital 
accumulation if managers are as enmeshed in performance controls, as 
Willmott says? And how, if their resistance is covert to the point that it 
is undetected by these controls, can it be a problem for senior 
management? 
According to Willmott, it is only a small minority of the most senior 
managers, abetted by a few accomplices, who are wholeheartedly 
committed to the goal of profitability (Willmott, 1997: 1335, 1348). The 
rest, he tells us, are preoccupied with ‘other concerns – such as career 
advancement and job security – which are not necessarily consonant 
with the reliable and effective stewardship of investors’ interests’. (ibid.: 
1338). In addition, they may play games of ‘office politics’ which have 
little to do with profitability (ibid.: 1339) or selfishly resist company 
policies which threaten to devalue their accumulated skills and 
knowledge (ibid.: 1348, footnote).  
The first two arguments confuse the question of commitment to a 
goal with that of whether actors have a motive (i.e. any motive) for 
acting in furtherance of that goal. To most lay observers, a concern with 
career advancement and job security would seem to provide highly 
effective levers through which middle and lower managers might be 
induced to take a keen, albeit purely instrumental, interest in 
profitability, whilst ‘office politics’ might work either way. That leaves 
only resistance to changes which might devalue their personal capital as 
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a genuine reason why managers might resist the prioritization of profit; 
not an uncommon situation, but not one which is universally applicable 
either. 
To what does Willmott attribute this widespread disaffection? One 
observation that he offers is that only few managers own substantial 
portions of their companies or have a direct material interest in its 
profitability (1997: 1335). Theoretically speaking this is the good ol’ 
Rock ‘n Roll of ‘sectional managerialism’ (Nichols, 1969) – a long way 
from the close attention to subjectivities which he recommends 
elsewhere. Substantively speaking, moreover, they are reasons why 
managers might be indifferent to capital accumulation, rather than 
hostile to it. Nor are they even convincing as reasons for indifference. 
The proportion of a company’s equity held by managers is no index of 
the proportion of their personal remuneration which is linked to its 
profitability, whilst the prevalence of indices of economic performance 
in the control systems of most modern companies, sometimes right 
down to the level of the business unit (Armstrong, Marginson, Edwards 
and Purcell, 1996), make it doubtful indeed that many managers have 
no direct interest in profitability, at least that of their own patch. 
These attributions of interests aside, the main thrust of Willmott’s 
argument concerns the employment relationship as it is now 
experienced by middle and lower managers. He quotes a number of 
authorities to the effect that middle and lower managers have 
experienced a proletarianisation of their conditions of employment. 
Although they remain economically privileged compared to the workers 
they manage, they have now come to ‘share in the subjugation and 
oppression that characterises the lives of productive workers’, a 
quotation from Braverman (1974: 418), which Willmott italicises as a 
key point in his argument (1997: 1334). What these various authorities 
do not go on to say, however, and what Willmott does, is that the 
density of performance controls, pervasive accountability and relative 
lack of autonomy typically mean that middle and lower managers now 
feel little or no allegiance to their companies or their profitability (ibid.: 
1335). 
This is a key point in Willmott’s argument, and it hinges on a 
conceptual leap, and into the bargain an assumption about subjectivities, 
which is both logically unwarranted and, so far as the evidence goes, 
empirically falsified. It is unwarranted because a withdrawal of allegiance 
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does not follow as a matter of logic from a loss of opportunities for 
self-expression. Elsewhere, in fact, Willmott has castigated other 
authors for the ‘essentialism’ of any assumption that the routinization of 
work even results in a sense of deprivation (Willmott, 1990). Even 
supposing that it does, Mills (1956: 243) has argued that the 
consequences may be the precise opposite of those claimed by 
Willmott: that routine white collar employees compensate for the fact that 
their work ‘offers little chance for external prestige claims and internal 
self-esteem’ by ‘borrowing’ prestige from the companies for which they 
work. Empirical evidence that routine work need not be associated with 
a lack of allegiance to the company was encountered during the 
ChemCo studies. There were, for example, the operatives who were 
described as ‘like a stick of rock; break them in half and you’d find 
“ChemCo” stamped through the centre’ (e.g. Harris, 1987: 93) and the 
cheers which rang out when one of the plants achieved a monthly 
production record, not in the plant itself, but amongst the clerks who 
had calculated the figures (not previously reported). 
Willmott’s thoughts on the proletarianising effects on middle and 
junior managers of organizational control systems are also at variance 
with a substantial literature on behavioural accounting. Most such 
systems nowadays take the form of targets against which performance is 
monitored, sometimes at intervals of as little as one week (Armstrong, 
Marginson, Edwards and Purcell, 1996). In the literature relating to such 
systems, the conventional wisdom is that, provided targets are set in 
consultation with those to whom they apply, and set at levels which are 
challenging yet attainable, far from provoking the resistance which 
Willmott assumes, they are actually internalised as personal goals (e.g. 
Caplan, 1971). To be fair, these are beliefs which are only patchily 
supported by empirical research. More persuasive is Hopwood’s classic 
study (1973) which found that the manner in which senior managers 
used accounting information in the evaluation of their subordinates was 
the crucial variable. Hopwood distinguished between a non-accounting 
style of evaluation in which the accounting information was largely 
ignored, a budget-constrained style in which it was treated as the only 
relevant index of performance and a profit-conscious style in which it 
was melded with other relevant information to produce a rounded 
picture of the contribution of the manager to company profitability. If 
Willmott’s picture of managerial reaction against organizational controls 
were correct, one would expect the non-accounting style to do the least 
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damage to managerial motivation, the budget-constrained style to 
produce the antagonistic reaction of which he writes, with the profit-
conscious style somewhere in between. In fact, Hopwood found the 
profit-conscious style of evaluation to be most effective – not an 
unexpected finding admittedly, but one which flatly contradicts 
Willmott’s crudely determinist picture of dysfunctional management 
controls. 
The weight of evidence, then, is against Willmott’s supposition that 
the primary effect of organizational controls systems is to demotivate 
those managers to whom they are applied. 
At points, Willmott argues that the potential for disarticulation 
between the requirements of capital accumulation and the practices of 
middle and junior managers arises not just from their conditions of 
employment but from influences external to the workplace altogether. 
In this vein, he argues that a reconstructed labour process theory ‘must 
incorporate an appreciation of how [managers’] work is coloured by 
diverse cultural and ideological influences in addition to being shaped 
by their career interests as sellers of valued skills’ (Willmott, 1997: 1343, 
italics added). The mandatory incorporation of such extra-curricular 
influences might prove difficult, however, in view of the concurrent 
need to avoid the pitfalls of ‘bourgeois’ pluralism. As Willmott himself 
put it only ten pages earlier, ‘It can readily be acknowledged that many 
influences (e.g. familial, religious, professional) do inform the practical 
accomplishment of managerial work. But in advanced capitalist 
societies, these influences are more-or-less directly conditioned – 
promoted or suppressed – by politico-economic pressures to sustain or 
revitalize processes of capital accumulation’ (ibid.: 1333). Evidently, 
these are not easy waters to navigate. 
It is on the basis of the foregoing arguments, fallible though they 
are, that Willmott feels able to sum up the case thus: 
In response [to ‘various sticks and carrots’], managers may mobilize 
other values, agendas and concerns to diffuse, resist, or circumvent pressures 
that are intended to make their agency more predictable and profitable 
[reference omitted]. (1997: 1347, italics added) 
Formally speaking, the logic of this is unassailable: it is indeed possible 
for managers to react in this way, although that requires an assumption 
that that those advisory staffs who design the relevant appraisal, reward 
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and career progression schemes and those senior managers who operate 
them are ‘judgmental dopes’, a pejorative assumption which Willmott is 
quick to attack in connection with any suggestion that managers 
‘slavishly’ (as he puts it) perform the functions of capital (1997: 1340). 
On that unlikely basis, nevertheless, he is still entitled to his claim that 
managers may resist the pressures on them. A page later, though, the 
‘may’ has firmed up to the extent that it confronts senior management 
as an accomplished fact: 
For (senior) managers and other committed agents of capital who 
elevate “the business objective of making a profit” above all else, a basic 
problem is the recalcitrance of managers whose allegiance to this objective 
is partial, ambivalent and not infrequently dramaturgical. (Willmott, 
1997: 1348, italics added) 
In sum, Willmott believes that the subjectivities of middle and lower 
managers are influenced against the prioritization of capital 
accumulation by the very controls intended to procure their 
commitment. How far he also believes that they are able to act on these 
inclinations is less clear, but the balance of his statements on the matter, 
not to mention his insistence that managerial practices possess the 
capacity to influence ‘capitalist social relations’, certainly suggest some 
degree of autonomy. 
A Preliminary Evaluation 
The first thing to note about the vision of the capitalist corporation 
behind this characterization of managerial subjectivities is the sheer 
implausibility of the theory of power which informs it. How is it, the 
question poses itself, that a tiny oligarchy of zealots is so consistently 
able to squeeze profit out of a largely disaffected mass? In effect, we are 
asked to swallow what Foucault (1980, 78-108) called a ‘juridical’ theory 
of power: that it flows downwards from the persons of a ruling élite. 
Against this, one of Foucault’s genuine insights was that overarching 
systems of power can only be constructed out of the raw material of 
lower-level networks through which power already ‘circulates’ (ibid.). In 
other words, all systems of power – even Willmott’s imagined 
dictatorship of the boardroom – can only function through webs of 
complicity. But managerial complicity is precisely what he is concerned 
to deny. 
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Also implausible is the contention that the primary effect of 
managerial control systems is rebellion. In a number of the foregoing 
quotations, Willmott seems to imagine the corporation as controlled by 
a tightly-knit web of bureaucratic sanctions (‘carrots and sticks’). Where 
this is the case, the response to the implicit low-trust employment 
relationship may well be disaffection, as Fox (1974) amongst others has 
argued, but disaffection can only become resistance in those interstices 
of the system which have not so far succumbed to advances in the 
techniques of monitoring. More usually, however, managerial control, 
especially at the more senior levels but to some degree at all levels, is 
achieved not through detailed performance controls but through the 
socio-cultural production of trust (Kanter, 1993), albeit backed up by 
procedures for the post-hoc evaluation of the discharge of fiduciary 
responsibilities. This means that a condition of access to those 
managerial positions characterised by high-trust employment 
relationships is an ongoing assurance to that the trust will not be 
abused, an assurance made and reaffirmed by a host of subtle signals 
given off in the course of daily practice and which are minutely 
scrutinised by colleagues and superiors in a normatively dense 
managerial culture (Whyte, 1960). 
The fact that managers are already enmeshed in a culture with its 
ready-made significances and meanings also means that it is difficult to 
imagine that they routinely ‘struggle with the existential significance of 
the purposive quality of human consciousness’, as Willmott repeatedly 
contends (1997: 1354). In Knights and Willmott (1985), this personal 
quest for meaning and identity is argued from an individualized re-
working of Berger and Luckman’s concept of ‘world-openness’ (1967: 
65ff). But world-openness in Berger and Luckman refers to the near-
infinite possibilities for the social construction of meanings and 
practices, the aggregation of which comprises a culture. As Berger and 
Luckman themselves put it, ‘Man’s [sic] self-production is always and of 
necessity, a social enterprise’, the consequence being that, ‘world-
openness, while intrinsic to man’s biological make-up, is always 
prempted by social order’ (ibid.: 69, italics added). In no way, therefore, 
does Berger and Luckman’s concept of world-openness imply that 
individuals are routinely confronted with the ‘existential anxiety of 
experiencing the natural and social world as separate and uncertain’ 
(Knights and Willmott, 1985: 26-7), and none of the alleged 
shortcomings which Knights and Willmott believe themselves to have 
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discovered in Berger and Luckman (and, inter alia, in Goffman) make it 
plausible that the concept should be so revised. It is true that there are 
occasions on which individuals may ask questions of their culture, for 
example when circumstances of personal calamity expose its taken-for-
granted meanings, or in settings expressly designated for the purpose, 
such as a Kierkegaard reading-group or an MBA seminar on business 
ethics. Most of the time, though, as Mintzberg (1980) convincingly 
observed of managers, we don’t have the time. 
Finally, like many anti-structuralist thinkers (he would probably 
prefer ‘post-structuralist’), Willmott seems insensitive to the emergent 
properties of co-ordinated action: that outcomes may be accomplished 
perfectly well without a commitment to those outcomes on the part of 
all concerned – as Lockwood (1964) long ago recognised in his 
distinction between system integration and social integration. As is 
realised by army commanders and was once realised by structural 
functionalists, a commitment to glory (or system goals) may be intensely 
gratifying to those whose business it is to personify these motivational 
abstractions, but it is normally enough that the division of labour is 
adequately designed and that ‘the training kicks in’. In other words, 
there are many managers for whom a commitment to capital 
accumulation is no conscious part of their tacit notion of a job well 
done, a quasi-professional commitment to which may be sufficient to 
ensure their contribution to the extraction of surplus value. A ‘well-
engineered’ production process, for example, would have the effect of 
reducing the porosity of the working day even if its designer thought of 
distributed profit as unmitigated parasitism. 
In summary, Willmott’s scenario of widespread disaffection within 
the managerial hierarchies of corporate capitalism is implausible and 
even if it were not, it would still not follow that it would make a 
difference to management practice. 
Arguing the Case 1: Against ‘Labour Process Orthodoxy’ 
It may be the very implausibility of this thesis of managerial contrariness 
which leads Willmott to concentrate so much of his fire on a 
stereotyped labour process orthodoxy which he describes as ‘reducing 
managerial work to the execution of capitalist functions’ (Willmott, 
1997: 1333). Most often, as Edwards (2007) has pointed out of similar 
allegations in Ezzamel, Willmott and Worthington (2004), the 
practitioners of this reductionist creed are left anonymous. In Willmott 
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(1997), however, a substantial part of the argument is directed against 
three papers in which I develop a theory of intra-managerial 
competition within the capitalist agency relationship (Armstrong, 1989a; 
1991a; 1991b), and on that basis I must assume that I am one of the 
culprits.3 Since I now need to compare my theory with the one which 
Willmott criticises, it is necessary that I offer a brief exposition. 
In general, managerial work consist of two parts: the intellectual 
labour of production and a contribution to the ‘global function of 
capital’, i.e. the extraction, realization and allocation of surplus value. 
The proportions vary with different managerial positions but generally 
speaking the capital functions dominate at the higher levels. 
Insofar as they perform the functions of capital, managers act as 
agents of the principals who own the capital. That is, they are employed 
for the purpose of furthering the interests of capital through the 
management of their subordinates. This does not mean that managers 
carry out the instructions of the owners of capital, nor are they 
bureaucrats employed to follow rules laid down by those owners. 
Agency on behalf of a principle is not a matter of obeying instructions 
or of performing specified tasks in accordance with predetermined 
procedures. Instead, agents are expected to use their best abilities, their 
initiative and their judgment in the interests of the principle. When 
principals know less of the business in hand than the agents they 
employ (a condition which institutional economists call ‘information 
asymmetry’), this means that all positions of agency are, in some degree, 
positions of trust. 
Trust, however, is an expensive commodity. At its higher levels, it 
commands spectacular salaries and extensive benefits. It is also the 
subject of various forms of social production ranging from relatively 
formal schemes of appraisal and career progression to the clubhouse 
propinquity through which male managerial cultures achieve the feat of 
cloning, which Wilbert Moore memorably described as ‘homosexual 
reproduction’ (Moore, 1962: 109, quoted in Kanter, 1977: 48). These 
expenses mean that principals have an interest in economising on the 
extent to which trust is diffused downwards into hierarchically 
organized agency relationships. Crudely put, it may be cheaper to 
employ highly trusted managerial agents to control less trustworthy 
agents than to vest some intermediate level of trust all. So it comes 
about that the more junior positions, though still positions of agency, 
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are also subject to supplementary controls by more trusted agents in 
positions of greater authority. 
The disproportionate rewards attaching to positions of trusted 
agency sets up a competition in which the displacement of trust from 
one managerial position (or set of positions) to another is at stake. This 
competition exists at a number of levels, ranging from the individual, 
through the functional department, to the efforts of entire managerial 
professions to promote themselves as the proper custodians of some 
‘vital’ aspect of company policy. Since the implementation of these 
policies (or decisions) necessarily involves authority over other 
professions (or individuals), trust, to a first approximation, can only be 
gained by one set of agents at the expense of others. 
All of this means that the ‘proletarianisation’ of managers referred to 
by Willmott and other writers actually incorporates a number of 
potentially independent processes. There is, firstly, a proletarianisation 
of condition which refers to a deterioration of the conditions of 
employment. Secondly, a proletarianisation of function refers to a 
substitution of intellectual labour for some part in the global function of 
capital (Crompton, 1979). Thirdly, there can occur a withdrawal of trust 
within the global function of capital such that a particular position is 
subjected to additional performance controls and audits. 
To go further is not possible within the confines of this chapter, but 
the interested reader is referred to Armstrong (1991b) for a fuller 
exposition. We are now in a position, though, to see what Willmott 
makes of this theory. 
As Willmott presents the argument of my 1989a paper, I contend 
that ‘managerial work forms no part of the labor process’. I am further 
accused of ‘conceptualizing management only as “a means of degrading, 
controlling and driving manual labour” (Armstrong, 1989a: 309)’. ‘This 
manager-as-an-agent-of-capital formulation,’ Willmott continues, 
‘effectively denies, or at least views as insignificant, the contradictory 
positioning of many managers within capitalist work organizations’ (1997: 
1336, italics in original). This, of course, is exactly wrong: the 
contradiction between the employee status of managers and the 
expectation that they will act in the interests of their employers lies at 
the very heart of my approach. As for Willmott’s quotation from my 
1989a paper, that is lifted from a sentence, the first half of which 
explicitly points out that the productive contribution of intellectual 
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labour remains productive (i.e. a labour process) even when it is co-
opted as ‘a means of degrading, controlling and driving manual labour’, 
as it is in Scientific Management. Thus Willmott’s truncation of the 
quotation and his addition of a gratuitous and italicised ‘only’ is a gross 
distortion of its actual meaning. Far from contending that managerial 
work forms no part of the labour process, both the sentence in question 
and the preceding paragraph make it perfectly clear that the intellectual 
components of productive work, whether performed by specialized 
advisory staffs or incorporated into the work of managers are indeed to 
be regarded as labour processes. In the light of this, it is more than a 
little galling to read Willmott’s comment that, in making precisely the 
same point in a later paper of 1991a, ‘Armstrong (1991a) appears to 
acknowledge his mistake’ (Willmott, 1997: 1336). 
It is those parts of managerial work which are devoted to the 
extraction, realization and allocation of surplus value which should not 
be considered as labour processes, for the simple reason that work of 
this kind produces and reproduces nothing but the capitalist social 
relations of production. It is hard to see what Willmott finds to disagree 
with in this restriction of the term ‘labour process’. In Willmott (1990) 
we read that a ‘more adequate appreciation of subjectivity must be 
founded upon the materialist premise that the labour process “is, first 
of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, 
through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the 
metabolism between himself and nature” (Marx 1976: 283)’ (italics 
added). It is not immediately apparent, to say the least, how such a 
definition might be stretched so as to include the extraction, realization 
and allocation of surplus value. Willmott and I are also as one, or so it 
appears, in objecting to the promiscuous use of the term to describe any 
and all occupations within the capitalist social order because doing so 
ignores the social relations of production (Willmott, 1997: 1336). It is 
only when the question moves on to specifics, to the matter of which 
managerial work, if any, Willmott would exclude from his definition, 
that matters become more imprecise. Quite soon in his 1997 paper, in 
fact, all mention of any such restriction disappears and a labour process 
approach to management surreptitiously morphs into an unproblematic 
treatment of everything managers do as a labour process. In the course 
of this conceptual slippage, the deficiency which Willmott earlier 
condemned in ‘bourgeois sociology’ – namely, its denial that 
management occupies a particular position within the social relations of 
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production (1997: 1333) – creeps into his own analysis. This denial then 
becomes overt when he recommends an ‘analytic move’ in which the 
‘capital-privileging exploitative organization of labor processes’ are 
considered to be undertaken by at different times by ‘different elements 
within the collective worker’ (ibid.: 1337, italics added). This bizarre 
redefinition of Carchedi’s (1977) collective worker, with its correlative 
erasure of the distinction between managers and workers in respect of 
their placement in the capitalist social relations of production is 
achieved by arguing that autonomous groups of workers are, in the very 
fact of their self-organization, acting as agents of capital. Directly 
counter to Willmott’s own strictures against ‘bourgeois analysis’, it is 
also an insight from academia, which will come as a retrospective 
clarification to the former colliers of the National Union of 
Mineworkers. It is, of course, the product of mistaking organization 
within the labour process for the organization of the labour process for 
the purpose of extracting surplus value. Self-organizing groups of 
workers do not control the whole of the wage-effort bargain, and it is 
on this that the rate of exploitation depends. 
Part of Willmott’s objection to the idea that management involves 
agency on behalf of capital, or that they perform the functions of 
capital, may lie in an overly-mechanical view of what this entails. 
Burawoy’s surely uncontentious observation that management ‘is 
concerned with securing co-operation and surplus’ (Burawoy, 1985: 
39),4 for example, is castigated for ‘reducing managerial work to the 
execution of capitalist functions’ (Willmott, 1997: 1339, italics added), as 
if the performance of capital functions were a programmable task. It is 
not of course. As I have already explained, it is characteristic of 
principal-agent relationships that the actions of the agent are not wholly 
specified, that they are expected to use their best judgment and creative 
capacities in the furtherance of the principals’ interests, with all the 
misperceptions of those interests, failures of judgment and infirmities of 
capacity which decision-making autonomy entails. Further, that same 
autonomy exposes agents – and through them, principals – to whatever 
‘moral hazards’ have survived the systems of incentivization and 
monitoring on the one hand, and the social production of trust of the 
other. Provided such defalcations remain the exception, there is no 
incompatibility between an agency theorization of management and 
such instances of misplaced trust. As for Burawoy’s so-called ‘reduction’ 
of managerial work to capital functions, it needs to be remembered that 
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these are economic categories, not concrete forms of managerial action. 
Once it has been recognised – as it is in Burawoy’s treatment – that 
some of management consist of the intellectual labour of production, 
there is no reduction involved in speaking of the rest of it as the 
execution of capitalist functions. 
An Unproductive Encounter with Unproductive Labour 
Willmott also objects to my use of the term ‘unproductive labour’ in 
Armstrong (1991a) to describe that part of managerial work which 
consists of agency on behalf of capital,5 though it is a little difficult to 
see why this is so, since he also allows that the distinction is 
‘heuristically and politically useful insofar as it recollects how, within 
capitalist labor processes, managers are hired to perform the 
“unproductive” task of ensuring that surplus value is pumped out of the 
collective laborer’ (Willmott, 1997: 1336). As I have already pointed out, 
I do not myself think of management in such infantile leftist terms, 
though I sympathise at this point with what I take to be Willmott’s 
general drift. For a theorist who insists that managerial work is not 
reducible to a function of capital, however (ibid.: 1339, 1343), this still 
does not seem a very intelligent thing to say. 
‘Mistakes’ apart, Willmott’s makes two objections to my 
identification of capital functions with unproductive labour (and by the 
same token, presumably, to Braverman’s also, 1974: Ch. 19). The first is 
his claim (already discussed and dismissed) that elements of 
unproductive management are actually dispersed throughout the 
‘collective worker’. The second is that it is difficult to separate the 
productive and unproductive elements in any given act of management. 
This is admitted in the general case, although there are aspects of 
managerial work which fall clearly into one category or the other. 
Attempts to unpick the weave of managerial work in this mechanical 
fashion, however, are largely beside the point. What matters about the 
work of managers is not so much the elements of which it is made up 
but the outcomes which it achieves, and these are comparatively easy to 
separate into productive and unproductive aspects. Performance 
monitoring systems, for example, can easily distinguish between the 
volume and quality of production on the one hand, and measures of 
financial performance on the other. 
In an attempt to further explicate and justify the distinction between 
the productive and unproductive aspects of management, I also sought 
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to show that the distinction between management as intellectual labour 
and management as an agency of capital is one which is recognised – 
roughly speaking – in the practitioner tendency to restrict the term 
‘management’ to the capital functions (Armstrong, 1989a: 310), and that 
this usage is an historical product of the capture of ‘management’ from 
industrial engineering by educational and consultancy interests 
(Armstrong, 1991a). On the first point, and as a proxy for many similar 
discussions I cited Koontz and O’Donnell’s (then) widely used 
textbook, thus: 
Failure to distinguish executive functions from nonmanagerial technical 
skills is another source of confusion . . The manager . . may or may not 
possess such technical skills. In his managerial capacity he is certainly 
not utilising such operating expertness [sic] . . if he [sic] can rely on 
upon and successfully use the technical skills of others, he need not 
possess a nonmanagerial skill at all. (Koontz and O’Donnell, 1968: 55) 
To this, I might have added: 
In a very real sense, the goal of every manager must be surplus . .the 
goal of managers as managers is fundamentally the same in business and 
non-business enterprises. It is also the same at every level. (ibid.: 7) 
And similar pronouncements can be found in other influential writers, 
ranging from Henri Fayol to Drucker. From these I drew the inference 
that talk of ‘management’, at least within the culture of Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism, refers not to the entirety of what managers do, but to the 
generalised task of producing, realizing and allocating surplus values 
through the control of people as distinct from any technical expertise 
and ability to organize which managers contribute to the productive 
process itself. It is in that sense, not the crude generalisation about the 
work of actual managers implicit in Willmott’s critique, that I identify 
‘management’ with unproductive labour. 
Having criticized my work for views it does not express, and for 
views which it does express but are shared by himself, Willmott feels 
able to sum up and dismiss its overall conclusion thus, ‘[a]sserting that 
managerial work forms no part of the labor process is no way to defend 
the distinctiveness of labor process theory’ (1997: 1336). Though he 
refers to my paper of 1991b, the one in which my theorization of the 
dynamics of trust within the capitalist agency relationship is set out in its 
From Bourgeois Sociology to Managerial Apologetics 
 185 
most developed form, he does so only to remark that, ‘Management 
hierarchies, as even Armstrong (1991b: 18) allows are “battlegrounds of 
mutual obstruction and ideological warfare, in which as much effort 
goes into subverting opponents as into constructive efforts on behalf of 
the principal”’ (Willmott, 1997: 1348, italics added). From Willmott’s 
form of words, the uninformed reader would assume that ‘even 
Armstrong’ referred to some leftwing bigot for whom the monolithic 
nature of capitalist management was an article of faith, albeit one 
reluctantly abandoned in the face of evidence to the contrary. In fact, 
even the title of the paper in question, ‘Contradiction and Social 
Dynamics in the Capitalist Agency Relationship’, makes it clear that the 
view of management as a conflictual plurality lies at the core of my 
theorization of the agency relationship. The quotation which Willmott 
presents as an untypical gleam of illumination actually refers to my 
summary of a spectacular illustration of intra-managerial conflict in a 
fascinating – and decidedly non-Marxist – case study of product 
championship and organizational politics by Wilson (1982). 
Arguing the Case 2: In Search of Recalcitrance 
For Willmott, it is important that ‘relations of production are practically 
accomplished through the existential media of human conduct’ (1997: 
1344). That they allow for a good deal of variation in their enactment is 
common ground. The capitalist agency relationship, as I describe it in 
Armstrong (1991b), is built on trust as well as on incentives and 
monitoring, and this implies precisely that managers bring their personal 
capabilities, perceptions and values to the business of capital 
accumulation. This, however, is not enough for Willmott, since, as we 
have seen, he objects to any suggestion that managers can be adequately 
understood as agents of capital: 
managers do not “just” operate or supervise the physical and 
organizational means of production in ways dictated by the imperatives 
of capitalism. Their materiality as human subjects also obliges them to 
struggle with the existential significance of the purposive quality of 
human consciousness and not just with its contribution to productive 
activity. (Willmott, 1997: 1354) 
In more accessible language, Willmott believes that the attitudes of 
many (most?) managers are inimical to the prioritization of capital 
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accumulation, and that these attitudes (sometimes?) influence what they 
actually do. 
Since the quotation is taken from his conclusion, it is not 
unreasonable to expect the body of his paper to marshal some 
supporting evidence. Recognising this, Willmott devotes two pages to a 
discussion of ‘Managers as (Misbehaving) agents’ (1997: 1338-1340). In 
fact, these two pages contain little evidence of managerial recalcitrance 
of any kind and none at all of refusals to act in the interests of capital 
accumulation. He quotes Braverman (1974: 151) on the existence of 
‘unbounded cynicism and revulsion’, but neglects to inform his readers 
that Braverman was speaking of workers in the cited passage, not 
managers. He castigates Burawoy (1985: 10) for his portrayal of 
managers as ‘compliant functionaries who unproblematically perform 
the task of securing and obscuring surplus value’. He argues that games 
of office politics ‘cannot be assumed to be consistent with, or fully 
functional for, the extraction of surplus’. He tells us of Hyman’s (1987) 
opinion that managers have more opportunities for misbehaviour than 
other employees. And apart from more exhortation to take note of 
existential subjectivities and so forth, that, believe it or not, is all. 
In a later section entitled ‘On the Materiality of Managerial Subjects’ 
we learn more of the managerial recalcitrance which figures so 
prominently in Willmott’s analysis. A Manufacturing Director ‘at one of 
our case study companies’ bemoans the difficulty of getting his middle 
managers to use computers (Willmott, 1997: 1347). Sir John Harvey-
Jones has a grumble about obstructive bureaucrats at ICI (ibid.: 1348), 
and in a footnote to the same page, Goffee and Scase (1986) discover 
that managers often resist changes which devalue their accumulated 
skills and knowledge. In fact, this last is highly believable, but is also 
explicable as resistance to a degradation of their positions within the 
capitalist agency relationship, as I point out in Armstrong (1991b). 
None of it, either separately or cumulatively, holds up as evidence 
for the case Willmott is trying to make. 
The strange thing is that such evidence should have been easy to 
find. Though the capitalist enterprise depends on the extraction of 
surplus value, competitive conditions permitting, it is not essential that 
the maximum amount of it should be extracted the entire time. This 
being the case, it should have been possible to find examples of small 
acts of managerial kindness performed at the expense of capital 
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accumulation. Part of the problem may be that managerial ameliorations 
of the conditions of employment at the expense of profitability have 
typically been interpreted as ‘indulgency patterns’ of the kind first 
described by Gouldner (1955). That is, they have been viewed as a 
control strategy rather than a principled protection of the workforce 
from the full impact of capital accumulation. Whether through 
ignorance, complacency or lack of competition, there are circumstances 
in which senior managers and shareholders can be placated with sub-
maximum levels of output. It then becomes possible for junior 
managers to reach an accommodation with the workforce in which 
informal concessions are traded for co-operation in achieving the 
required levels of performance. As an account of managerial motives, it 
is possible that this reading is overly cynical: whatever their efficacy in 
achieving a smoothly running workplace, it is entirely possible that 
some managers may enter these arrangements out of a genuine desire to 
treat their fellow human beings decently. 
If and where this is the case, two things need to be borne in mind. 
The first is that is that the managers who enter such arrangements with 
their workforces are not really resisting the demands of capital 
accumulation; rather they are making use of a temporary and local 
slacking of that demand in a particular way – choosing the ‘welfare 
goods’ of a pleasant working relationship over the possible career 
advantages of maximising output. The second is that ‘indulgency 
patterns’ are extremely vulnerable to changes in personnel or policies. 
This, in fact, was demonstrated in Gouldner’s own study when a new 
manager took over, determined to make his name by boosting the 
financial performance of the plant (ibid.). The implicit analogy with the 
takeover bidder suggests that this kind of erasure of indulgency patterns 
is a process general to the capitalist economy as a whole, but more 
particularly to the newly ‘impatient capitalism’ described by Sennet 
(2006). 
All this said, it is still striking that it is so difficult to find instances in 
which managers have sheltered their workers from the demands of 
profit. The reasonable conclusion, surely, is that such instances are thin 
on the ground and that Willmott’s depiction of managerial subjectivities 
and the way they act on them is broadly incorrect. 
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Arguing the Case 3: Re-Reading ChemCo 
Having made so much of the divergences between managers’ private 
values and motivations on the one hand, and the demands imposed 
upon them in the name of profitability on the other, there is something 
distinctly odd about Willmott’s violent reaction to Nichols and 
Beynon’s exploration of exactly the same moral problem in their 
‘ChemCo’ studies (Nichols and Beynon, 1977). Willmott (1997: 1349) 
picks up Nichols and Beynon’s story at the point where a plant manager 
has come across a left-wing leaflet which described managers like 
himself as ‘pigs’. The manager’s outraged reaction was, ‘I’m not a pig. I 
bloody well care about what I’m doing’ (Nichols and Beynon, 1977: 39). 
Willmott objects, first of all, to Nichols and Beynon’s interpretation 
of this outrage as a conflict between ‘personal morality and economics’ 
(ibid.: 40). ‘Keeping faith with the precepts of orthodox Marxist 
analysis’, as Willmott puts it, Nichols and Beynon have failed to 
consider the possible agency of this manager in ‘shaping and reforming 
the social relations of production’. As we have already seen, phrases of 
this kind in Willmott’s lexicon, mean something like the face-to-face 
styles of social interaction between managers and workers – habits 
rather than structures and, as such, most definitely susceptible to 
managerial agency since they are its proximate expressions. Even in this 
sense any meaningful revision of the terms on which managers and 
workers interact might prove difficult, since Willmott himself has 
previously pointed out just how limited is the scope for managers to 
neglect the priorities of capital accumulation (1997: 1333, 1335). And 
having himself commended ‘Marxian theory’ as offering a ‘penetrating 
analytical framework’ (ibid.: 1333), it is hard to understand what he 
finds objectionable in the ‘precepts of orthodox Marxian analysis’ when 
he believes himself to have encountered them in Nichols and Beynon 
(ibid.: 1349). Undeterred by these contradictions, Willmott proceeds to 
accuse Nichols and Beynon of assuming that managerial work is ‘wholly 
“structured by the needs of capital” (Nichols and Beynon, 1977, p. v)’. 
Before considering the accusation itself, notice the forty-or-so pages 
which separate the quotation taken from Nichols and Beynon’s preface 
and the passage which Willmott is currently considering (Nichols and 
Beynon, 1977: 39). Such a gap suggests that there is a cut-and-paste job 
going on. Sure enough, on Nichols and Beynon’s page xv (not v) we 
find that it is the future of both managers and workers which will be 
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‘structured by the needs of capital’, not managerial work as such. 
Naughty! 
On the next page of their book (ibid.: 40), Nichols and Beynon 
report a conversation between the same manager – the one who 
objected to the ‘pigs’ leaflet – and his engineer-in-charge. In it, the 
manager expressed concern that the seemingly interminable 
experiments in human relations which were going on in ChemCo at the 
time tended to deflect attention from the fact that ‘we are in business to 
make money’. For Nichols and Beynon, this is further evidence of the 
same conflict between personal morality and the treatment of labour as 
a commodity. They describe the manager as ‘one of those who 
hesitatingly inspect themselves for cynicism’, and provide an extended 
quotation in which he does just that, reflecting on his experiences of 
selecting people for redundancy. Despite his misgivings, the manager 
also recognises that he had ‘a job to do’ (ibid.: 40-41). 
Willmott’s reading of this passage is tortuous indeed. He first tells us 
that Nichols and Beynon interpret the exchange as ‘unambiguous 
confirmation of the plant manager’s identification of managerial work 
with making profits’, where, in fact, they have just told us that he also 
identifies it with making distasteful moral choices. Having chosen his 
ground, Willmott then takes Nichols and Beynon to task for their 
supposed failure to realise that the manager’s ‘rationalisation of his 
position’ is context-dependent – when Nichols and Beynon themselves 
have just made exactly the same point: that there is a ‘task-specification’ 
view of management in tendential conflict with a moral one. For 
Willmott, however, context-dependence does not refer to the differing 
frames of reference within which the repercussions of one’s work may 
be considered, that of personal morality and that of the ‘realities’ of 
business. For him, it is a more superficial and calculative matter of 
talking about money in the presence of one’s superior (remember that 
the manager was in conversation with his engineer-in-charge) and about 
personal morality for the benefit of ‘lefty researchers’ (Willmott, 1997: 
1350, footnote). If this last contemptible insinuation were true, we 
could indeed expect this manager, and most others for that matter, to 
act as the unproblematic agents of capital, since ‘lefty researchers’ are 
thin on the ground in most companies whereas the presence of one’s 
superiors, both in person and in the implicit form of performance 
monitoring and appraisal schemes, is more-or-less continuous. Perhaps 
realising that what he has just said conflicts with his conviction that 
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there exists the possibility of a disarticulation of managerial action from 
the dictates of capital accumulation, Willmott immediately qualifies it 
with the observation that there may not be a complete break between 
personal morality and the performance of a role. 
Having made this point – and then having unmade it too – Willmott 
kicks off in a big way. Nichols and Beynon, he thunders, are ‘blinkered 
by the framework of orthodox Marxism’ in that they ‘assume the 
existence of a stable managerial identity’ (1997: 1349).6 This, one 
observes sotto voce, is a feature of orthodox Marxism which seems to 
have escaped the notice of previous scholars. The assumption, 
continues Willmott fortissimo – wherever it comes from – leads Nichols 
and Beynon to assume the plant manager must be dissembling when he 
insist that “I bloody well care about what I’m doing”’. 
No they don’t. They say the exact opposite. It is Willmott who 
assumes that the manager must be dissembling – and then does not 
assume it (Willmott, 1997: 1350, footnote). What Nichols and Beynon 
actually say is that the manager is ‘doubtful and a little confused, even 
about what his own motives are’ (Nichols and Beynon, 1977: 40). 
Now, Willmott is a major figure in, and on some accounts, the co-
founder of, Critical Management Studies, a sub-discipline not noted for 
the clarity of its expositions. How is it that he is unable to grasp the 
literal meaning of some of the most accessible prose in the entire field 
of industrial sociology? And why, having commended a Marxian 
approach for its ‘penetrating analytic framework’ (supra) does he 
become so incensed when he believes himself to have encountered it in 
Nichols and Beynon? 
Recognising that we are in the realms of conjecture, it appears that 
Willmott needs data from ethnographic fieldwork to lend substance to 
an otherwise unconvincing argument but also needs to take issue with 
Nichols and Beynon because their findings contradict the manner in 
which he wishes to portray middle management. Elsewhere, as we have 
seen, he writes as if profitability in capitalist economies is a minority 
preoccupation, largely confined to senior executives plus a few hangers-
on, and that it is imposed by these on a largely apathetic or disaffected 
majority of managers through the machinery of performance 
monitoring, appraisal schemes and incentives (Willmott, 1997: 1348-9). 
From this point of view it was remiss of Nichols and Beynon to 
discover that Chemo’s plant managers accepted both the legitimacy of 
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profit and a personal morality which sometimes conflicts with it, and 
downright inconsiderate of them to report that on these occasions, it 
was profit which won out. These are findings which cast doubt on 
Willmott’s whole thesis – that the personal and moral commitments of 
managers may bring them into significant conflict with the demand for 
profitably. This might explain why he constructs Nichols and Beynon as 
straw men who believe that the ChemCo managers are unproblematically 
committed to profit since it enables him to disregard the (for him) 
damaging finding that the managers’ moral misgivings were practically 
inconsequential. 
Over two pages of convoluted argument, in fact, Willmott manages 
to convince himself that these managers’ declared opposition to human 
relations experimentation in the name of profit ‘may be conjectured’ 
(1997: 1351) to have been a contextually acceptable means of 
articulating a defence of their preferred way of doing things. By thus 
constructing an interpretation of the managers words in diametric 
opposition to their literal meaning, Willmott is able to pull an 
interpretive victory from the jaws of empirical defeat. As Thompson 
(2005: 372) has remarked of similar acrobatics of interpretation by 
others of the Critical Management Studies school, it is an impressive 
demonstration of the theory-dependence of data. 
Willmott’s masterful way with empirical work is again in evidence in 
his discussion of Harris’ (1987) putative replication of the ‘ChemCo’ 
studies. His first move is to select a passage from Harris in which senior 
managers express doubts about their subordinates’ commitment to the 
efficiency and profitability of their plants, claiming that it provides 
‘further evidence of managers’ “identity work”’ (Willmott, 1997: 1351). 
Not in itself it doesn’t. Willmott’s interpretation depends on two 
assumptions of his own: firstly that the senior managers concerned were 
by implication emphasising the indispensability of their own supervision 
and secondly that this was a means of reinforcing their own view of 
themselves. These things may have been so, of course, but equally they 
may not. It is just as likely that the senior managers concerned were 
expressing their exasperation at what they saw as an unnecessary 
distraction from all the other important things which senior managers 
have to do. 
Willmott then uses Harris’ material to mount yet another attack on 
‘orthodox labour process analysis’. The problem is that Harris’ book is 
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already written as an attack on labour process orthodoxy – at least as that 
is represented in the work of Nichols and Beynon (1977)7 – but it is an 
attack from a unitarist position which would reject a labour process 
approach even as Willmott seeks to ‘reconstruct’ it. Objecting to a view 
of the employment relationship as the site of conflicting interests, 
Harris prefers, as she puts it, to see the employer as the Arbeitgeber – the 
‘giver of work’. Willmott’s solution to this problem – incredibly – is to 
use Harris’ data to concoct ‘orthodox labour process’ interpretations all 
of his own and then to demonstrate their inadequacy. The material he 
chooses is Harris’ account of the junior managers’ resistance to an 
‘industrial relations strategy’ (probably the ‘New Working Arrangement’ 
described by Nichols and Beynon (1977: Ch. 7). The first of Willmott’s 
analyses makes the ‘Panglossian assumption’ that whatever managers do 
will turn out to be to the ultimate benefit of capital. The second 
assumes that it would have done so had the design of the scheme taken 
into account the reactions of workers and junior managers. Having 
himself set up both of these feeble efforts, Willmott has no difficulty in 
knocking them down again. 
Arguing Against the Case 
Whereas Willmott cannot discover, or cannot convincingly re-work, 
evidence which will support of his imputations of managerial resistance, 
I can produce some which shows managers reacting to 
proletarianisation, both of position and function, by intensifying the 
exploitative pressures on their workers. The case material comes from 
four months’ full-time observational fieldwork which I performed in a 
medium-sized shoe factory in 1978. It has been previously reported in 
Armstrong, Goodman and Hyman (1981) and Armstrong (1983, 
1989b). 
The managers concerned were the first-line supervisors, badly paid 
and routinely abused by the production manager whenever the 
operatives which they supervised were discovered to be waiting for 
work or otherwise idle. Added to this proletarianisation of condition (cf. 
Crompton, 1979), they had also suffered a proletarianisation of function 
in that they could only discharge their responsibility for maintaining the 
flow of production by searching for the materials which would keep 
their operatives occupied and personally hauling these materials into 
position. Far from reacting to this ‘double proletarianisation’ (ibid.) by 
resisting the pressure to make profits or by making common cause with 
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their operatives, however, these supervisors repeatedly clashed with 
them over the rates to be paid in the event of work stoppages. 
According to the national agreement between the trade union and 
the employers’ association, various standby hourly rates were supposed 
to be paid in the event of stoppages. Wages thus paid out, for which 
there was no corresponding production, were counted as departmental 
‘losses’ for which the supervisors were held responsible. In extreme 
cases, the supervisors concerned would have to account for these losses 
in an inquisition chaired by the universally-feared production manager. 
In order to avoid this, they would go to extraordinary lengths to avoid 
paying the standby rates. The favoured tactic was to assign 
responsibility for the stoppage to the operatives themselves, since the 
agreement stipulated that the standby rate applied only to stoppages 
outside the operatives’ control. Since this tended to provoke 
confrontation, the less assertive of the supervisors would do this 
surreptitiously in the hope that the discrepancy in the operatives’ pay 
packets in a fortnight’s time would go unnoticed. The female 
supervisors (of female workers) were more confrontational. One of 
them went so far as to thrust a brush into the hands of any stopped 
pieceworker, refusing to authorise a standby payment on the grounds 
that ‘you can’t be stopped because there’s always work to do in a 
factory’. This author of this particular syllogism was said to ‘pay you as 
if it was her own money’. 
In summary – and there was much more – the rancour which 
existed between the supervisors and their operatives was palpable, bitter 
and clearly related to the functions which the supervisors were 
supposed to perform for capital. Spoken of by senior management as an 
‘unproductive’ cost, their situation was precarious. They could only 
justify their position, and so hang onto the little they had, by 
demonstrably playing what part they could in maximising the ratio of 
output to wage costs – the rate of exploitation in Marxist terms. In 
other words, they reacted to the degradation of their position in the 
capitalist agency relationship – and the immiseration of condition which 
went with it – by hanging onto that position as best they could. 
This, it will doubtless be objected, was just one factory, was a 
factory observed thirty years ago, and observed into the bargain by the 
labour process fundamentalist ‘even Armstrong’. It is, on the other 
hand, evidence, and it is evidence against a belief in favour of which 
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Willmott is able to produce none: the belief that managers react to a 
degradation of their position by resisting the demands of capital. 
It is also arguable that similar processes have occurred at the 
collective level. During the decline of collective bargaining which took 
place in the early 1980s, personnel managers, as many of them still 
styled themselves, did not react to the threat to their livelihoods with a 
collective disaffection which expressed itself in an attempt to shield 
workers from the pressures of capital accumulation. Re-branded as 
human resource managers and their professional organization as the 
Institute of Personnel and Development, they sought instead to restore 
their position within the global function of capital by finding new ways 
of contributing to profitability, achieving this principally by annexing 
and extending the training functions previously carried out by line 
managers. 
Concerning subjectivities, there may also be lessons to be learnt 
from the conduct of the production manager who featured in the 
foregoing account. Notorious as a bully, his most recollected exploit 
was to terrorise the workers in the factory’s largest department by 
smashing up the chairs which they had installed in their toilet for the 
purpose of enjoying a quiet smoke. More routinely encountered during 
this period of fieldwork was the managerial saying ‘In this job you can 
be a bastard or a bloody bastard’ – a bloody bastard being one who is in 
the habit of adding gratuitously inflicted deprivations and humiliation to 
the routine pressures of capital accumulation (see also Nichols and 
Beynon, 1977: 34). That ‘bloody bastards’ are quite commonly the 
product of the search for meaning and identity in managerial work is 
suggested by the substantial literature on bullying in the workplace (e.g. 
Einarsen, Hoel, Zapf and Cooper, 2002), a literature which includes 
surveys which indicate that it is widespread (I.P.D., 1996). Insofar as 
this is the case, the hidden injuries of capitalist management may lie not 
only in the habitual suppression of the decent impulse in the 
furtherance of capital accumulation but also in the seepage of the 
delegated power attached to the ownership of the means of production 
into the psychology of the procedural sadist and the petty tyrant 
(Ashforth, 1994).8 
Concluding Remarks 
First, the procedural issues. Reading Willmott on the sources from 
which he constructs his theories, one is struck by the virtual absence of 
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unqualified approval.9 There are always ‘failures’ to report, always the 
‘unfortunately’ or ‘however’ which prefaces the ‘deeper reflections’, 
‘more adequate appreciations’ or ‘fuller theorizations’ which are 
required, almost invariably on the topic of subjectivities or identities. 
Reading these disquisitions as closely as has been required for the 
production of this critique, one is also struck by how often Willmott’s 
own readings turn out to be at best careless and at worst unscrupulous, 
with most of them somewhere in between. As Friedman (2004) has 
pointed out, positions from which Willmott, and sometimes his co-
authors, wish to express their differences are subject to various forms of 
‘strawmanning’, the most blatant of which involves the appropriation of 
an author’s core ideas and their representation as the critics’ own 
corrections of that author. Such is the case with my own thinking on 
intra-management competition within the global function of capital. 
Quotations are lifted out of context, truncated so as to distort their 
meaning and sometimes juxtaposed with others so as to suggest a 
continuous flow of thought when they actually occur in remote and 
quite different contexts – all of this in a manner which recalls nothing 
so much as the black arts of the blurb-writer. Casual forms of words 
which are quite peripheral to the main thrust of an author’s argument 
are exhibited as if they were major position statements, the failings of 
which then testify to the importance of the critic’s work of intellectual 
purgation. Such is the case with Burawoy’s summation of management 
as concerned with ‘co-operation and surplus’ in a participant 
observation study which was contextually limited to the shopfloor of a 
machine shop.  
The empirical evidence mustered by Willmott in support of his 
belief in the ubiquity of middle management resistance and the 
centrality of a search for existential significance is treated no better. 
Classic ethnographies of the workplace and elsewhere are subjected to a 
series of ‘reinterpretations’, in every one of which Willmott accuses the 
authors of misreading their own data and into which he projects his 
own preoccupations with subjectivity and identity by way of correction. 
Much of Willmott’s manner – the misreadings, the opacity of 
expression and the pile-up of qualifications which teeter on the edge of 
self-contradiction and sometimes topple into it – stems from the logical 
impossibility of the position which he is trying to take up. He objects to 
bourgeois pluralism because it does not recognise the primacy of the 
capitalist social relations of production, but also to what he calls 
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‘orthodox labour process analysis’ which does. As far as one can tell, 
since he does not name any of its practitioners, this orthodoxy appears 
to be his own invention. This being the case, one can only reconstruct it 
from the authors criticised (say) in Willmott (1990; 1997) and on that 
basis deduce that that its only common features are a disregard of 
existential subjectivities and a belief that managerial capitalism is still a 
form of capitalism. Since bourgeois pluralism is simply the negation of 
this latter position – coinciding in that respect with what Nichols (1969) 
called ‘non-sectional’ managerialism, there is simply no space between 
the two positions. Either the capitalist social relations of production are 
the primary context of managerial behaviour or they are not. 
Willmott’s response to this logical impasse is to try to create such a 
space by constructing a ‘labour process orthodoxy’ which asserts that 
managers do nothing but instantiate and maintain the capitalist social 
relations of production. This probably explains why he represents a few 
chance remarks by Burawoy and more extended passages from my own 
work as arguing just that. Thus hamstrung, ‘labour process orthodoxy’ 
can indeed offer no explanation of the very obvious fact that (most) 
managerial work involves more than a performance of the functions of 
capital, a deficiency which leaves the theory thus disabled unable to 
compete with the satisficing of stakeholder interests posited by 
bourgeois pluralism. It is into that manufactured aporia that Willmott 
inserts his theory of managerial subjectivities. By positing that these 
incline managers to react against the prioritization of capital 
accumulation he can simultaneously claim to recognise the primacy of 
the capitalist social relations of production and account for the fact that 
managers do other things besides execute the functions of capital. The 
problem, of course, is that such a theory relies on the improbable 
assumption (and Willmott presents no evidence that it is anything more) 
that most managers (and Willmott always writes of them in general 
terms) react to organizational controls by rejecting the purpose behind 
them. 
Given that Willmott presents this theory of managerial contrariness 
as a reconstructed labour process approach, one of its extraordinary 
features is precisely its neglect of the labour process. Managers do other 
things besides execute the functions of capital not because their 
subjectivities so incline them – or not in the first instance – but because 
they must first ensure that use-values are produced. Without these there 
can be no exchange values, no surplus of those exchange values over 
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the values of the inputs which went into them and hence nothing for 
capital to appropriate realise and allocate. The problem for (many) 
managers is that they must contribute to the co-operative division of 
labour required in the production of use-values and simultaneously 
ensure that the surplus value thus created goes to capital. The moral 
dilemmas described by Nichols and Beynon (1977) amongst others 
stem from the resulting conflict between the psychological conditions 
of co-operation and the pressures upon managers ‘at the end of the day’ 
to treat labour as a commodity. As compared to the theorization of 
subjectivities offered by Willmott, a very traditional theory of this kind – 
which would be my own view of what an labour process orthodoxy 
would look like – has the merit of locating the existential anxieties 
experienced by (some) managers in the fact of their general conformity 
to the pressures upon them rather than in a general – and empirically 
elusive – rebellion. 
Finally, a comment may be in order on the quasi-existentialist10 
preoccupations which run through the entire Knights-Willmott corpus 
of writings on the labour process: the unwavering assumption that 
managers, workers and everyone else for that matter, are engaged in 
projects of self-exploration variously described as ‘a struggle with the 
existential significance of the purposive quality of human consciousness’ 
(Willmott, 1997: 1354), the pursuit of ‘elevated identity’ (Knights, 1990: 
312) or a search for a ‘sense of order in which identity is “secure”’ 
(Knights and Willmott, 1985: 33). Since this process (these processes?) 
seem to have been missed in every one of the ethnographic studies 
reviewed by Willmott and his co-authors, the weight of evidence, surely, 
is that they are either insignificant in most cases, or even non-existent. 
It is not hard to see why this might be the case. From Dubin’s 
(1956) discovery that work, for most workers, is not a ‘central life 
interest’ to Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer and Platt’s (1968) 
identification of ‘instrumental privatization’ to Gouldner’s (1969) 
reflections on the ‘unemployed self’, alienated labour was a major theme 
of industrial sociology from the 1950s to the late 1970s, meaning that 
work for most people is precisely not an expression of the ‘purposive 
quality of human consciousness’. As C. Wright Mills memorably put it, 
‘Each day men [sic] sell little pieces of themselves in order to buy them 
back each night and weekend with the coin of fun’ (Mills, 1956: 237). 
Mills’ observation has since been expanded into a major theme of the 
sociology of the 1980s onwards: that identities in late capitalism are 
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mostly constructed not through work but in the sphere of consumption 
and constructed there through a bricolage of commercially available 
significations. du Gay (1996) has even re-imported this theme back into 
the workplace, arguing that identities are formed therein, not by 
reflection on the involvement of the individual in the labour process but 
by the consumption of a discourse of enterprise which bears only the 
most tenuous connection with it. Though du Gay’s particular argument 
and evidence are ultimately unconvincing (Armstrong, 2001), they do 
suggest that the experience of the labour process for many is so void of 
content that almost any script can be written onto it. 
One of the odd things about the Knights-Willmott treatment of 
identity is that they both recognise the prevalence of alienated labour – 
en passant at least – yet still expect it to be the subject of existential 
ratiocination. For example, Knights (1990: 312) observes that the raw 
materials of ‘elevated identity’ are not commonly available to shopfloor 
workers whilst Willmott argues that the primary orientation of most 
managers ‘is likely to be to their careers, their families and perhaps to 
their “profession”’ (1997: 1335, 1338), a fairly clear statement of 
instrumental privatization as it relates to managers, albeit one which is 
largely untested. 
Obviously, the prevalence of alienated labour does not mean that 
there is no fulfilling work to be found in capitalist societies. Reality is 
always messier than theory and capitalist societies are never capitalist in 
every nook and cranny. Notwithstanding Willmott’s conjectures on the 
effects of organizational control systems, there may be many middle 
and junior managers for whom work is a major means of self-
expression, and we know for a fact that there are a few for whom that 
involves the bullying of subordinates. In such cases we could indeed 
expect work to figure prominently in the process of identity formation, 
though not in the contrarian manner envisaged by Willmott. Where 
alienation prevails, on the other hand, we would not. 
It is as well to remember, perhaps, that academia – for some at least 
– is one of the enclaves of expressive possibility which have so far 
resisted the alienating tendencies of capitalist rationalisation. It is from 
academia that researchers such as Willmott and I observe the work of 
those who are not so privileged, sometimes at first hand but often 
through the reports of other fieldworkers, and it is back to academia 
that we render our accounts. As with any translation between two forms 
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of life there are pitfalls, one of which is that the method of verstehen as 
applied to the social sciences can so easily morph into a projection of 
one’s own preoccupations into the interpretation of social action. 
Specifically, the self-absorption of reflective intellectuals, whose 
preoccupation with their own identities depends on a degree of 
insulation from the urgencies of ‘impatient capitalism’ (Sennett, 2006), 
cannot be assumed to be shared by managers and workers who are not. 
To proceed otherwise, surely, is to slip back into a ‘bourgeois sociology’, 
the pole of repulsion from which Willmott began. 
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1 Willmott repeatedly refers to these methodological devices as ‘stratagems’, a 
word which carries overtones of trickery or deception, as compared to 
‘strategy’ (e.g. Willmott, 1997: 1340-2). 
2 As Thompson (1989) points out, Giddens himself has recognised something 
of this, albeit as a difference in the levels of abstraction rather than 
embeddedness. Whilst the two certainly connect in that more deeply 
embedded structures are also more abstract in the sense that they are capable 
of articulation in many surface forms, the term abstraction, suggesting as it 
does, a difference only in the way these structures must be apprehended, fails 
to capture the idea that the more ‘abstract’ are also less susceptible to change. 
Layder (1994: 138-9) has made substantially the same point, noting that 
Giddens’ conception of social structure as ‘rules and resources’ simply omits 
all those features of a social formation which are not articulated as 
vocabularies of motive.  
  Thompson also argues that Giddens has not so far explained how his 
theory of structuration might apply to the instantiation and reproduction of 
the more ‘abstract’ structures, a point not adequately dealt with in Giddens’ 
(1989) reply to his critics. Whether something like the process described in the 
main text might do the trick is as yet an open question of course. 
3 Readers are entitled to a frank account of a writer’s motives. Writers, though, 
are entitled to offer one only to those readers who are conscientious enough 
to truffle through the footnotes. It is here, therefore, that I confess that an 
irritation at Wilmott’s treatment of my work is a supplementary motive for 
the production of this chapter. 
4 In its context, this summary form of words is Burawoy’s description of the 
particular management interest in the game of ‘making out’ (the workers’ 
practice of making the maximum possible bonus allowed by the incentive 
payment system). Whatever else managers may do, it is reasonable to suppose 
that their particular interest in a payment system is to do with its efficacy as a 
means of extracting surplus value. That Burawoy points this out tells us 
nothing about his view of other aspects of management work and Willmott is 





the generality of managerial work, his ‘co-operation and surplus’ need not 
refer to capital functions at all. Work in any social formation must yield a 
surplus and if management exists at all, it must be its primary task to see that 
it does so. Capitalism is not distinguished by the production of surplus value 
but by the fact that the surplus goes to capital. 
5 On this there is a tale to tell, and it is one which says as much about the 
quality of the editing which has gone into the successive volumes from the 
Labour Process Conferences as it does about my own failings as a theorist. 
On being told by one of the editors of the 1991 volume that they wished to 
include my paper, I intimated that I wished to reconsider my remarks on 
unproductive labour in the light of comments made at the conference. The 
reply was as illuminating as it was succinct, ‘Too late mate’. Since the work 
was published under my name, nevertheless, I make what defence I can in the 
main text. 
6 So intent is Willmott on taking a swipe at Nichols and Beynon that he fails to 
notice that his backswing takes an inadvertent hack at his own theory. If, as 
he maintains, ‘identity’ is context-dependent, it is difficult to see how it differs 
from ‘rôle’ and also hard to see how it might have any explanatory value 
independent of the expectations which attach to a rôle. 
7 Since Willmott sees fit to recall my ‘unequivocally hostile critique’ of Harris’ 
work at the 1988 Labour Process Conference (Willmott, 1997: 1351, 
footnote) it is as well to set the record straight. Harris’ work was presented as 
a replication and refutation of Nichols and Beynon (1977). It was based on an 
ethnographic study of some of the same plants studied by Nichols and 
Beynon and is addressed throughout to the interpretations made in that study. 
In fact Nichols and Beynon (1977) is by far the most frequently cited work of 
industrial sociology referred to in Harris’ book, being mentioned on almost 
half of Harris’ pages and always in unequivocally hostile terms. Since I was 
one of the research assistants employed on Nichols and Beynon’s research, 
the ‘critique’ to which Willmott refers was actually a reply to Harris’ own 
criticisms and should have been evaluated as such. 
8 Blake Ashforth is an honest man. Having produced a widely-quoted paper on 
the subject of petty tyranny he subjected the syndrome to empirical 
investigation thirteen years later. Much less widely quoted, this second paper 
reported that the construct was actually quite rare, at least as he 
operationalised it (Ashforth, 2007). 
9 Thompson and Smith (2000) have commented on this aspect of Willmott’s 
writing, albeit from a slightly different point of view: ‘All contributors are 
picked over to see whether they matched the appropriate analytical criteria or 
demonstrated the favourite sins of post-structuralism: determinism, 
essentialism and dualism.’ 
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10 Willmott (1990: 372) has commented on the ‘baggage’ carried by the 
terminology of existentialism. If this is a complaint, it is a disingenuous one 
coming from an author who has used it with such consistency. Words are the 
medium of academic production and it is a basic competence that they should 
be handled with an adequate grasp of their connotations. 
 
